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Abstract 
Distribution plays a key role in telecommunication and computing systems today. It 
has become a necessity as a result of deregulation and anti-trust legislation, which has 
forced businesses to move from centralised, monolithic systems to distributed systems 
with the separation of applications and provisioning technologies, such as the service 
and transportation layers in the Internet. The need for reliability and recovery requires 
systems to use replication and secondary backup systems such as those used in e-
commerce. 
There are consequences to distribution. It results in systems being implemented in 
heterogeneous environment; it requires systems to be scalable; it results in some loss 
of control and so this contributes to the increased security issues that result from 
distribution. Each of these issues has to be dealt with. A distributed processing 
environment (DPE) is middleware that allows heterogeneous environments to operate 
in a homogeneous manner. Scalability can be addressed by using object-oriented 
technology to distribute functionality. Security is more difficult to address because it 
requires the creation of a distributed trusted environment. 
The problem with security in a DPE currently is that it is treated as an adjunct service, 
i.e. and after-thought that is the last thing added to the system. As a result, it is not 
pervasive and therefore is unable to fully support the other DPE services. DPE 
security needs to provide the five basic security services, authentication, access 
control, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation, in a distributed environment, 
while ensuring simple and usable administration. 
The research, detailed in this thesis, starts by highlighting the inadequacies of the 
existing DPE and its services. It argues that a new management structure was 
introduced that provides greater flexibility and configurability, while promoting 
mechanism and service independence. A new secure interoperability framework was 
introduced which provides the ability to negotiate common mechanism and service 
level configurations. New facilities were added to the non-repudiation and audit 
services. 
The research has shown that all services should be security-aware, and therefore 
would able to interact with the Enhanced Security Service in order to provide a more 
secure environment within a DPE. As a proof of concept, the Trader service was 
selected. Its security limitations were examined, new security behaviour policies 
proposed and it was then implemented as a Security-aware Trader, which could 
counteract the existing security limitations. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Service Engineering and Security 
Computers are pervasive throughout the telecommunications industry. They are 
utilised by the core infrastructure, e.g. in switches, by the software applications 
operating and controlling the infrastructure, e.g. Intelligent Networks combine these 
technologies to create a means of separating switching and logic functions in order to 
build a more flexible distributed architecture for service provisioning. The Internet 
provides another illustration of how distributed computer systems are combined with 
an underlying telecommunication network. 
Object-Oriented technologies are also playing a key role in integrating heterogeneous 
systems across the globe. E-commerce companies use it to wrap legacy applications 
and make them available to an Internet audience. Telecommunication companies use 
distributed object systems to build their Telecommunication Management Networks 
(TMN), and so manage their vast telephone networks. Such systems need to be 
supported. This is where the concept of Integrated Service Engineering (ISE) 
emerges. ISE supports the development, deployment and provisioning of services. It 
is accomplished through the use of a Service Machine, a key component of which is 
the Distributed Processing Environment (DPE). The DPE provides an object bus and 
a set of supporting services, which allow distributed objects to be created, activated, 
operated and destroyed in a stable and consistent environment. Future modifications 
and technology innovations may make it even more difficult to distinguish between 
computer and telecommunication technologies. Therefore ISE. which acts as the 
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standard providing all these services, needs to cope with the new demands of this 
environment. 
On May 4, 2000, the " I L O V E Y O U " worm, also known as the "Love Bug", 
bombarded email systems around the world [1]. Users received an email asking them 
to check the attached "Love Letter". The attachment was a script that contained the 
payload. If the attachment was opened the computer was infected. The "Love Bug" 
changed registry settings so that it would be run every time the computer was 
rebooted and sent copies of itself to everyone listed in the user's address book. It also 
destroyed multimedia files, such as JPEGs and MP3s. It is estimated that over two-
thirds of the Fortune 500 Companies were affected at a cost of $6.7 billion [2, 3]. 
Although the "Love Bug" was a computer worm, it required the underlying 
telecommunication network to allow the worm infect on a global scale. 
Security has always been an issue. It has been used by governments and private 
individuals to protect resources they deemed valuable and therefore at risk. 
Cryptography, the science of hiding information from unwanted eavesdroppers, has a 
long history [4]. While it was realised that security was required in 
telecommunications and computing when they were two distinct technologies, 
distributed systems suffer from a new set of security problems. The system itself is 
distributed and therefore is not necessarily under the complete control of the users. 
For example, if you are sending an email, it may pass over several insecure networks 
before reaching its destination. The distribution also results in increased access to the 
system, i.e. it provides more points of vulnerability for attack. While security on this 
new media was not originally a primary concern, viruses such as the "Love Bug" have 
heightened security awareness. Businesses, governments and individuals are now 
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realising that they are at risk and must protect themselves and their assets in this 
technology arena. 
Computer telecommunications are subject to serious threats. These threats can happen 
within any part of society - civilian or government, and can have far reaching even 
global consequences. ISE is a key component, as it facilitates the provisioning of 
services in this distributed environment. By its very nature, this environment is more 
vulnerable and security is seen as the single most important design criteria in many 
systems today [5]. Therefore ISE must deal with security and all the problems it 
presents. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
The aim of this research is to investigate and facilitate the security of DPEs. The 
research recognises the importance of security in distributed systems in e-commerce 
and telecommunications environments. The study has five objectives. 
1. Understand the DPE and its security requirements: The study needs to 
understand DPEs, define the security requirements of distributed systems and 
identify any requirements that are particular to the ISE environment. Through 
analysis of the State of the Art in ISE it should be possible to identify those 
areas of the requirements that need to be addressed using current and novel 
security techniques. 
2. Define a framework for DPE security: The research needs to define a new 
security framework for DPEs. This framework needs to address all the of the 
reqirements defined in objective I . 
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3. Assess how D P E security is maintained across a heterogeneous 
environment: The framework needs to ensure that it preserves security in a 
fully distributed heterogeneous environment. It must be able to work on and 
across multiple hardware platforms. It needs to be able to inieroperaie across 
multiple security domains, where different security policies and mechanisms 
are in operation. 
4. Assess the impact of D P E security across all services: DPEs also provide a 
set of distributed services to support distributed objects. The research wil l 
assess how secure these services are and whether the new Security Framework 
can adequately protect them. 
5. Assess practical implementation and veriFication of D P E security 
framework: The research wil l be verified by mapping it to a DPE 
specification and then implementing the Security Framework, verification wil l 
be based on this implementation. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis has been structured so that most of the background information (mainly the 
state of the art survey work) is confined to the initial chapters. 
Chapter 1 - Introduction - This provides an introduction to the research project 
objectives and how they were accomplished. 
Chapter 2 - Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed Processing 
Environments - This chapter discusses the general principles applied in ISE Service 
Machines and their key component, the DPE. Current DPE architectures are 
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described, including a detailed description of one service, the Trading service, which 
is used in a later chapter to identify service-related issues. 
Chapter 3 - Logical Security in Distributed Systems - The general principles of 
security are discussed, along with security issues that are specific to distributed 
systems. 
Chapter 4 - Requirements for a new Framework for D P E Security - The 
requirements of DPE security are analysed and, as a result, a new set of DPE security 
requirements are defined. The current problems in DPE security are then identified, 
and this directed the recognition of the need for a new security framework, which is 
then presented to address these issues. 
Chapter 5 - Secure Interoperability in a D P E - The Secure Interoperability Service 
is defined in this chapter. Although it is a key component of the new Security 
Framework, the substantial work involved in designing this service requires a separate 
chapter to fully consider the new features, 
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Chapter 6 - Security-Aware D P E Services - This chapter investigates how the DPE 
security service interacts with other DPE services to see i f there are any security 
issues. The Trading service was selected for a detailed analysis of the topic. On 
finding numerous security problems, a new Security-Aware Trader is then proposed 
and defined to overcome the existing vulnerabilities. 
Chapter 7 - Verification of the New Framework - The research provides a proof of 
concept by mapping the new Security Framework to a particular DPE specification, 
namely the Object Management Group's (OMG) Common Object Request Broker 
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Architecture (CORBA). This chapter describes how this was achieved, the issues that 
were discovered and how they were addressed. 
Chapter 8 - D P E Security Prototype - This chapter describes the implementation of 
a prototype of the proof of concept defined above, in order to prove that it is viable in 
practice. Although an implementation proves that the research can be constructed, 
other verification work is required to ensure that it is feasible in a real-world scenario. 
This chapter provides performance-modelling data and evaluates the future trends of 
DPEs, indicating where this research can play a part. 
Chapter 9 - Conclusion - The final chapter assesses the research and whether the 
objectives were successfully met. It defines future work in the DPE security arena that 
should be considered. 
A number of appendices are also included, which provide a range of supporting 
materials, including published papers. 
2. Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed 
Processing Environments 
2.1 Introduction 
Integrated Service Engineering (ISE) considers the problem of service development, 
deployment and provision in today's distributed heterogeneous telecommunications 
environment. A service machine is the technology, both hardware and software, used 
in provisioning and deploying these services. A key component of the ISE service 
machine is the Distributed Processing Environment (DPE), which helps support the 
lifecycle of these objects and allows them to inter-operate across heterogeneous 
operating systems, networks, languages, applications, tools, and multi-vendor 
hardware [6]. 
ISE initially began in the realms of the telecommunications world, but with the 
emergence of computing technologies such as integrated circuits in the 1960's, the 
telecommunication providers began to realise they could harness the technology to 
enhance their own networks and services. The main influences to this work were 
Intelligent Networks (IN) and Open Distributed Processing (ODP). By using both of 
these technologies, telecommunication providers could increase their services and 
fully utilise the existing infrastructure resources. Another influential computing 
technology was object-orientation. This was seen as another very useful technology in 
the telecommunications environment. With deregulation impending, the network 
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providers would be forced into interoperability and would have to be able to provide 
new services quickly and efficiently i f they were to remain competitive. 
ISE did not remain solely in the telecommunication sphere. The Internet, which 
utilises existing telecommunications networks, is a strong user of ISE standards. It too 
is a distributed system that requires flexible implementation independent provisioning 
of services, even though the services are of a different nature to the ISE originators 
(e.g. e-commerce). Many businesses are interested in ISE because it promotes 
heterogeneous interoperability, and so allows them to take advantage of Internet 
technologies to access their legacy systems. This chapter wi l l now look an ISE DPE 
and its supporting principles. 
2.2 Influential Technologies in ISE 
The areas that most significantly influenced in ISE were ODP and object-orientation, 
the relevant principles of which are examined in the following sub-sections. 
2.2.1 Open Distributed Processing 
All distributed processing, be it object-oriented or not, is based on the work of the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO). The following is a definition of a 
distributed processing "ideal": 
"Within a permissible domain of interest, anyone should be able to access and use 
any resource at any location and at any time, with only the desired knowledge of 
the underiying infrastructure, and with a response time acceptable for the required 
purpose" [7]. 
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The ISO works on standardisation in Open Distributed Processing (ODP). It has 
developed a framework (or reference model) called the Basic Reference Model of 
ODP (RM-ODP) [8]. It specifies an architecture that integrates support for 
distribution, interoperability and portability. Fundamental to the RM-ODP is the 
notion that distributed processing systems can be studied and described from several 
viewpoints. Each viewpoint represents a different abstraction of a distributed system 
[9]. The viewpoints are as follows [10]: 
• Enterprise: directed to the needs of system users, it provides a view of how 
the information system is placed and used within an enterprise; 
• Information: directed to the needs of information managers, engineers and 
analysts, it provides an information model with a view covering information 
sources and sinks, and the flows between them; 
• Computational: directed to the needs of application designers, it provides a 
view on how information processing facilities, functionally or logically, 
perform the information processing tasks; 
• Engineering: directed to the needs of system and communication designers, it 
provides a view of the distributed mechanisms and the various transparencies 
needed to support distribution; 
• Technology: directed to the needs of programmers, system maintainers and 
system managers, it provides a view of the components and links that are used 
to build a distributed system. 
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Distributed systems are capable of offering substantial benefits to their users. The key 
characteristics have been identified as follows [11]: 
• Resource sharing, which may relate to items of data, software components 
(this includes distributed objects) or hardware components. 
• Openness is the requirement for the availability of well-defined interfaces to 
resource managers. 
• Concurrency brings the benefit of higher performance. 
• Scalability has been a dominant concern in distributed systems. The 
replication of data and the distribution of load between servers are the key 
techniques that are used to address it. 
• Fault tolerance can be addressed more efficiently in distributed systems than 
in more centralised system architectures, e.g. hardware redundancy and 
recovery from hardware and software failures, 
• Transparency addresses the need of users and application programmers to 
perceive a collection of networked computers as an integrated system hiding 
the distributed nature of the resources used to perform the user's task. 
2.2.2 Object-Orientation 
Another key area for ISE, which has influences in both IN and ODP, is Object-
Orientation ( 0 0 ) . OO is the organisation of software as a collection of discrete 
objects that incorporate data structure and behaviour. 0 0 supporters believe that it 
promotes future reuse and reduces errors and maintenance [12]. The distributed 
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processing community has also adopted it because it hides implementation details -
an important issue in a distributed environment. 
The key 0 0 principles are as follows [11]: 
• Object: a piece of code that owns Attributes (data values) and provides 
services through Methods (also called functions or operations). 
• Classes: a collection of like objects make up a class (sometimes called a type). 
A class acts as a template that describes the behaviour of a set of objects. 
Therefore objects are actually run-time instances of a class. 
• Encapsulation: hides the internal implementation details of an object from 
other objects. An object can publish a public interface that defines how other 
objects can interact with it, while still keeping the implementation private. 
• Polymorphism: allows the same method to do different things. Depending on 
the type of object, the method wil l produce a different effect/action. 
• Inheritance: allows a new child class to be created from an existing class. The 
subclass or derived class inherits the methods and data structure of its parent 
class, and can then add its own methods and data structures, without affecting 
the parent. This promotes savings in code and simplifies the overall 
understanding required within a system. 
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2.3 Telecommunications Information Networking 
Architecture 
The Telecommunications Information Networking Architecture Consortium (TINA-
C) is a consortium of about 40 communications companies, computer and network 
equipment vendors. TINA-C defined the de facto standard Telecommunication 
Information Networking Architecture (TINA), based on Bellcore's original INA, 
which hoped to guarantee interoperability between information networks designed 
using the architecture by defining a set of principles and concepts for the 
specification, design, implementation, deployment, execution, and operation of 
software for telecommunication systems. Telecom systems are complex; TINA breaks 
them down into manageable units through logical/functional partitions and 
separations [13]. 
TINA has a business model [14], which describes the stakeholders and how they 
interact in the TINA environment. Consumers buy services from Retailers. However, 
the service is actually provided by Third Party Service Providers, while connectivity 
streams are supplied by Connectivity Providers. Brokers act like a telephone 
directory, and allow stakeholders to obtain references to other providers. 
The following sub-sections wil l outline the TINA overall architecture, and its relevant 
constituents. 
2.3.1 The Overall Architecture 
The overall architecture was defined as follows (and is depicted in figure 2-1 below 
[15]): 
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• Service Architecture: design, specification, implementation and management 
of services; 
• Network Architecture: design, specification, implementation and 
management of the transport network; 
• Management Architecture: design, specification and implementation of the 
software systems to manage services and resources; 
• Computing Architecture: design, build and distribute software and the 
supporting software environment. 
/ Overall ^ 
\ ^ Architeaure J 
Service \ ( Network ^ / M a n a g e m e n t ^ Computing A 
Architeccure y Architecture y \^ Architecture J \^ Architeaure J 
( Session Subscription ^ Network ^ Conf igurat ion^ Fauh \ f D P E ^ 
Model Model y VResource Model/ \^ Mangement y \ ^ Managementy \^ Architeaure y 
Figure 2-1 TINA Overall Architecture 
The *Basic Separation Architecture' [16] is one of the key principles in TINA-C. It 
states that there are computing separations between different layers of software. The 
architecture is made up of a collection of interconnected computing nodes (see figure 
2-2 below). The lowest level of a node is the hardware. Above this the Native 
Computing and Communications Environment (NCCE) is found. This is made up of 
the operating systems for the local hardware. The NCCE provides a type of 
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transparency, as the Distributed Processing Environment (DPE) is unaware of die 
hardware and operating systems used. The DPE is sub-divided into the DPE Bottom 
and the DPE surface. The DPE Bottom offers services such as trading which are 
available on every node, while the DPE surface offers other services to all nodes but 
they wil l only be resident on certain nodes. The complete DPE handles distributed 
processing and provides transparency between the nodes and the telecommunication 
applications, which exist on the highest level. 
TINA Applications 
DPE Surface 
DPE Bottom ^ Inter-DPE ^1 DPE Bottom 
NCCE 
Hardware 
Interface 
Ngtworh 
NCCE 
Interconnections 
Hardware 
Nddel Node 2 
Figure 2-2 Structure of TINA system 
TINA was structured in this way to provide true independence (i.e. technology 
independence and portability) as it states that non-TINA DPEs can be part of the 
system. This also implies that federation with the non-TINA systems should be 
possible. 
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Within the TINA application layer of this architecture there is further layering, based 
on the Telecommunication Management Network (TMN) [17, 18] layers. They are 
defined as follows: 
• Element Layer: populated by objects that represent atomic units of physical 
or logical resources, defined for allocation control, usage and management 
purposes; 
• Resource Layer: .populated by objects that maintain, view and manipulate 
collections of elements and their relationships (it provides the service layer 
with an abstracted view of the elements); 
• Service Layer: populated by objects involved in provision of services to 
stakeholders; objects can be service-specific or service-independent. 
From this Overall Architecture, the Networking Architecture is considered outside the 
scope of this research and so wil l not be presented in any further detail. The Service, 
Computing and Management Architectures all have some relevance to the work and 
are now considered in more detail. 
2.3.2 The Service Architecture 
The traditional concept of a call in telecommunications is substituted by the more 
flexible concept of a session. A session represents the information used by all 
processes involved in the provision of a service [19]. For example, in a 
videoconference the information about connections, charging and user profiles may 
change during the conference as participants join and leave. The session helps keep 
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such information coherent throughout the conference. Sessions are not just for 
complex services, and can represent something as simple as a web-search. The session 
can be further refined into access, service usage and communications separations, see 
figure 2-3 [15] below. 
User Domain Provider Domain ii User Domain 
Access Session ^ ^^^^^ (^^^^^ Access Session 
/User Serv ice \ /Provider Services /User ServiceN 
>i Session y "V Session y Session / 
Service Session 
Communication Session 
Figure 2-3 TINA Sessions 
Before being able to participate in a session, each user must establish an access 
session with the provider; this is comparable to a login session on a multi-user 
computer. The access session corresponds to the establishment of the terms and 
conditions of the session. It allows the user to start, combine and participate in several 
sessions, i f authorised to do so. The service session corresponds to the provision of 
the service itself and ensures overall coherence of control and management. It is 
divided into the User Service Session, which manages the state of each user's activity 
and resource attributes (e.g. charging context), and the Provider Service Session, 
which contains the service logic and offers the functions allowing the user to join a 
session, or be invited to session. The service session contains only one provider but 
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can have multiple users. The communication session provides an abstract view of the 
actual transport network connections. 
TINA also uses the concept of domains [20]. One type of domain is an administrative 
domain where all the objects in the TTNA system are under the ownership of a single 
stakeholder. A simple example of this is illustrated in figure 2-3 above, where the user 
and provider domains are depicted. 
2.33 The Computing Architecture and the D P E 
The Computing Architecture adopted the basic concepts of RM-ODP. It uses 
viewpoints to model complex systems (see section 2.2.1). One such viewpoint is 
Engineering, which describes the framework for deploying applications and 
describing the DPE. 
The DPE Architecture consists of the DPE Kernel, the Kernel Transport Network and 
the DPE services, as illustrated in figure 2-4 below [14]. The DPE Kernel provides 
support to object life-cycle control, i.e. creation/deletion of objects at run time, and 
inter-object communication, which provides mechanisms to support the invocation of 
operations provided by operational interfaces of objects. The Kernel provides the 
basic, technology-independent, functions that represent the capability of most 
computing systems (i.e. the ability to run programs and the ability of programs to 
communicate with each other). The DPE Kernel is assumed to be present on all nodes 
that contain a DPE. 
The Kernel Transport Network (kTN) facilitates communications between remote 
objects, i.e. DPE kernels on different nodes. The kTN provides a technology 
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independent view of the communication facilities provided by the NCCEs of the DPE 
nodes. It is a virtual network that is logically different from the transport network. 
TINA differentiates between the DPE Kernel and DPE Services. The DPE Kernel 
provides a basic set of capabilities that are expected on all nodes, while DPE services 
are considered more advanced capabilities that may not be present on all nodes. The 
DPE services provide operational interfaces to support the runtime execution and 
communication of objects. 
DPE 2 Applications 
DPE Kernel DPE Kernel 
Kernel Transpon Network 
Transport Network with Distributed 
Nodes 
Figure 2-4 D P E Architecture 
A subset of the DPE services are listed below [21]: 
• Trading: provides binding between objects that use a service and objects that 
provide the service; 
• Notification: enables objects to receive notifications without being aware of 
the set of recipient objects; 
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o Transaction: consists of three main management functions - transaction, 
concurrency control and deadlock management; 
o Security: authentication, authorisation and security conn-oiling; 
o Object Lifecycle: object creation, deletion, activation, deactivation and move. 
The Computing architecture also defines the TINA Object Definition Language 
(ODL) [22]. TINA-ODL is used to define objects and their interfaces, and supports 
stt-eams or asynchronous messaging. 
2.3.4 The Management Architecture 
The TINA Management Architecture (depicted in figure 2-5 below [14]) is a set of 
concepts and principles used to build and manage systems that wil l manage TINA 
systems. The architecture can be divided into two forms of management, Computing 
and Telecommunications. However, before looking at these, some generic 
management principles within TINA wil l be slated. Firstly, management can be 
functionally separated using the Open System Interconnection's (OSI) system 
management FCAPS, i.e. Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, and 
Security [23]. Secondly, management systems are modelled so that management 
operations and relations can be defined. Managed entities are represented as objects 
and provide operational interfaces to allow managing objects to manipulate them. 
Computing Management involves the management of computers (NCCE), DPE and 
of the software that runs on the DPE. Software management (i.e. deployment, 
installation and operation of software computing nodes) and Infrastructure 
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management (i.e. how to manage NCCEs, DPEs, and kXN) are the main concerns of 
this type of management. 
Service Resource Element 
Applications 
Kernel Transport Network 
Generic 
Mgmt 
Figure 2-5 TINA Management Architecture 
Telecommunication Management involves the management of the transpon network 
and the management of the appHcations that use and control this network and the 
management services. Therefore telecommunication management deals with both the 
service and network architectures. 
TINA has been adopted by the Object Management Group (OMG) as the basis for its 
Common Object Request Broker Architecture, which has many commercial 
implementations available. 
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2 . 4 Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
The TINA architecture has been adopted, in particular by the OMG. It defines a 
middleware standard - Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), 
which adheres to both of the previously mentioned Open Distributed Processing 
(ODP) standards (see section 2.2.1) and object-orientation ( 0 0 ) standards (see section 
2.2.2). 
CORBA (see figure 2-6 below [24]) currently consists of an ORB and 15 
CORBAservices (see Section 2.4.3 below for CORBAservices overview) [24]. Its 
function is to allow objects, which are implemented across a heterogeneous and 
distributed platform, to communicate. The ORB is an object bus» which allows objects 
to transparently make/receive requests to/from other objects, whether they are local or 
remote. The CORBAservices are a collection of system-level services that 
compliment the ORB by providing a robust environment and extending a distributed 
object's behaviour, i.e. all the basic services an object wi l l need during its lifecycle 
such as security and persistence. CORBA was designed to allow intelligent objects to 
discover each other and inter-operate on an object bus. In addition, CORBAfacilities 
are specified. They are classed as either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal facilities 
apply to all application domains and there are currently only four defined - printing 
facility, secure time service, intemationalisaiion service and mobile agents facility. 
Vertical or Domain facilities relate to particular application fields; they are defined as 
collections of IDL-defined frameworks that provide services, which applications can 
use directly. There are currently nine domains working on defining industry 
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appropriate IDL, e.g. Healthcare, Financial, Insurance, Telecommunications, Utilities, 
Electronic Commerce, Manufacturing, Transportation and Life Science Research. 
< 
Application Obiects 
Coimnon Fadfities (CORBAfacilities) 
Vertical Common Facilities 
• • • 
Horizontal Common Facilities 
Distributed Systems 
Documents 
Info. 
Mgmt 
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Object Request Broker (ORB) 
Naming Persistence UfeCyde Properties Concurrency CoOedions Security Trader 
# • • « ^ • 
Extemalization Events Transactions Query Relationships Time Ucendng 
Common Object Services (CORBAservices) 
Figure 2-6 O M G C O R B A Architecture 
2.4.1 C O R B A Interface Dennition Language (IDL) 
Distributed objects are accessed through their interfaces. So, in order to provide 
flexibility, interfaces are defmed not in code but in an Interface Definition Language 
(IDL). This means that the interface is now accessible across different languages, 
tools, and operating systems. The IDL defines the operations a distributed object can 
perform, the parameters required and any exceptions that may be generated in the 
process. 
Although IDL appears to be a subset of the C++ language, it is not a programming 
language. It is used to specify the contract that exists between the client and server. 
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Some additional keywords have been added to deal with distribution issues. It is 
currently mapped to several languages, e.g. C, C-H- [25], Java [26], Ada, Smalltalk 
and COBOL. Programmers are able to deal with CORBA objects using their native 
language constructs. Since the DDL provides implementation-independent access to 
objects in the ORB, client and server objects that are written in different languages are 
able to inter-operate. Therefore IDL provides the basis for interoperability and 
transparency. 
2.4.2 C O R B A Object Request Broker (ORB) 
The ORB is the middleware that allows clients and servers to communicate. It allows 
clients to transparently invoke a server method, while the client is unaware of where 
the server is located or how it is implemented. Figure 2-7 [24] below illustrates the 
CORBA ORB structure. 
On the client side, the ORB intercepts a client call and then finds an object to 
implement the request. It passes the parameters, invokes the service and then returns 
the results. The client IDL stubs provide static interfaces to objects, by defining how 
clients invoke corresponding services on servers. The stub acts as a local proxy for a 
remote server object. The server operations are defined in DDL and the stubs are 
generated by an IDL compiler, and include any marshalling' code required. 
' Marshalling is the conversion from one data represeniaiion type to another in communication 
software and is a key component in distributed applications. 
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Figure 2-7 C O R B A O R B Structure 
On the server-side, the ORB locates the server object adapter, gives it the parameters, 
and then gives control to the object implementation via the server IDL skeleton. The 
server IDL skeletons are generated by an IDL-compiler. They provide static interfaces 
to each exported server. 
The Object Adapter accepts requests for services on behalf of the server's objects. It 
provides a run-time environment for instantiating server objects, passing requests and 
assigning object references to server objects. 
The Implementation Repository (also known as the Server Repository) holds 
information on the classes that servers support and their corresponding runtime 
objects and object references. 
2.4.3 CORBAservices 
The CORBAservices are a set of system level services that are used to extend the 
ORB functionality. Currently 15 such services are defined, as listed in Table 2-1 
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below. Every service can be accessed by every client ( i f security allows) and basic 
CORBAservices are used by both applications and CORBAfacilities [27]. 
No. CORBAservice Function 
1. Life Cycle Service Creates, copies, moves and deletes objects on the ORB. 
2. Persistence 
Service (PS) 
Stores components persistently on a variety of storage 
servers. 
3. Naming Service Locates components by name (i.e. provides clients with 
an object reference to a server). 
4. Event Service Register/Unregister interest in specific events" - basic 
publish and subscribe messaging service. 
5. Concurrency 
Control Service 
Lock manager working for threads or transactions. 
6. Object Transaction 
Service (OTS) 
Two-phase commit co-ordination among recoverable 
components using fiat or nested transactions. 
7. Relationship 
Service 
Creates dynamic links between objects, and mechanisms 
for traversing the links that group objects together. 
8. Extemalisation 
Service 
Stream-like mechanism used to get data into and out of 
objects. 
9. Query Service Query operations for objects (superset of SQL). 
10. Licensing Service Meters the use of objects for licensing purposes. 
11. Properties Services Associates properties (named values) with objects. 
12. Time Service Synchronises time in a distributed environment. 
13. Security Service Framework for distributed object security. 
14. Trading Service "* Advertises object services; similar to the naming 
service, it is used by clients to find server object 
references. 
15. Collection Service Manipulates objects in a group as opposed to 
manipulating them individually (e.g. queues, stacks, 
lists, etc.). 
Table 2-1 CORBAServices 
^ An Event is an occurrence within an object specified to be of inieresi to one or more objects, e.g. 
when security administrator objects register interest in when the security alarm object is set to 
"alarm-raised". 
^ The Trading Service Is selected as the example service for the research and will be studied in more 
detail. 
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2.5 The Trading Service 
The Trader is often described as the DPE's Yellow Pages. I f a client is looking for a 
service, but does not have a name of the service provider, the client can go the Trader 
and ask for the names of all the service providers of the required service. Traders have 
an important role to play in future Internet and telecommunication networks. The 
interest in security in web-based [28] and other distributed systems [29, 30] means 
that Traders wi l l have to incorporate security i f they are to be included in this future. 
Trader 
^ Linked Tradcis ^ / lyadcr A 
\Export 
f Importer \ Service ^ f Exporter 1 / [ntcTBction y 
Figure 2-8 Trader interactions 
Trading is the process of matching a service request, against a list of supported 
services provided by potential servers, as illustrated in figure 2-8 above [31]. The 
basic function of the Trading services involves an exporter (i.e. a server) advertising 
its available services, by notifying the Trader. The Trader keeps a Registry of such 
advertisements. An importer (i.e. a client) makes a request on the Trader for a 
particular service, specifying any conditions that need to be met. The Trader checks 
its Registry to find a matching service type, with corresponding conditions. The 
Trader then notifies the importer of the exporter and the service. 
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2.5.1 The Trader Data Structures 
The Trader uses two data structures the Repository and the Registry. The Repository 
(or Service Type Repository) holds details of service types. This generally consists of 
the interfaces to a service and a set of properties that would describe the service. For 
example, i f the service were a data store, the service description would hold details 
such as the type of data store, e.g. file server or database, the location of the store, 
amount of space available, whether it supports backup or replication, etc. A property 
can also specify its iriode. The property mode attributes have the following 
connotations: 
• mandatory - an instance of this service type must provide an appropriate 
value for this property when exporting its service offer. 
• readonly - i f an instance of this service type provides an appropriate value 
for this property when exporting its service offer, the value for this 
property may not be changed. 
I f a property is defined without any mode, it is defined as being "optional" (i.e., an 
offer of that service type is not required to provide a value for that property name, but 
i f it does, it must be of the type specified in the service type), and the property value 
subsequently may be modified. The "mandatory" mode indicates that a value miisi be 
provided, but that subsequently it may be modified. The "readonly" mode indicates 
that the property is optional, but that once given a value, subsequently it may not be 
modified. Specifying both modes indicates that a value must be provided and that 
subsequently it may not be modified. 
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These service details are static details, but a Trader can also hold dynamic properties. 
Dynamic properties are not held in the Trader and have to be obtained at run-time via 
a dynamic property evaluator interface with the specified service. For example a 
dynamic property of the datastore could be the ''space available", which the Trader 
would obtain at runtime [32]. 
The second data structure is the Registry. It holds instances of the service types 
described in the Repository, i.e. it holds the details of actual datastores, e.g. 
"Departmental FileServer", Floor 2, 3 gigabytes available, supports SQL. So by 
specifying a service type and a list of properties, a client can ask a Trader to provide a 
list of all the datastores that are support SQL and have over 1 gigabyte of space 
available. 
2.5.2 Attributes 
Each Trader also has Attributes. These define a Trader's characteristics, i.e. policies 
for functionality supported and policies for scoping the extent of a search. Attributes 
are initially specified when a Trader is created and can be modified or interrogated via 
an administration interface. 
2.5.3 Interfaces 
Importers, Exporters and the Traders are all part of the Trading Community, i.e. all 
objects that interact to import/export services [31]. Interaction between members of 
the community is via a set of defined interfaces. Interfaces are also defined to other 
Trader components. 
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The interfaces described below are the TINA specification. This specification was 
originally produced by the OMG for the CORBA Trading Service [33], which was 
itself based on the ISO's ODP Trader specification [31]. The interface names are 
defined in uppercase bold, and the operation names are in italics. 
• The L O O K U P interface is used by importers to discover and import services, 
via the Query operation. 
• The O F F E R I T E R A T O R interface is used to return a set of service offers 
from the Query operation by enabling the service offers to be extracted by 
successive operations on the interface. 
• The R E G I S T E R interface is used by exporters to advertise their services. 
They can advertise the services using the Export operation; the Withdraw 
method removes a service offer from the Trader; Describe returns the 
information about an offered service that is held by the Trader; Modify is used 
to change the description of a service as held within a service offer. 
• The D Y N A M I C P R O P E R T Y E V A L interface is provided by an exporter who 
wishes to provide the value of dynamic properties at runtime, e.g. when 
exporting a datastore interface, a dynamic property could be "space available" 
which can only be derived at runtime. The exporter provides a reference to the 
interface so that the Trader can invoke the evalDP operation to obtain a 
property value. 
• The L I N K interface allows a Trader to use the services of another Linked 
Trader. Links can be added, removed, listed and modified via the interface. 
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• The P R O X Y interface allows a Trader to determine at runtime the object 
reference of a service offer, because although the Trader has the offer name 
and type it does not have an object reference. 
• The S E R V I C E T Y P E R E P O S I T O R Y interface allows service types to be 
created and managed in the Repository. It provides operation to allow the user 
to add, remove, list and modify service types in the repository. 
• The ADMIN interface allows the administrator to configure the system and 
set various parameters. There are four methods. The Attributes and Set 
operations allow administrator to set and return the values of the current trader 
attributes. Listjoffers allows the administrator to perform housekeeping by 
obtaining a handle on each of the offers (excluding proxy offers) within a 
Trader. List_proxies returns a set of offer identifiers for proxy offers held by a 
Trader. 
2.5.4 Linked Traders 
Traders from different domains can create links or federations and so pool their 
service offers. I f a Trader cannot find a matching service, it wil l then pass the request 
onto another Linked (or Federated) Trader. The linked Trader can then check its 
Registry to see i f it can match the original request. So when a Trader links to other 
Traders, it makes the offer spaces of those other traders implicitly available to its own 
clients, i.e. linked trading allows an importer access to multiple Trading domains. 
30 
Chapter 2: Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed Processing Environments 
Proxy 
PFtOXy(expon_Proxy. 
'ithtimw_Proxy, Descrtba^Pmxy) 
Exporter J 
ReGISTER(Expon. Withdiaw. Doscribe] 
'iihdjaw_Using_Constmini, Rosotve) 
y ) DYNAMICPROPERTYEVAL 
^ (gvalDP} 
SERVICE_7YPE_REPOSlT0RY(Add_Typo. 
Removo_Type. ListJType, Descnbe_Type, 
Fui!y_Descjibe^Type, MaskJType. 
Unma$k_Type) ^ 
Importer 
LOOKUPiOueiy) 
TRADER 
Service Type 
Repository 
Registry 
OFFERITERATORC 
NBxt_n. Maj^Loft. 
UNK(Add^Unk. 
RaTiove_Unk. 
Descrfbo_UnK 
UsLUnks. 
Modity_Unk} 
Linked 
TRADER 
ADMIN(Aniibutes, Set. 
psLOffers. UsLPmperties) 
Admin strator 
Figure 2-9 Trader 
A Trader has to be explicitly linked to another. However, these other Traders may be 
linked to yet more Traders, and so the initial Trader can reach a large number of other 
Traders. This can also cause a problem by providing too much choice. In order to 
narrow the search parameters on service offers, Traders provide Policies, Constraints 
and Preferences. Policies are used to provide information that affects a Trader's 
behaviour at runtime, e.g. allow the client to specify the scope of a search, how the 
search is to be performed or how many trader links can be traversed. Constraints 
allow the client to specify search criteria, by using a well-formed expression 
conforming to a constraint language. For example, a client could use SQL as a 
constraint language. Preferences allow the client to specify the order in which offers 
are returned. Figure 2-9 illustrates an example of a basic Trader structure described. 
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2.5.5 Uses of an Unsecured Trader 
Apart from the core function of the Trader providing references to server objects, it 
has also been suggested by Resnick [34] that the Trader could be used to standardise 
Worid Wide Web (WWW) facilities. There are a number of search engines, web 
crawlers and white pages such as Yahoo, HotBot, and Alta Vista. However, these 
facilities, especially the search engines, lack a programmatic interface and differ not 
just in implementation but also in how they are accessed, how predicates are formed 
and how Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) are registered. Therefore a synergy 
between the Trader and the Internet facilities would offer a solution. Search engines 
would benefit from a standardised programmatic API, which is important when the 
search engines are not just interested in web pages, but also in intelligent objects that 
export functional interfaces, and the clients seeking them are not people using GUI 
interfaces but client objects using APIs. The search engines offer highly scalable data 
stores, with fast search algorithms and accumulated stores of server objects that have 
already been categorised. This opens up a whole new opportunity for offering 
services, of any kind provided by intelligent objects, to both users and client objects in 
a distributed environment. 
It is also important to remember that ODP and Trading is not just for Internet use. It is 
designed to work on any heterogeneous distributed object environment. Therefore 
some other possible uses of the Trader have been suggested by the Disnibuted 
Systems Technology Centre (DSTC) research group in University of Canberra, 
Australia [35]: 
32 
Chapter 2: Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed Processing Environments 
• real-time trading, e.g. dynamic configuration of services within 
telecommunications switches (combining bandwidth from local and trunk 
carriers to provide an end-to-end service); 
• large scale trading, e.g. using trading to access network elements from 
network management applications for a national telephone system. 
2.6 The Security Service 
While the security principles and the current DPE security model wi l l be discussed in 
the following chapters, a brief description of the CORBA security service, which wil l 
be used later in the research, wi l l be presented in this section. The CORBA Security 
Service (CORBASec) [36] provides a framework for distributed object security. 
There are two levels of security. Levell provides protection for applications that are 
"unaware" of security, by transparently calling security functions on object 
invocation. Level2 security provides more facilities and allows applications 
themselves to control the security provided, i.e. security-aware applications. 
CORBASec currently supports certain levels of authentication, access control, 
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. Another feature of CORBA security is 
the use of credential delegation between objects. It allows credentials to be 
propagated along an object request chain. 
33 
Chapter 2: Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed Processing Environments 
Object Referenc 
Clicnl Kcqucst 
request request rrcii 
O R B S c c u r i U ' R f r M C C SfccuritA' Ser\ ice K>RB 
Secure 
liivoration 
Viiuli Secure 
liivocntion orate N 
/Secure 
^ontexi^ ^ V n u t M 
ecurilv tokens ill usAocinlin 
nmteci messuces 
Figure 2-10 C O R B A Security Service 
Security is implemented by a number of objects, as shown in figure 2-10 above. Apart 
from the specific security interfaces, CORBA makes use of two objects. Current and 
Credentials. Current, a pseudo-object initially used by the transaction service to 
propagate transaction context, has been adopted by security to propagate the security 
context. It does so by holding a reference to Credentials. Once a user is authenticated, 
a Credentials object is created. It holds information such as roles, privileges and an 
authenticated ID. 
In order to provide "out-of-the-box" interoperability across multi-vendor ORBs, 
CORBA now defines different Common Secure HOP (CSl) profiles [37]: 
34 
Chapter 2: Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed Processing Environments 
• CSI Level 0 security provides identity-based policies without delegation. 
Therefore only the identity (no other attributes) of the initiating principal is 
transmitted from the client to the target, and it cannot be delegated. 
• CSI Level 1 security provides identity-based policies with unrestricted 
delegation. As in CSI Level 0 only the identity is transmitted from the client to 
the target. However, the identity can be delegated to other objects, using 
simple unrestricted delegation. 
• CSI Level 2 security provides identity and privilege-based policies with 
controlled delegation. Therefore, all attributes can be passed form client to 
target, including access, and audit identities and any privilege attributes such 
as role or group. These attributes can be delegated, but are subject to any 
restrictions placed on the delegation process by the initiating principal. 
CSI Level 0 is addressed by SSLIOP, an implementation of HOP over a Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) [38] connection. The full-scale security version of HOP, SECIOP, 
is used by the other mechanisms'*. Both protocols lie between the network transport 
layer (TCP/IP) and the GIOP protocol layer, and so are considered mutually 
exclusive. 
Figure 2-11 below summarises the objects that are specified in the CORBA Security 
Service specification [36]. These objects are categorised into their security service 
functionality. 
•* CSI version 2 is addressing the use of SSLIOP to cover Level I and 2, by inu-oducing Privilege 
Aiuibuie Certificates, so ihai S S L can provide access conirol. 
35 
Chapter 2: Integrated Service Engineering and Distributed Processing Environments 
Authentication 
& Authorisation 
Secure Invocation 
&QoP 
Non-Repudlatlon 
& Audit 
Current 
Credentials 
AccessDcclslon Vault NRCredentlals AuditDcclslon 
Required Rights h 
Principal 
Authentlcator 
SecurityContext t] AudltChannet 
DomafnAccoss 
Policy 
AccessPollcy 
Sec u rein vocation 
Policy 
NRPolIcy AudltPolIcy d 
Dotogatlon Policy 
Figure 2-11 C O R B A Security Objects 
The object functionality is defined as follows: 
Operational Objects: 
• Current: represents service state specific information associated with the 
current execution context and is available to both clients and servers. 
• Credentials: represents a particular principaPs credential information. It 
includes information such as that principal's privilege and identity attributes, 
such as an audit id. It also includes some security-sensitive data required when 
this principal is involved in peer-entity authentication. However, such data is 
not visible to applications. It is referenced by the Current object. 
• PrincipalAuthenticator: responsible for authenticating principals and 
creating Credentials containing their privilege attributes. 
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• AccessDecision: responsible for determining whether the specified 
Credentials allow an operation to be performed on a target object. It uses 
access control attributes for the target object to determine whether the 
principal's privileges, obtained from the SecurityContexl (see below) are 
sufficient to meet the access criteria for the requested operation. 
• RequiredRights: specifies which rights are required to use which operations 
of an interface, and is generally used by AccessDecision. 
• Vault: facilitates creating Credentials objects and establishing security 
contexts between clients and targets when they are in different trust domains. 
• Security Context: hold security information about the client-target security 
association and are used to protect messages, and is generally created by the 
Vault object. 
• NRCredentials: hold the identity and attributes of a principal, which are 
specifically used for non-repudiation operations. The attributes include 
whatever is needed for identifying the user when generating and checking 
evidence, e.g., it might include the principal's key (or provide access to it) 
when required to sign evidence. NRCredentials is available via the Current 
object. 
• AuditDecision: used to obtain information about what needs to be audited for 
the specified object/interface in this environment. 
• AuditChannel: used to write audit records. 
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Administrative Objects: 
• DomainAccessPoIicy: implements the access policy, by granting/revoking a 
set of named "subjects" (e.g., users) with a specified set of "rights" (e.g., get, 
set, manage, use) to perform operations on the "objects" in the domain. 
• AccessPolicy: defmes what subjects are available in a domain, and what rights 
they can be granted, for particular operations. 
• DelegationPolicy: controls which credentials are used when an intermediate 
object in a chain invokes another object. 
• SecurelnvocationPoHcy: specifies secure invocation policies for security 
associations, including controlling the delegation of client's credentials, and 
message protection. 
• NRPolicy: holds the non-repudiation policy information, such as the evidence 
types required. 
• AuditPolicy: identifies which operations (if any) on an object wil l be audited. 
The ful l CORBASec specification [36] contains more comprehensive details on these 
objects and the security service. 
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter has studied the concepts of ISE and Distributed Processing 
Environments. A l l DPEs have a defined set of requirements such as independence, 
openness, transparency, scalability and object-orientation in order to provide a 
flexible environment that can adequately support distributed objects. These 
requirements wi l l have to be taken into consideration when defining any security 
framework within this environment. 
The main focus of the ISE study was TINA, the telecommunications architecture, 
which has widely influenced the telecommunication and distributed research 
environment. The TINA DPE architecture consists of the DPE Kernel, kTN and DPE 
services. It is the DPE security service and the management security function that is 
of interest to this research and they wil l be examined in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
TINA is also a practical standard that has been adopted by the OMG for its ORB 
technology. CORBA, along with its Trading and Security Services was described, and 
wil l be used later in the research. The next chapter wi l l now look at security in general 
and the issues and principles that arise within the context of a DPE. 
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3.1 Introduction 
According to Price Waterhouse Coopers [39], it is estimated that in 2000 hackers wi l l 
cost businesses around the world almost 1.6 trillion US dollars and that 40,000 person 
years^ of productivity due to computer downtime. However, the survey is believed to 
underestimate the total cost because it only refers to companies with over 1000 
employees and so does not take small to medium sized enterprises into account. This 
highlights the extent of the problem on a global scale, and figures indicate that the 
problem is getting worse. The latest CERT/CC statistics show that the number of 
security incidents is increasing. In 1988 only 6 incidents were reported, while in 2000 
21,756 were reported [40], With such a high cost, security cannot be ignored; the 
situation has to be addressed. 
Security refers to procedural, logical, and physical measures that are aimed at 
preventing, detecting or limiting any system misuse, be it accidental or deliberate. 
Procedural measures refer to administration and policies such as changing passwords 
regularly or selecting trustworthy staff. Physical measures are those taken to ensure 
security by tangible means such as locking doors. Logical measures are those such as 
authentication and access control. It is the logical measures that are examined in this 
chapter. 
* One person year is defined as one person working a 24-hour day, 365 days a year. 
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General security concepts, which have well accepted, standardised specifications, wi l l 
be explained. Other general security principles, relevant to the research wil l also be 
presented; they wil l prove useful in guiding the definition of a DPE security 
framework in the up-coming chapters. 
3.2 Security Principles 
Security for distributed systems uses a set of overlapping concepts or services, as 
specified by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) [41] - authentication, 
access control, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. Security management is 
also considered. By applying these concepts, a system can be made more secure. The 
ISO security services relate to distributed environments and to the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model [42], and so the concepts also apply to a 
DPE. The following sections wil l look at each of the services and what they provide. 
3.2.1 Access Control Service 
The ISO states that "security is used to minimise the vulnerabilities of assets and 
resources" [41]. An asset is anything of value in a global computing system and a 
vulnerability is any weakness that could be exploited to violate a system and its 
information. Therefore, one obvious way to minimise threats is to limit the users who 
can have access to assets/resources [43]. This means that all data, programs and 
services need to be protected, but not just from users but also from illegal access by 
other programs and services. It should be noted that threats occur from two basic 
areas, external and internal. Generally, external threats can be minimised by denying 
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access to the network, e.g. permitting external access only through a firewall [44]. 
Internal threats are more difficult to handle, or even to recognise. However, internals 
threats are a significant problem as numerous studies have shown that they have 
typically accounted for about 80-85% of security breaches [45], although the CSI/FBI 
2000 survey shows, external incidents are increasing because of the Internet [46]. 
Threats can be deliberate or accidental. They can occur as the result of: 
• destruction of assets; 
• corruption or illegal modification of assets/resources; 
• illegal or unauthorised disclosure of data; 
• interruption or denial of services. 
Therefore control of access needs to be addressed at several levels: 
• access into the network / DPE; 
• access to an asset or resource; 
• type of access to an asset or resource. 
The Access Control Security Service protects resources from unauthorised use. It can 
be used on various assets, e.g., communications packages, stored data, or components. 
The service can be broken down into several core components [47]: 
• Subjects & Objects: the entities to which access control is applied to or 
utilised by. 
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• Access Operations: Access operations specify the type of access that is 
permissible. It requires the definition of Access Rights [48] and Access 
Attributes [49]. 
• Access Control Structures: The basic access control structure is an Access 
Control Matrix (ACM). Two derivatives of the A C M are the Access Control 
List (ACL), where access rights are stored with the object, and the Capabilities 
List (CL) where access rights are stored, using an un-forgeable token, with the 
subject. 
• Intermediary controls: Administration needs to be as simple and effective as 
possible, therefore intermediary controls are introduced. Privileges collect the 
right to execute a certain set of operations under a particular activity, e.g. 
system administration. Privileges are often specified in a predefined set of 
Roles, where subjects derive their access rights from the role they are 
performing. 
3.2.2 Authentication Service 
One type of threat is known as a masquerade; that is when an entity successfully 
pretends to be some other legal entity and thereby gains illegal access to a resource. 
Therefore before granting access to a user or resource, the security service should be 
able to guarantee that the user/resource is actually who/what it claims to be [50, 51]; 
this is the responsibility of the authentication service. 
In the case of connection-oriented environments (i.e. CORBA), peer entity and peer-
to-peer authentication apply. Peer entity authentication provides corroboration of the 
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identity of a principal within the context of a communication relationship (only one 
entity is identifying itself, either the client or the server), while peer-lo-peer 
authentication (also known as mutual authentication) involves both client and server 
entities authenticating each other. The process involves the exchange of 
authentication information. The information exchanged wil l depend on the 
authentication technology used. It is generally based one of the following: 
• secret knowledge - e.g., passwords; 
• cryptographic techniques - e.g., digital signatures [52, 53]; 
• characteristic - e.g., biometrics [54, 55]; 
• possessions - e.g., smartcards [56]. 
A key authentication concept, which should be mentioned at this point, is the Trusted 
Third Party (TTP) [57]. In the case of public keys, it is actually impossible to be sure 
that a particular user's public key is not a forgery unless a digital certificate is used 
[58]. The certificate contains the user's public key and an endorsement that the key is 
real, made by a TTP's digital signature. The issue of trust is now shifted to the TTP -
so i f an entity trusts the TTP, he can trust that the user's public key he received is real, 
and not a forgery. Such TTP's are called Certification Authorities (CA). The X.509 
Authentication Framework [59] specifies a framework for certificates and a 
hierarchical structure for CAs, as illustrated in figure 3-1 below. 
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Figure 3-1 X,509 Certification Authority Hierarchy Structure 
In the above figure, Userl and User2 do not currently trust each other because they 
are in different domains, using different CAs, CAi and CA2 respectively. However, 
they do have a common CA when the hierarchy structure is used, CA4, and because 
CA4 has issued CA2, that means that Userl can trust User2's certificate. Similarly, 
User2 wil l trust Userl's certificate, because working through the hierarchy, CAi is 
issued by CA3, which in turn is issued by the trusted CA4. 
3.2.3 Confidentiality Service 
Confidentiality on a network means being able to guarantee the privacy and secrecy 
of an asset, such as a data file containing personnel details. Confidentiality can be 
applied to data, whether it is in storage or in transit, and may be applied to only 
selected fields, instead of a whole message/record, in the interests of enhancing 
performance while still providing adequate protection. There are two basic 
cryptographic approaches: 
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o Symmetric: where the encryption and decryption keys are the same, and 
therefore keeping the key secret is imperative. An example of this is the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [60]; 
o Asymmetric: where the encryption and decryption keys are different. In this 
case the encryption key (or public key), is available to everyone so that they 
can encrypt plaintext and then send the ciphertext to user A. However, only 
user A wil l know the decryption key (or private key) and, therefore, only he 
can decipher data sent to bim. An example of this is the Rivest Shamir 
Adleman (RSA) algorithm [61, 62]. 
The existence of certain regulatory requirements, in relation to cryptography, 
complicates access to and use of cryptographic mechanisms in certain countries [63]. 
There are two main issues - key length and cryptography use. The cryptographic 
algorithm and key length define the strength of encryption. Some countries have 
export laws that limit the key length of a given algorithm, e.g. US, France, Russia. 
The other issue relates to the use of cryptography, i.e. whether it is used for 
authentication and integrity purposes versus its use for confidentiality. When used for 
confidentiality, the export laws are usually more stringent. However, in the case of the 
US, new regulations were defined in January 2000 that considerably relaxed the tight 
restrictions that were previously in place [64]. 
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3.2.4 Integrity Service 
Integrity of resources ensures that attempts to modify data can be detected no matter 
what corruption attempts have been made on them [65]. In a comprehensive security 
survey database, maintained by Cohen, the attack section lists 95 possible classes of 
attack that can be used in networked systems, it includes everything from computer 
viruses to input overflows. Of these 95 classes, 66 are used to corrupt information 
[66]. Therefore any integrity services must guard against any threats involving illegal 
asset/resource modification. Integrity is applied to both data and system resources. 
Data integrity ensures that the data has not been accidentally or maliciously altered or 
destroyed [67]. System integrity ensures that all resources in a network are available 
to users and that the system remains in a state consistent with strictly defined security 
rules and regulations [68]. 
Cryptography can be utilised in the integrity service. An important cryptographic 
mechanism is the one-way hash function. It takes a variable-length string (called a 
pre-image) and converts it to a fixed-length output string (called a hash value). It 
works in one direction, i.e. it is easy to compute a hash value from pre-image, but it is 
difficult to generate a pre-image that hashes to a particular value. Another desirable 
attribute of a one-way hash function is to ensure that it is also collision-free, i.e. it is 
hard to generate two pre-images with the same hash value. Therefore a one-way hash 
function can be used as a fingerprint to a particular pre-image, e.g. Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) [69] and Message Digest 5 (MD-5) [70]. A one-way hash function 
with the addition of a secret key is known as a message authentication code (MAC) 
[71]. The hash value is a function of both the pre-image and the key. Therefore only 
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someone with the identical key can verify the hash value. This is useful for providing 
authenticity. 
3.2.5 Non-Repudiation and Auditing Service 
Repudiation is the denial of an action by an entity. For example, a user may deny 
sending or receiving a message. Non-repudiation forces an entity to be accoimtable 
for its participation in some action [72]. The ISO defines the types of evidence 
required in a Non-Repudiation service [73]. There are several proofs, some of which 
are described below: 
• Proof of Origin: provides the recipient with unforgeable proof that the message 
originated from the originator. 
• Proof of Receipt: provides the originator with unforgeable proof that the message 
was received by the original recipient. 
• Proof of Submission: provides the originator with unforgeable proof that the 
message was submitted for delivery to the original recipient. 
• Proof of Delivery: provides the originator with unforgeable proof that the 
message was delivered to the recipient. 
Non-repudiation is made up of a set of supporting facilities that are required to 
provide a full service; it includes evidence generation and verification, evidence 
storage and transmission, and an adjudicator to settle any disputes using the evidence 
produced. A notary is also required. 
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Auditing is an intrinsic part of Non-Repudiation. It records security relevant events* 
in an audit trail (log) for later analysis. This analysis can be used to help identify 
unauthorised activity within the system. The audit service can also be used to generate 
alarms to indicate that a more immediate response is required. ISO defines that the 
security audit function needs to provide trail analysis, archiving and examining, and 
alarm handling. 
A specialisation of auditing is Intrusion Detection. It covers the monitoring of 
network activity and the analysis of data for potential vulnerabilities and attacks, 
historical or current. It is an important component in system security. There is a lot of 
research emphasis on this subject, (he most prominent are Next-generation Intrusion 
Detection Expert System (NIDES) [74] and more recently Event Monitoring Enabling 
Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) [75]. There are also many 
commercial products available [76]. 
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Figure 3-2 Monitoring Agent Structure 
* A security relevant event is any action within the system, which has been niarked as being of interest 
to the security service, e.g. user authenticaiion, object creation, or database access. 
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In Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), there are three basic processes involved 
monitoring, analysis and response. These functions are represented in the generic IDS 
solution, the Monitoring Agent [77] illustrated in figure 3-2 above. It is comprised of 
the following components: 
• Sampler: pulls information from the system and produces audit logs; 
• Knowledge Base (KB): keeps the sum of all knowledge that the monitoring 
system requires to operate. The KB will hold the following types of information: 
- security policy to ensure that the monitoring is in accordance with the 
overall system policy; 
security log to record recent events that have taken place in the system; 
profiles of the activities of every user and resource in the system; 
- sampling information to generate the security logs; 
- analysis information that is required by the analysis techniques; 
- response information that is required by the responder. 
• Analyser: takes information from the sampler and compares it with the data 
stored in the KB and from an analysed conclusion, it determines whether a 
security violation has taken place. 
• Responder: takes the analyser output and information from the KB, and it decides 
and implements the action to be taken. 
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3.2.6 Security Management 
The ISO [41] defines a security policy as a set of criteria for provision of security 
services. It defines what is and what is not permitted in the area of security during 
general operation of a secured system. It must be implemented by taking the 
appropriate security measures. However, security measures wil l not be effective 
unless the user understands what needs to be protected and can determine what 
mechanisms are used, i.e. what the policy is. Security needs a complete and usable 
administration system that wi l l allow administrators to maintain and operate security 
on a day-to-day basis. 
Administration occurs within a domain. A security domain is defined by the ISO as a 
set of resources where a specific security policy should be applied. Security 
management must control and support security within its own domain and possibly 
allow for inter-domain security interaction. OSI defines three categories of security 
management; security system management, security services management, and 
security mechanism management. 
• Security System Management is responsible for applying security 
management to the whole system. Firstly, it ensures that the security policy is 
implemented. Secondly, it must manage interactions with other management 
functions and with the other security management systems (described below). 
• Security Service Management deals with all events in relation to security 
services. It wi l l decide which mechanisms wil l implement a service. It wi l l 
negotiate for these mechanisms and then invoke them. 
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• Security Mechanism Management ensures that mechanisms can operate by 
providing all the necessary resources. For example, in the case of key 
management, it wi l l generate suitable keys, determine which entities should 
receive a copy of the key and then distribute keys securely. 
3,3 Other Principles relevant to DPE Security 
While the security principles described above apply to any type of system requiring 
protection, the following sub-sections outline some principles that are particularly 
pertinent to a DPE. 
3.3.1 Security Domains and Trust Models 
Within any security system, trust is involved somewhere, e.g. the receiver a certificate 
has to trust the Certificate Authority's process of registration and certification; a 
system administrator has to trust that users wi l l not give their userids and passwords 
to unscrupulous hackers; users have'to trust system administrators not to abuse their 
privileges and access private data; Internet shoppers have to trust on-lines businesses 
to protect their data, especially their credit card numbers. When trust breaks down the 
consequences can be devastating. I f the trust is misplaced, a system can be 
compromised. A hacker can use a password to break into a system and steal, modify 
or damage data or available services. If , as happened to several on-line companies, 
credit card information is compromised [78] then companies can go out of business 
because the consumer has no confidence in the company's ability to protect their data. 
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Trust is not only integral to a security model, it is necessary to the successful 
operation of the security system. 
Three possible trust scenarios can function in an interoperability model: 
• No trust: The issue of having no trust existing between disparate security 
domains means that mutual suspicion exists. No attempt wi l l be made to 
establish trust and the domains wil l continue to treat each other with suspicion. 
This type of behaviour can be implemented through the use of *guest' 
privileges, which allow an untrusted entity very restricted and controlled 
access to a system. 
• Pre-existing trust: This scenario refers to the fact that two disparate security 
domains trust each other due to a previously negotiated trust between them. 
This type of trust is generally achieved by security administrators from the 
domains agreeing the terms and conditions of secure interoperability. This can 
include defining recognised userids that would operate in both domains and 
defining security mapping between the access control privileges of each 
domain, i.e. administrative co-operation between the two domains is 
necessary. For example, in domains that use roles and access privileges to a 
file system, "UserAB" is defined in domain A and domain B. In domain A, 
"UserAB" is a member of the ^'manager" group and has "read" and "write" 
access to all files on the files server. In domain B, "UserAB" is a member of 
the "technician" group and has "update" access to files in the technician's 
directory. 
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• Trust needs to be established: In the pre-existing trust scenario above, the 
trust was defined between specific domains and required administrative 
interaction in both domains. There is one other scenario. This is when trust can 
be established between two domains that have no prior knowledge of each 
other. An example of this is the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [79] with 
certificates and Certificate Authorities. "UserAB" is a member of domain and 
has a certificate issued by Certificate Authority 1. "UserAB" tries to access a 
server in domain B. Domain B has no knowledge of domain A, but it does 
recognise Certificate Authority I . Therefore it can authenticate UserAB*s 
certificate and allow access to the server. In this case, domain A and B have 
no prior knowledge of each other but they do have a common trusted third 
party, Certificate Authority 1, which is used to establish trust. 
3.3.2 Distributed Trusted Computing Base 
Security trustworthiness is the ability of a system to protect resources from exposure 
to misuse from malicious or accidental means. However, this is more complex in a 
DPE than in a centralised system such as IBM*s Resource Access Control Facility 
(RACF) [80]. Trust in a centralised system is usually static because servers are 
generally trusted and remain trusted through their entire life. Trust is also confined to 
a single security facility, such as RACF in an OS/390 environment. This is not the 
case in a DPE. The security model can exist over multiple distributed platforms with 
various security mechanisms, such as Sesame [81], Kerberos [82] or SSL, and the 
trust model is not static over the lifetime of an object, because an object can be both 
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client and server and so can be both trusted and untrusied depending on the role it is 
playing at a given time. 
A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is the totality of protection mechanisms within a 
computer system, including hardware, firmware and software, the combination of 
which is responsible for enforcing a security policy. The ability of a TCB to enforce 
correctly a unified security policy depends on the correctness of the mechanisms 
within the TCB, the protection of those mechanisms to ensure their correctness and 
the correct input of parameters related to the security policy [83]. In a DPE the notion 
of a distributed TCB has to be adopted, because the mechanisms, data and program 
logic used by the TCB could also be distributed. Therefore, a distributed TCB can be 
seen collection of objects and mechanisms that must be trusted so that a secure end-
lo-end connection can be made between a client and server. This implies that the 
distributed TCB may need to include parts of the Native Computing and 
Communications Environment (communication network, operating system and any 
security mechanisms resident therein), the DPE kernel, DPE services (including the 
security service itselO and possibly some related TINA applications (such as 
management applications). 
3.3.3 Interoperability 
Interoperability relates to the problem of allowing an interaction to occur between two 
disparate domains. There are several approaches that can be used to deal with the 
issue. The various merits and applicability within a DPE environment of these 
approaches wil l be discussed in the following sections. 
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3.3.3.2 Bridges 
A bridge provides a point of connection between two disparate domains. It can 
provide translation between the domains, so that interoperability is possible. The 
bridge can exist at any level. One example of a bridge is the Wireless Application 
Protocol (WAP) Gateway [84]. WAP is the de-facto standard for the presentation and 
delivery of wireless information and telephony services on mobile phones and other 
wireless terminals. The WAP specification uses standard Web proxy technology to 
connect the wireless domain to the Web. 
There are two basic types of bridge, immediate and mediated. Immediate bridges are 
full bridging solutions between two domains. They map specifically from one domain 
to another. Immediate bridges provide a fast and efficient solution but are inflexible 
because they only provide a mapping between two specific domains. Therefore, i f 
there are n domains, which require bridges to interoperate, then the number of bridges 
required is: 
• (n^-n)/2 
In the example below there are 4 terminals, each in its own domain. Therefore the 
number of bridges required in the immediate bridging solution is 6. 
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Immediate Bridging Mediated Bridging 
,SL Temiinal 
}^^mi Bridge 
Figure 3-3 Interoperability Bridging Solutions 
Mediated bridges provide the translation lo some common domain. In this case, only 
n bridges are required between n domains, and therefore the number of domains can 
be easily extended without increasing the number of bridges exponentially. In the 
example illustrated in figure 3-3 above only 4 bridges are required for the 4 domains. 
However, the use of mediate bridges is not as efficient as immediate bridges for small 
number of domains, because it requires two bridges between any two domains, i.e. 
every message is translated twice. 
These bridges deal with bridging technology domains. The issue of bridging security 
domains presents other problems. When considering a mechanism level security 
bridge, one obvious problem comes to the forefront - any message that is subject to 
encryption or an integrity check has done so using a specific security mechanism 
(algorithm). Therefore, to translate lo another mechanism, the bridge is required to 
decrypt and then re-encrypt the message. This would add a considerable performance 
overhead, to a service that may already be stricken by performance degradation from 
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the initial encryption, or integrity checksum. If a mediated bridge is used then this 
performance hit wil l be doubled because two bridges wil l exist and translate the 
message. I f a mediated bridge is used then the issue of trust and deployment exist. For 
example, the bridge wil l need to have access to both types of mechanism and could 
possibly reside in one of the two domains. This scenario would imply that the bridge 
is not necessary as the domain already would have access to the mechanisms. 
However, the bridge could also reside outside both domains with a TTP, but then trust 
must be established between each of the domains and the T I P , as the TTP wil l have 
access to the original message at some point during the translation process. As such it 
offers another point of vulnerability over which the two domains have no control. 
3.3.3.2 Standard Mechanisms 
The use of specific bridging technology is only one solution. Another solution is to 
use common technologies between the client and server. There are two requirements: 
o Common protocol that wi l l undertake the initial negotiation between client and 
server; 
o Common set of security mechanisms available in the client and server 
installations. 
The common protocol wi l l begin the negotiation between the client and server. It wil l 
allow the client and server to select a common security mechanism(s) that meet the 
requirements for the secure association between them. Once the negotiation has been 
completed, the agreed mechanism(s) can be used to provide the secure context 
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between client and server. The most common example of this is the SSL protocol, 
which uses the SSL Handshake protocol to define what mechanisms wil l be used by 
the client and server to provide a secure context. The secure communication is then 
provided by the SSL Record protocol. The assumption here is that the client and 
server are able to agree a common set of mechanisms that meet the minimum security 
requirements of their respective security policies, e.g. both client and server policy 
specify that they require encryption, and an appropriate mechanism is available to 
secure the communication. 
3.3.3.3 Generic Tokens 
A generic token is standardised, non-specific data that can be used to provide data 
between two entities. Such tokens are commonly used as a means of communicating 
data for many different purposes. For example, a generic token is the format that 
NIDES (see Section 3.2.5) uses to distribute and work with audit data. Another 
commonly used example is the Generic Security Service Application Protocol 
Interface (GSS-API) [85]. It provides portability between distributed security 
architectures by using simple interfaces to security services and generic tokens, which 
can then be implemented and utilised by a range of underlying mechanisms and 
protocols. The generic tokens are successful because they use opaque data, 
mechanism identifiers for a standard set of mechanism, and standardised status codes. 
This means that GSS-API is extensible and can easily adopt new mechanisms. 
Therefore, any generic token should use these devices to ensure that it remains 
portable across multiple mechanisms and environments. 
59 
Chupier 3: D.>j;iafl Security in Distribmed Systems 
3.3.4 Mechanism Independence and the Separation of Mechanism & Service 
Management 
Mechanism independence is the notion that a service's functionality is not dependent 
upon the mechanisms that implement it, in other words different mechanisms can be 
used by the service to provide the same service functionality. This results in two 
benefits. Firstly, since the user is not concerned with what mechanism is used to 
implement a service (e.g. a service object), it means that the service should be 
portable across different implementation platforms and also assists with the OO 
objective of encapsulation. Secondly, a result of mechanism independence is the 
separation of mechanism from service management. This facilitates fiexibility and 
allows the introduction of new mechanisms without compromising the service 
functionality. This feature also assumes that the protocol is designed to accommodate 
generic tokens/data types that the appropriate mechanism can then utilise, i.e. the 
protocol or any object interfaces are not mechanism dependent. Architectures such as 
the Comprehensive Integrated Security System (CISS) [86] actively promotes 
independence by utilising a layered architecture. GSS-API also promotes 
independence by utilising generic interface definitions that are not dependent on any 
underlying mechanism. 
3,4 Summary 
This chapter has looked at logical security for distributed systems. Firstly, it examined 
general security principles, which apply to all systems requiring protection. They 
include all the security services - authentication, access control, integrity, 
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confidentiality and non-repudiation - which need to be applied in a DPE security 
solution. 
The discussion proceeded to cover other principles that wi l l prove important in 
defining DPE security by addressing issues encountered when operating in a 
distributed, heterogeneous, multi-domain environment. The discussion proposes some 
methodologies for addressing these problems and they should also be considered in a 
DPE security solution. 
The next chapter wi l l provide an analysis of the security requirements for DPEs, and 
how they can be achieved, which wil l then assist in the definition of a new DPE 
security framework. 
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Security 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the currently defined security requirements for DPEs and 
identifies that they do not fully cover the problem space to support the design of an 
appropriate security framework. The problem domain is then analysed with an 
industrial partner ^ and goes on to provide a complete set of the DPE security 
requirements. 
These requirements are then applied to the TINA security model, which is found to be 
wanting by comparison with the requirements. The chapter concludes with a new 
security framework that address the requirements identified in the new DPE problem 
domain. 
4.2 Requirements for DPE Security 
Chapter 3 outlined the general security services (see section 3.2) and also identified 
some principles such as trust models and distributed TCB (see section 3.3) that would 
prove useful in defining a DPE security model. However, they do not provide a 
complete set of DPE security requirements, necessary to define a framework. 
^ Research was done in collaboration with Onuige (Prof. Paul Reynolds), and reviewed by an industry 
expert. 
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This section considers the particular requirements of a generic distributed object 
system (GDOS), which have been collated from current literature. Such systems are 
the genesis of a distributed processing environment. By their nature GDOS are less 
secure than client/server because the act of distribution transparency means that the 
traditional operating system cannot be trusted to protect the server resources and data 
in transit. Therefore servers in a distributed system have to find new ways to protect 
themselves without adding an unacceptable overhead effecting performance and 
availability. 
4.2.1 Distributed Object Complications 
A distributed object system is considered less secure than traditional client/server 
systems [24, 36] for the following reasons: 
o A distributed object can have the roles of both client and server: In 
traditional client/server systems, servers can always be trusted. However this 
is not true for distributed systems, as roles are not clearly defined, e.g. a single 
entity can act as both a client and a server and so the trust model is more 
complex. 
o Distributed object interactions are not transparent: Because of 
encapsulation^ [ I I ] , a client is not fully aware of the interactions that take 
place when it invokes an object and so they are more difficult to control. 
Encapsulation consists of separating the external aspects of an object, which are accessible to other 
objects, from the internal implementation details of the object, which are hidden from other objects. 
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• Distributed objects are polymorphic: Objects can be replaced without any 
interruption to the system, as long as the interface remains the same. This 
provides a perfect opportunity for Trojan Horses^ to infiltrate a system. 
• Distributed objects can scale without limit: There are no theoretical limits 
on the number of servers or clients in a system, therefore a security system 
wil l have to scale and be able to cope with the large number of resources and 
users that could possibly be involved. 
• Distributed objects are dynamic: Objects are created, operate and can then 
be destroyed. Such dynamics have to be performed securely. The system is not 
static and the security system needs to be flexible enough to securely 
accommodate this. 
4.2.2 Review of Currently defined GDOS Security Requirements 
The following is a summary of an analysis into the security requirements as currently 
stated by TINA [87] and the OMG [88]. Each requirement, and its implications upon 
the functionality of the security model, is described and then summarised in Table 4-
I . 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #1: The security system must support Identification and 
Authentication: Within a secure object system, it is imperative to identify and 
authenticate an entity. This process should support any authentication mechanism and 
should result in a unique set of certified credentials for the entity. 
^ A Trojan Horse impersonates a legitimate entity to illegally obtain data or perform some other 
malicious activity. 
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There are two possible scenarios, intra and inter-DPE authentication. In the first, the 
entity seeks authentication within the local system, and is identified and authenticated 
locally. Therefore, die validation can be trusted locally. In the latter, the entity may 
have been identified and authenticated in another system within the distributed 
environment. Thus the security service has to support the validation of such an entity. 
This is achieved by either a Trusted Third Party (TTP) (see sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.1) 
from which the local security system can obtain a proof of identity or a proof that the 
identification and authentication is trustworthy, i.e. was executed within a trusted 
system or, by the use of a single sign-on facility, which would lower the number of 
user logons required (a facility which cryptographically can have a high overhead due 
to the authentication process). 
Many different types of entities need to be authenticated, not just users. Services and 
objects wi l l also request access to other services, data and system resources. Al l such 
requests have to be validated. Therefore, authentication wil l apply to entities at all 
levels of the system - users, services, and objects. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #2: The security system must support Access Control and 
Authorisation. Once an entity has been authenticated, it also requires privilege 
information that wil l define what objects (operations) it can access. This requires a set 
of privilege attributes be assigned to the entity. 
There are multiple schemas that can be used for access control and the security model 
should be able to use them, including the use of roles/groups to reduce the 
administrative overhead (see section 3.2.1). Again two forms of operation are 
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envisaged, one within a local system, and another via a TTP to allow access across 
different domains. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #3: The security system must support Propagation of 
Attributes. Due to the nature of distributed object systems, objects need to be able to 
delegate their privileges/attributes to other objects. However, they also need to be able 
to apply constraints specifying when and where these delegated privileges can be 
used, otherwise the privileges could be used at anytime and in any domain by a rogue 
entity. 
With different domains, different security policies may present some difficulty and 
require a trust relationship to be established between two domains. The attributes 
from one domain should be mapped to authorised attributes in the other domain to 
provide validation for access control and auditing. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #4: The security system must support Secure 
Communications. Communication, both for operational and system data, needs to be 
secured (see sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4), but flexible. 
The user should be able to select the Quality of Protection (QoP) required (e.g. 
cryptographic strength) and should also be able to select how much of the message 
needs to be protected. Again, the system should have the ability to support different 
encryption and integrity mechanisms. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #5: The security system must support Secure Stored Data. 
Objects are the definition of both behaviour and data, thus any data within an object 
or utilised by an object needs to be protected. 
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While the security service may not be able to secure the data, it should have the 
ability to indicate that the data is considered sensitive and so should be stored 
securely, thereby allowing external mechanisms to secure it, i.e. the Quahty of 
Protection required. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #6: The security system must support Security Audit. Auditing 
of security relevant events is essential. The system should be able to identify events 
based on their classification and assign the audit information to an audit trail and/or an 
alarm process. 
The audit records also need to be protected from any modification, both in transit or 
when stored in the audit trail. Tools are required to analyse trails, and access to a 
generic toolset (i.e. sampler, knowledge base, analyser and responder refer to section 
3.2.5) and the audit trail records should be available to facilitate intrusion detection. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #7: The security system must support Non-Repudiation. To 
ensure accountability, non-repudiation facilities are required (see section 3.2.5). Non-
repudiation will include the generation, verification, transmission and storage of 
evidence. Such a service also requires access to an adjudicator for dispute settlements. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #8: The security system must support Security Management. 
Security management needs to support the distribution system, service and 
mechanisms (see section 3.2.6). An administrative interface to handle each function is 
required; these interfaces should be comprehensive and easy to use, as usability will 
ensure that security is properly applied. 
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R E Q U I R E M E N T #9: The security system must support Interoperability. DPEs 
provide for an open and distributed environment, and allow interactions between 
different administrative domains. 
Thus security policies and administration within a local domain need to be preserved, 
but this has to co-exist with the preservation of inter-domain security. Interoperability 
is required at both the invocation and security service level. Thus a secure invocation 
initiated in one domain to be completed in another requires the security services to 
inter-operate in order to facilitate this, and may require security attributes, i.e. 
credentials and privileges, to be mapped from one domain to another because they 
support different schemas. It will also require some negotiation to allow common 
security mechanisms and protocols to be agreed between different domains. Another 
option is the use of a gateway to translate between attributes/mechanisms/protocols 
(see section 3.3.3). 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #10: The security system must support system Scalability. The 
architecture should accommodate and allow the evolution of networks, services and 
management capabilities from small to large (global) scale in terms of its ability to 
handle the number of users, nodes, and administrative domains required. 
The security service itself must be scalable in order to cope with an "carrier class" 
large-scale systems, and so should support the use of roles/groups to reduce 
administrative costs and also allow the use of multiple inter-working security 
domains. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #11: The security system must support Integration with 
existing environments. There is already a huge investment in technology by the 
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telecommunication and data processing industry. Therefore, if this model is to be 
successful it must integrate with the existing technologies. This requires a flexible 
structure that will allow the security model to deal with multiple options for service 
and mechanism implementations and allow the flexibility to manage each of these 
different types and their data formats (see section 3.3.4 on mechanism independence 
and separation of mechanism and security management). This requirement also covers 
the need to meet the differing regulatory requirements that exist in different countries 
(e.g. rules regarding the use of cryptography). 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #12: The security system must support system recovery. The 
recovery system should establish consistent security states after security failures by 
taking various actions. This involves the maintenance of the rules used to react to real 
or suspected security violations, the remote reporting of apparent violations of system 
security, and security administrator interactions [41]. Within the system a Knowledge 
Base (KB) could hold the maintenance rules, while the "Sampler" would be used to 
collect system data that is then processed by the analyser. The "Responder" defines 
the system response that should be taken in accordance with the rules stored in the KB 
(see section 3.2.5. for IDS). 
The following table summarises the identified requirements, and lists the functionality 
that is required by a DPE security framework to facilitate the requirements. 
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No. Security 
Requirement 
Functionality required 
I. Identification and 
Authentication 
Identify entities and generate identity attributes 
Use multiple authentication mechanisms 
2. Authorization & 
Access control 
Generate privilege attributes 
Use multiple authorization mechanisms 
Use role/groups 
3. Propagation of 
security attributes 
Specify when propagation is required 
Specify constraints on propagation 
4. Secure 
communications 
Ability to select Quality of Protection 
Ability to select amount of message to be protected 
5. Secure stored data Ability to specify that data needs to be secured 
Ability to specify the Quality of Protection 
6. Secure Auditing Audit security relevant events 
Produce audit records 
Issue alarm 
Protect audit information in transit or in trail 
Should be extended to facilitate intrusion detection 
7. Non-repudiation GenerationA^erification of evidence 
Storage of evidence 
Secure transport of evidence 
Adjudication facility 
8. Management: 
System 
Service 
Mechanism 
Administrative interfaces required to handle 
management of each of these management functions 
9. interoperability Interoperability at all levels-
- Invocation 
Security Service, Mechanism and Protocol 
Mapping of attributes between domains 
10. Scalability Security service must be scalable itself as well as 
working in scalable environment 
Use of domains 
Use of groups etc in administration 
11. Integration with 
existing 
environments 
Flexible structure to allow the model to integrate with 
other technology environments/security models 
Facilitates regulatory requirements 
12. System Recovery Knowledge base system 
Table 4-1 GDOS Security Requirements 
Whilst the twelve requirements identified above originated from a DPE environment 
(i.e. TINA and OMG), they do not specifically address the complete DPE problem 
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domain, and can be applied to any distributed object system. It is necessary to 
consider a new definition of the problem domain for DPEs, and focus on requirements 
in the secure DPE space. 
4.2.3 Analysing the D P E Security Problem Domain 
Figure 2-3 (see section 2.3.1) illustrates the framework of TINA system, of which the 
unifying component is the DPE. In order to have a comprehensive set of requirements 
it is necessary to view the DPE as part of the overall architecture and the layers 
around the DPE need to be included in the analysis to ensure that any relevant 
security functionality that extends beyond the DPE layer boundary is included. 
The procedure for identifying the requirements for DPE security was to define the 
domains of security within the TINA system structure and secondly to identify what 
domains are relevant to the DPE security model, i.e. identify the scope of DPE 
security. The results of this analysis are grouped around the definition of three sub-
domains of the TINA framework. 
4.23J Transport Sub-Domain 
The transport sub-domain covers both the N C C E and Hardware layers and relates to 
the security of the hardware and operating systems utilised by a TINA 
implementation. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #T1: The security system must support the procedures, both 
physical and logical, for preventing any intrusion or modification of networking or 
computing resources, i.e. it must support intrusion detection. 
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R E Q U I R E M E N T #T2: The security system must support such actions as ensuring 
correct installation and adequate protection of hardware and software, addition of 
software patches, and control of communications ports through firewall technology. 
[N.B. this requirement is considered outside the scope of the DPE security model, 
with the exception of the management of mechanisms, in particular security 
mechanisms, both hardware and software based, that may be utilised by the DPE 
security. The reason that this management function is considered an exception is 
because of the importance of mechanism-independence to DPEs and the fact that the 
kTN (providing a logical transport network for the DPE, using the N C C E resource) 
will be part of the NCCE.] 
4.2,3,2 The Middleware Sub-Domain 
The middleware sub-domain covers both the DPE Kernel and DPE Security Service 
concerned with the protection of TINA service objects, i.e. the computational objects 
used to create services. This security will need to operate at three separate levels: 
operational, control and administrative. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #M1: The security system* must support functions such as 
ensuring only authorised access to objects, based on authenticated identities, and also 
the protection of any inter-object communications. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #M2: The security system must support the operational concerns 
of a TINA service, e.g. the video conferencing session, is secured. This includes the 
maintenance of integrity and confidentiality of any data streams and ensuring only 
authorised subscribers use the service. 
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R E Q U I R E M E N T #M3: The security system must support the control concerns of 
the TINA service by ensuring that information controlling the service configuration, 
e.g. the Quality of Service of a video stream, is protected. This involves securing the 
control data and ensuring audit services are available to track any control changes. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #M4: The security system must support the administrative 
concerns of the DPE, which includes the assurance that the security data relative to 
the service and subscriber (e.g. user and service profiles) is available and, that it can 
be administered securely. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #M5: The security system must support the DPE kernel. The DPE 
kernel is resident on every node. Although its internal security needs to be provided 
by local implementation means, inter-DPE security will have to be supported, as 
individual objects of logical DPEs may physically reside in different domains. 
4.2.3.3 Application Sub-Domain 
This sub-domain entails the protection of the applications built in the lop layer of the 
system structure. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #A1: The security system must support adequate security by 
authenticating participants, only allowing authorised access to services, securing any 
inter-participant communications and providing adequate audit and non-repudiation 
facilities as required. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #A2: The security system must be provided in accordance with a 
security policy. It should be simple to administer and hide distribution issues, such as 
location, from the user. 
73 
Chapter 4: Requirements for a m.*iv Framework for DPE Security 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #A3: The security system must operate at two levels because there 
is no guarantee that security is available in every domain. 
Firstly, security-inactive applications (i.e. those that do not employ any security 
facilities themselves, but they are still subject to any DPE security that is specified by 
the active security policy within that domain) require that although a security provider 
operating in a DPE may not have any security policy, the DPE will automatically 
provide security. It may be assumed that this type of security is always available in a 
secure DPE. 
Secondly, security-active applications i.e. those applications that are consciously 
implementing security themselves, are required to be able to access the DPE security 
service. Security-active applications are still subject to the DPE security policy, as 
with security-inactive applications, but they are also managing and implementing 
their own application security by utilising the DPE security service directly. 
4.3 Formulating a DPE Security Framework 
Prior to the proposal of a new security framework for a DPE it is necessary to visit the 
existing security framework and juxtapose this with the previously developed security 
requirements. This analysis will highlight differences and opportunities that will form 
the basis of the new framework proposals. (N.B. This is supplemented by using a 
service example of a videoconference). 
The current TINA security model is focussed on the access session (see section 2.3.2), 
which defines the terms and conditions for its operation. Sessions and other 
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information objects are mapped onto service objects'^, which present an interface to 
the client, through which they operate; the client is not concerned with the internals of 
the object (i.e. its implementation is of no consequence to the client). Figure 4-1 [15] 
and the example below illustrate a simple case of two users using a service in a 
provider domain. 
Access session related objects provide a framework for offering secure and 
personalised access to services and for supporting mobility. The Initial Agent (lA) is 
the initial contact point for the Provider Agent (PA) wishing to interact with the 
provider, and is used to gain an access session with the User Agent (UA). The 
Provider Agent and User Agent objects interact within a secure and trusted 
relationship between the user and the provider (an access session). They support 
authorisation, authentication and customisation of the user's service access and 
provide a secure mechanism for starting and joining sessions. In terms of the access 
session, the user domains take access user roles; the provider domain takes an access 
provider role. The access session related User Application (as-UAP) provides the 
user interface for the user to interact with the provider. It interacts with the Provider 
Agent to perform user requests, e.g. to establish an access session, and use services. 
'** Precisely these are known in TINA syntax as Componenis. Components reside in a computational 
space and are not deployable yet maintain the characteristics of objects. For ease of understanding the 
term object has been used throughout to mean both computational componenis and technology objects. 
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Figure 4-1 TINA Service Example 
Service session related objects provide a framework for defining services, which can 
be accessed and managed across multiple domains. In the provider domain. Service 
Session Managers (SSMs) and User Service Session Managers (USMs) are 
instantiated by Service Factories (SFs) based on requests from User Agents. A 
Service Session Manager and User Service Session Manager provide session control 
capabilities — a Service Session Manager supports those shared among the users, and 
a User Service Session Manager supports those dedicated to a user. The service 
session related User Application (ss-UAP) in the user domain allows a user to 
interact with a service session and acts as an end point for session control. 
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The communication session related objects provide end-to-end connectivity. Figure 4-
1 (based on session example from 18) shows a Communications Session Manager 
(CSM), using a Terminal C S M (TCSM) to establish a stream binding between two 
stream interfaces on the users' User Applications. 
Although recognising the need for security, the TINA architecture does not provide a 
security framework. It provides some notion of authentication and authorisation 
functionality in the access session, but there is no detailed or formal specification on 
the topics. For example, although a user profile is a recognised information object in 
the TINA information model, there is no specification of what data needs to be held to 
represent an authenticated user in the system, e.g. the user*s security attributes, so that 
they can be propagated through the distributed system. The issue of inter-domain 
authentication and authorisation is not addressed, e.g. the use of TTPs and attribute 
propagation. The other security facilities of integrity, confidentiality, audit and non-
repudiation are not addressed by any of the service objects. Indeed, there are no 
service objects specified for security, the security function is just listed as part of the 
existing service objects such as the Initial Agent, Provider Agent and User Agent, and 
there are no interface definitions to assist system developers when building these 
objects. Indeed, it is this type of ambiguity that has led to confusion and proprietary 
solutions, which has hampered interoperability between product vendors, and service 
providers [89]. 
Security management is mentioned in the management architecture as part of the 
FCAPS framework. In relation to security, it. requires that FCAPS functions be 
considered in the service architecture [15] under the description of management 
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contexts. FCAPS defines the rules that govern particular management functional areas 
during a session, for example the accounting management context might contain 
information such as the tariff structure, which would calculate charge/charging-rate 
for a service. TINA also mentions management policies, i.e. a set of rules governing a 
particular management function in the domain that is associated with the policy. 
However, its specifications do not address what security contexts or policy 
configurations are required. 
Security is also limited to the access session. It is not mentioned within the service 
session. This is an unrealistic expectation, because it assumes that security is only 
considered when the service is initially accessed by a user, and does not account for 
the times when security requirements many change during the life of the service, e.g. 
if a video conference session has several participants, and during the session the 
conference leader, and therefore conu-oller, leaves and hands his responsibility over to 
another participant. In this case the security service would need to verify that the new 
leader is authorised to take this responsibility and update his profile. 
Scalability is not seen as a problem because the TINA system is designed to be 
scalable through its use of service objects. It is accepted that this has not been proven 
and the scalability issue has only been addressed by means of modelling techniques. 
Secure interoperability has not been approached. The TINA architecture states that it 
should be able to inter-operate with non-TINA systems. However, since it does not 
address a full TINA security model, it is impossible to evaluate how it can integrate 
with other existing security models. 
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Security within the DPE itself has not been addressed. There is no mention of how the 
DPE will be secured or how interaction with DPE services will be accomplished 
securely. The issue of a distributed T C B is not mentioned, and there is no 
specification of how applications will interact with DPE security. 
The DPE's failure to meet the specified security requirements is summarised in table 
4-2 below. Simply stated, TINA does not provide a security framework to protect ISE 
services. 
No. Security Requirement Addressed in TINA 
1 Identification and Authentication Yes - but limited 
2 Authorization & Access control Yes - but limited 
3 Propagation of security attributes No 
4 Secure communications No 
5 Secure stored data No 
6 Secure Auditing No 
7 Non-repudiation No 
8 Security Management No 
9 Interoperability No 
10 Scalability Yes - use of objects 
11 Integration with existing environments No 
12 System Recovery No 
T l Intrusion Detection No 
T2 Management of hardware/software protection No 
MI Secure, authenticated inter-object communications Yes - but limited 
M2 Secure operation of TINA services Yes - but limited 
M3 Secure control of TINA services Yes - but limited 
M4 Secure administration of TINA services No 
M5 Inter-DPE security No 
AI Secure participant interaction with applications No 
A2 Secure, usable administration of applications No 
A3 DPE security for security in-active and security 
active applications 
No 
Table 4-2 Summary of TINA vs. D P E security requirements 
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4.4 A New Security Framework for DPEs 
The following defines a new security framework for DPEs using syntax and semantics 
in line with TINA specifications. The operational service objects and their interactions 
within the service architecture are described first. Issues relating to implementation 
and deployment are also addressed. The management framework is then defined, 
along with the information structures required by the framework. 
4.4.1 DPE Security Service Overview 
Twelve new operational-level security service objects, illustrated in figure 4-2 below 
and functionally described thereafter, have been identified. 
General Pollcy/Contexl| Manager SecurityAgeni 
Authentication & 
Authorisation 
Authorisation AccessControi 
Agent Agent 
Secure 
Communications 
OoP 
Agent 
Audits 
Non-repudiation 
AuditSamplei 
Agent AudilAnalyser 
Audit 
R e s p o n d e r AuditKB 
NREvidence 
Agent NRStoie NRAdjudicator 
Figure 4-2 A New Security Framework for DPEs (Operational) 
4.4.1.1 General Layer 
The general layer has two security objects 
• Pronie/Context Manager (PCM): The PCM retrieves any security 
management data required by the operational level security objects. It will 
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access security policy information, facilitating security service object actions. 
For example, the Profile/Context Manager can retrieve authentication data to 
validate a user logging into the system. It is used to control user interaction 
with the security management data and objects. 
• Security Agent (SecA): The Security Agent acts as an initial point of contact 
with the security system, and therefore plays a role in the access session, h is 
not required in the service session because the objects used here are 
considered part of the T C B and the user will not have direct interaction with 
these service objects. Security Agent controls the user interaction by 
preventing a user directly interacting with security service objects. 
4.4.1.2 Authentication and Authorisation Layer 
The Authentication and Authorisation Layer has two security objects: 
• Authorisation Agent (AuthA): Encapsulates the authentication process for 
the TINA system. Authorisation Agent authenticates the user with the 
authentication data presented by the user, via the Provider Agent and Initial 
Agent, and validates it against the policy data retrieved by the Profile/Context 
Manager. Authorisation Agent is TINA service independent and security 
mechanism independent. It is also responsible for initialing the creation of the 
user's security context, and instantiating it with the appropriate identity and 
privilege security attributes. 
• Access Control Agent (ACA): When a user makes a separate request, the 
security access control is handled by the Access Control Agent. It is based in 
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the provider domain, because access is a server-side issue in ISE. It takes the 
user's security context information and uses it to compare to the access control 
policy (via the Profile/Context Manager), to decide whether the user is 
authorised to make the service request. If authorised, the user is allowed to 
proceed with the access session. The Access Control Agent can also be used 
by the service-session objects, when they are requesting a new service that 
may be restricted. 
4.4.1.3 Secure Commimications Layer 
The Secure Communications Layer has one security object: 
o Quality of Protection Agent (QoPA): The Quality of Protection Agent is 
responsible for providing secured communications between service objects. It 
is able to compare the QoP policies, via the Profile/Context Manager, of the 
communicating parties and then decide what QoP will be implemented. The 
Quality of Protection Agent is also utilised by the audit and non-repudiation 
facilities. 
4.4.1.4 Audit and Non-Repudiation Layer 
The Audit and Non-Repudiation Layer has seven objects: 
e Audit Sampling Agent (ASA): The Audit Sampling Agent is deployed 
throughout the TINA system and is responsible for collecting any audit data. It 
is responsible for deciding whether an event is security relevant. If it is, then 
the appropriate data is retrieved and forwarded to the Audit Analyser. 
82 
Chdpier 4: RequircnunUs for it new tr ante work for DPE Security 
• Audit Analyser (AA): The Audit Analyser analyses the information sent by 
the Audit Sampling Agent to decide i f the event is anomalous. It indicates the 
analysis result (i.e. whether a system violation has occurred or whether 
suspicion levels should be raised) and produces an analysis token; the latter is 
used to provide a ful l justification of the analysis results, i f required. 
• Audit Knowledge Base (AKB): The Audit Knowledge Base stores all data 
related to the auditing process, which includes audit sampling records (i.e. the 
audit trail), audit analyser tokens, audit responder actions, and any profiling 
and analysis data used to identify any anomalous behaviour. 
• Audit Responder (AR): The analysis result and token are then sent to the 
Audit Responder, which decides what to do. The responder has two basic 
types of response - saving the data to a specific audit log or producing some 
alarm. The alarm may be sending an email or screen message to an 
administrator, or it may involve a partial or complete system 
shutdown/lockout. These responses can be constructed using service objects. 
• Non-Repudiation Evidence Agent (NREA): Whenever the NR security 
policy defines that evidence is required, e.g. proof of receipt, the Non-
Repudiation Evidence Agent wil l be able to generate/verify evidence token for 
the appropriate service object. 
• Non-Repudiation Store (NRS): The Non-Repudiation Evidence Agent 
interacts with the Non-Repudiation Store also, to store evidence tokens when 
required. 
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• Non-Repudiation Adjudicator (NRAdj): The Non-Repudiation Adjudicator 
represents a notary that can make judgements on any disputes. A TTP wil l be 
used to verify evidence and then prove/disprove claims made by clients or 
servers. I l provides the following capabilities: 
o specify the tokens and identities of the disputing objects; 
o return a decision and the supporting token (i.e. the token that validates 
the decision). 
The adjudication process has two phases - the first is an on-line adjudication. 
The on-line adjudication allows the adjudicator (without any human 
intervention) to validate the evidence tokens, i.e. make sure they have valid 
signatures and that the times are correct. I f one-evidence token is found to be 
invalid, then the process wil l be able to settle the dispute by deciding in favour 
of the valid token holder. However, i f both tokens are valid, then one of three 
options is possible. I f the Non-Repudiation Adjudicator is implemented as an 
expert system, then it may still be able to settle the dispute based on some 
existing rules it contains. I f not, it can either signal for human intervention and 
request assistance in the adjudication process or it can return a judgement of 
''undecided". 
4.4.2 Realisation and Deployment Issues 
There are several issues within the Computational model of the new DPE security 
framework that should be addressed before proceeding to the service example, as they 
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will help clarify the service example presented in the following section. Figure 4-3 
below is used to help illustrate these issues (based on service example in 18). 
User Domain Provider Domain 
US-UAP 
AuthA 
\Access-j;eiat4d 
J QoPA 
ss-UAP 
NREA 
NRAdj 
S&sston-rea 
TCSM 
l^ommun/cat/orw 
Figure 4-3 Example of Security Service Object Deployment 
4,4,2,1 Absence of data storage objects 
The TINA service example (see section 4.3) has a notable absence of any data storage 
objects. Such specification is often left to the information model. However, in the 
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security framework it was deemed necessary to identify the Audit Knowledge Base 
and Non-Repudiation Store within the model for the following reasons: 
o The data stored in the Audit Knowledge Base and Non-Repudiation Store is 
very important to the overall framework and its security. The audit 
information wi l l help identify intrusions and the non-repudiation evidence 
tokens are required for adjudication. 
© The Audit Knowledge Base stores a variety of information, and therefore wi l l 
present a variety of interfaces to the Audit Analyser, Audit Responder, and 
Audit Sampling Agent. 
o The data in both repositories needs to secure data, both in transit and in 
storage. Therefore as service objects both the Audit Knowledge Base and 
Non-Repudiation Store wil l be able to utilise security mechanisms to secure 
the data internally, and they wil l also have security policies that wi l l allow 
them to negotiate security contexts with any clients, e.g. the Audit Analyser 
and Audit Knowledge Base wil l use the Quality of Protection Agent to create 
a secure communication channel between them so that audit records can be 
transported securely over the network. 
4.4,2.2 DPE service object placement in relation to the DPE Node 
It was previously stated that DPE services, such as security, are not necessarily 
present on all DPE nodes. However, it is recommended that any DPE node involved 
in security would have most of the security service objects available locally, to reduce 
the overhead of accessing remote service objects. The exceptions to this rule are the 
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Audit Knowledge Base, Audit Responder, Audit Analyser, Non-Repudiation Store 
and Non-Repudiation Adjudicator. The reason for this is that all the other agents are 
involved in almost every service - authorisation, access control and secure 
communications are usually requirements in a protected system. The audit and non-
repudiation functions are not always required, because they generally incur a high 
overhead. However, i f required the Audit Sampling Agent and Non-Repudiation 
Evidence Agent wil l be frequently utilised by the service objects and so should 
available locally. 
4,4,23 Availability of security service objects in session model 
The security service objects are not restricted to any single session type; their 
availability wi l l be dependent on the security service requirement within each session. 
The access session is generally concerned with authentication and access control, 
therefore the Security Agent, Authorisation Agent, Access Control Agent, and 
Profile/Context Manager are available. Secure communications can be required in 
both the access session (to secure the authentication process) and service session (to 
secure the TINA service), and, therefore, the Quality of Protection Agent is available 
to both. The CSM is considered outside the scope of the DPE security model. 
However, the Service Session Manager in the service session can utilise the Quality of 
Protection Agent when requesting the CSM to provide a secured communications 
stream. The audit and non-repudiation service objects are available in the access or 
service session depending on the security policy requirements. 
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4,4,3 D P E Security Management Overview 
The new security framework separates the management of services and mechanisms 
and thereby provides the required mechanism-independence. It involves the following 
steps: 
definition of new policy classes to separate management function; 
use of opaque data types to assist abstraction; 
definition of policies for all security functions for consistency; 
ability to locate the new policies; 
ability to handle security active/inactive policies. 
4.4,3,1 New Policy Classes 
A new Policy superclass is defined^ see figure 4-4 below. It wil l have two derived 
classes, ServicePolicy and MechanismPolicy, to administer security services and 
security mechanisms respectively. 
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Figure 4-4 Administrative Policy Class 
The Policy superclass has a single data attribute type, which identifies the object(s) or 
service objects to which the policy applies. Policy defines three abstract operations, 
get, set and query, used to maintain policy data, get retrieves a single administration 
record, based on a known identifier, while set updates a single administration record 
based on the identifier, query is able to retrieve a complete set of records (a 'bulk' 
implementation of the get operation - a standard 'multiple record get' optimisation 
used in 0 0 programming). The query method also allows the user to use any data to 
select the records. For example, i f the get method used on a video conferencing 
object, retrieved the identifier and reference to the videoconference, the user could 
then use the query method find out the details of the conference, e.g. bandwidth 
required, etc, to see i f he could request access to the conference. ServicePolicy has 
three data attributes. mech_used specifies the mechanisms to be used implementing 
the policy. This is an identifier that refers to an instance of the MechanismPolicy 
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class. The expiryjime and version specify the expiration time of the policy and its 
version. Operations to update/delete entries are not listed, as some policies wi l l not 
want this to occur, e.g. non-repudiation policies. Policies that do require such 
operations wil l add them to the their own class definition, which inherits the 
ServicePolicy class. The MechanismPolicy object has one data attribute, 
Mech_specific_data. This holds mechanism specific information, and thereby 
provides the means for mechanism (technology) independence. The MechanismPolicy 
also has remove and update operations. 
4,4,3,2 Abstraction through generic data types 
To preserve mechanism independence data items that are considered opaque data 
types should be used, because their internal structure has no significance to the 
interface or the caller, but has meaning to the underlying mechanism, e.g. GSS-API 
and CORBA use such data types. Another useful method of abstraction is the use of 
codes to indicate generic and mechanism specific errors (the use of exceptions can be 
implementation specific, e.g. C-f+ use of native exception handling). I f required, the 
codes can be divided in to major (generic) and minor (mechanism-specific) structure 
to preserve the mechanism independent nature of the service, while still passing 
useful mechanism-specific failure information. Also another reason that exceptions 
are not used is because, by standard 0 0 programming practice, they should indicate 
an exceptional circumstance that only occurs between 5-10% of the time. In this case 
the errors can be a valid response that occurs on a regular basis, e.g. security 
credentials expiring or corrupt signature. 
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4,4,3.3 Consistent Management Structure 
Providing a structured management system that operates across all the security 
facilities ensures consistent management. Currently, there is no standardised 
administration for each of the DPE security facilities. No management contexts or 
policies are defined. Therefore the policy and mechanism administration service 
objects should be applied across all of the security facilities to provide a 
comprehensive and coherent administration structure. 
M A N A G E M E N T A G E N T S 
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Figure 4-5 Security Service Objects - Management 
• AuthenticationPolicy (AuthPolicy) & AuthenticationMech (AuthMech): Two 
objects now administer the authentication process. Authentication Policy is 
responsible for holding the following: 
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o identifying an access session User Application and the authentication 
mechanism associated with it, e.g. the video conferencing service may require 
smartcard authentication; 
o authentication policy for a user, i.e. it identifies the authentication mechanism 
allowed for a user and the associated authentication data - for password 
identification it identifies the user*s ID and password; 
o security identity, which is used to create a user's security identity context that 
can be propagated throughout the TU^A system. 
Authentication Mechanism administers the authentication mechanisms. It holds 
data relating to the mechanism name and its object identifier within the system. 
The ISO/IEC specifications for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.l ) [90] and 
Basic Encoding Rules (BER) [91] are used to define what mechanism is used. For 
example, the Object Identifier 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 identifies the Kerberos V5 
mechanism. It may also identify the authentication data types required, e.g. 
character string is required for password authentication. 
• AccessControlPolicy (ACPolicy) & AccessControlMech (ACMech): The 
access control service-level administration, AccessControlPolicy, includes the 
following data: 
o identification of the access control mechanism used for the service; 
o user privilege attributes that wi l l be used to create the user*s privilege attribute 
context to be propagated through the system (this wi l l be linked with the 
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user's identity context), and wil l be used to evaluate whether a user is 
authorised to access a particular service. This wi l l also include the delegation 
status of the credentials, i.e. which, i f any, of the attributes that can be 
delegated through the TINA system; 
o provider-required privilege attributes, which identify what privileges are 
required for a user to access the provider's service (the user's privilege 
attribute context wi l l be evaluated against this). 
The ACMech holds the data relation to the administration of the access control 
mechanisms. It identifies the mechanisms used, along with other implementation 
information such as version and expiry date. 
• QualltyofProtectionPolicy (QoPPoiicy) & QualityofProtectionMech 
(QoPMech): Integrity and confidentiality management are handled by QOPPoIicy 
and QOPMech. The QOPPoIicy is responsible for the following data: 
o the QoP to be used, i.e. whether integrity, confidentiality or both are required 
to secure data; 
o identifying what mechanisms are required by a particular service object. This 
should identify the required mechanisms and other supported mechanisms that 
may be used instead, to provide flexibility; 
o for transit data, how much of a message wil l be encrypted, e.g. the whole 
message or just selected portions. 
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The QoPMech lists the mechanism and its object identifier. It wi l l hold any 
other mechanism specific information, such as the location of keys, version 
number etc. 
• AuditPolicy & AuditMech: The system audit information is administered by 
these objects. AuditPolicy manages the following data: 
o event selectors identify what event is considered security-relevant and what 
details of the event need to be recorded, e.g. an service access request should 
be audited and the selectors include the time, the user making the request, the 
service requested and whether the request failed or succeeded; 
o Audit Analyser and Audit Responder used. There may be several analysers 
and responders available, each possibly using different mechanisms or used 
for different sub-domains; 
AuditMech is used to administer the entire audit mechanisms, Audit Analyser, 
Audit Responder, and Audit Sampling Agent. It wil l hold mechanism specific 
details, such as location, object identifier etc. 
NRPolicy & NRMech: NRPolicy, responsible for non-repudiation administration, 
specifies the following: 
o the type of evidence required by a service object for a particular request; 
o the QoP for the delivery of non-repudiation evidence; 
o the storage object where evidence wil l be held; 
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o the accepted authorities (includes adjudicators and delivery authority); 
o the NR mechanism to be used to generate the evidence. 
NRMech specifies the mechanism-specific details for the non-repudiation 
mechanisms. 
• Policy/Context Manager (PCM): One further service object that can be included 
in this model is the Profile/Context Manager (already specified as an operational 
service object), which is used as the point of contact between the operational and 
management models. It is responsible for finding the appropriate administration 
object within a domain, retrieving security management information from policies 
and building security contexts with this data. The Profile/Context Manager 
abstracts the DPE-defined contexts from the actual security service 
implementations. 
4.4.3.4 Facilitating Security Active/inactive Applications 
The security requirements analysis (see section 4.2.3) outlined the need for security-
active and security-inactive applications. This implies that two security policies could 
exist for a single application, one as a domain default to handle all applications (both 
active and in-active) and then the particular security-active policy for an application. 
Therefore the management system needs to be able to administer the separate policies 
and define the rule of operation when two conflicting policies exist. The issue of 
allowing two policies to exist is addressed by identify the policy type, e.g. the policy 
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type can be defined as active or inactive. The second issue is more complex and wi l l 
be addressed in more detail when interoperability is discussed in Chapter 5. 
4 . 5 DPE Secured Service Example 
The example presented in this section illustrates a service session that is secured using 
the new security framework. The following assumptions are made: 
• only one user and one provider are involved; 
• only one security domain is involved (even though the figure shows 
User/Provider domains which would normally be different security domains -
the issue of interoperability between security domains wil l be addressed in the 
following chapter); 
• not all service object interactions are shown, in order to simplify the 
illustration, e.g. Profile/Context Manager interactions to build contexts are not 
shown. 
The video conferencing service example, which is based on the standard TINA 
service architecture example [15], presents two security relevant scenarios. The initial 
TINA scenarios assume that all the operations are successfully completed (no error, 
no fault, and no rejection) for simplicity. Some of the alternate outcomes wil l be 
outlined in each section. The example also does not address the issue of secure 
interoperability between disparate domains; it assumes that the security technology 
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and policies are compatible. Inter-domain secure interoperability wi l l be dealt with in 
chapter 5. 
4.5,1 Logging in to the Provider 
This example shows userA establishing an access session with their named user agent 
of the provider. The user wishes to make use of the provider's services, which the 
user has previously subscribed to. 
Preconditions: 
The user has contacted the provider, and the Provider Agent has an interface reference 
to an Initial Agent of the provider. 
The new security preconditions required: 
o security is available in both the user and provider domains; 
o user A is defined as an authorised user in the provider domain; 
o a QoPPolicy is available for the Provider Agent and User Agent; 
o there are no audit or non-repudiation policies related to the login process 
o the user and provider domains are in a single security administration domain 
and therefore secure interoperability is not an issue. 
Scenario: 
(The new security interactions are steps 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 13.) 
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1. User A uses an access session related User Application to login to the 
provider, as a known user. The access session related User Application 
requests the user authentication information such as the UserlD and 
password. The user then requests the Provider Agent to login to the 
provider, as a known user. The access session related User Application 
supplies the security information to the Provider Agent. 
2. Provider Agent requests that an access session is set up with the named 
User Agent of the user. Provider Agent provides the usemame of the user 
to the Initial Agent. 
3. The Provider Agent sends the security information to the Security Agent in 
the user domain. Security Agent". 
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Figure 4-6 New Secure Login Examples 
4. Security Agent" sends the information to Security Agent in the provider 
domain (Security Agent**), to authenticate the user. 
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5. Security Agent^ coniacis Authorisation Agent, which retrieves the 
authentication policy from AuthPolicy to authenticate the user. 
6. Once authenticated, Authorisation Agent also retrieves UserA*s privilege 
attributes from ACPolicy, to create the user's security context. 
7. Security Agent^ contacts the Quality of Protection Agent, to see i f secure 
communication is required with the user domain; Quahty of Protection 
Agent, finds the appropriate QoPPolicy, and returns the information to the 
user's security context. 
8. The completed security context is associated with the User Agent. 
9. An access session has been established. It returns the interface reference of 
the user's User Agent. 
10. Provider Agent retrieves its security policy information, via the Security 
Agent*^ to see i f secure communication is required. 
11. Provider Agent sends information about the user domain to the User 
Agent. This information is termed the Provider Agent context, and wil l 
include the security context information such as the QoP required by the 
Provider Agent. 
12. In this example, both domains require secure communications, i.e. 
integrity and confidentiality. The Provider Agent and User Agent request 
the Quality of Protection Agents in both domains, to negotiate what 
mechanisms are to be used, via the security context information, i.e. they 
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find a common set of mechanisms to use for both integrity and 
confidentiality, such as MD4 and 3DES. 
13. A secure communication channel is established between Provider Agent 
and Initial Agent. 
14. Provider Agent returns success to access session related User Application. 
Post-conditions: 
User has setup an access session between the Provider Agent and named User Agent. 
The named User Agent is personalised to the user, and has knowledge of interfaces of 
the Provider Agent. 
Any interface references of the Initial Agent held by the Provider Agent wi l l be 
invalid. 
The new security post-conditions required are: 
o a Provider Agent context containing security information has been created; 
o a security context containing UserA's security information is associated with 
the User Agent; 
o a secure communication channel exists between Provider Agent and User 
Agent. 
Alternatives within scenario: 
There are several alternatives available within this scenario, of which two key issues 
are listed: 
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• The user may have been unknown. The authentication could have failed at 
step 6 or the user could have been logged in with guest privileges. The 
outcome would be dependent on the domain policy in relation an un-
recognised user. 
• The known user may have supplied incorrect authentication information, e.g. 
an invalid password. In this case the login would have failed at step 6 and the 
session would have been terminated. A similar situation would arise for an 
expired/revoked user ID. 
Other alternatives relate to the security policies defined with in the domains, e.g. audit 
of the authentication process may have been required etc. For simplicity, it was not 
included in this scenario. 
4.5.2 Starting a New Service Session 
This example shows a user starting a new service session. The user is assumed to be 
in an access session with the provider and to have a valid subscription to the service 
(the service type is web-cast). The service session related User Application is 
assumed to be present on the user's terminal. Steps 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are 
new security related interactions. 
Preconditions: 
An access session exists between the Provider Agent (user A) and User Agent (in 
provider domain). An access session related User Application shows the user the 
services that can be started. 
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The new security preconditions are: 
• a security service exists in both the user and provider domains; 
• the user's has already been authenticated, a security context for the user is 
available to the provider and is associated with the User Agent; 
• a secure communication exists between the Provider Agent and User Agent; 
• the provider domain specifies an audit policy that records when a new web-
cast session is started; 
• the provider non-repudiation pohcy requires a proof of origin for a new web-
cast request; 
Scenario: 
1. The access session related User Application requests a list of services from the 
Provider Agent, which the user has subscribed to. The Provider Agent makes 
the same request to the User Agent. 
2, The User Agent contacts the Security Agent^ to see what services the user is 
authorised to see. Security Agent^ already has the user's security context and 
needs to compare it to the required attributes for services. 
3. Security Agent contacts the AccessPolicy, via the Access Control Agent, to 
see what attributes are required for the list of available services. 
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4. Once Security Agent** defines the list of authorised service, i.e. those services 
which the user has the required privilege attributes for, it returns the list to the 
User Agent. 
5. The User Agent returns the list to the access session related User Application, 
which displays the list to the user. The user selects a service to start, a 
recorded web-cast. The access session related User Application requests 
Provider Agent to start the service. 
6. The Provider Agent starts the service session related User Application, 
associated with this service session, and informs it of the service type that it 
should start (web-cast). 
7. The service session related User Application requests a new service session of 
service type web-cast, from the Provider Agent. (The service session related 
User Application may pass information about itself to the Provider Agent, 
including session models and feature sets supported, and references to its 
operational and stream interfaces.) 
8. Provider Agent requests to start a new service session of the service type 
(web-cast), to (user A's) User Agent. (It may also pass the information about 
the User Application.) 
9. Before User Agent starts a service, it wil l contact the Security Agent** to 
request that it checks the security policy for that particular service. 
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10. The Security Agent^ wi l l contact the Quality of Protection Agent, which wil l 
use QoPPolicy, to see i f there are any secure communication requirements for 
the web-cast session. In this case there is no QoP requirement. 
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11. The Security Agent^ wil l contact the Audit Sampling Agent, which wil l use 
AuditPolicy, to see i f there are auditing requirements for a web-cast session. 
The policy specifies that new web-cast session requests wil l be audited. 
12. In response to this, the Audit Sampling Agent generates an audit record, which 
is forwarded to the Audit Knowledge Base. No analysis is required, as the 
policy only requires the event to be logged. (For simplicity, the negotiation of 
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the secure connection, by the Quality of Protection Agents, between the Audit 
Sampling Agent and Audit Knowledge Base is not illustrated). 
13. The Security Agent*' wi l l contact the Non-Repudiation Evidence Agent, which 
wil l use NRPolicy, to see i f there are non-repudiation requirements for a web-
cast session. Their policy specifies that a proof of origin is required for the 
request. 
14. In response to this, the Non-Repudiation Evidence Agent generates a proof of 
origin token using the user's security information associated with the User 
Agent. This token is forwarded the Non-Repudiation Store. (For simplicity, 
the negotiation of the secure connection, by the Quality of Protection Agents, 
between the Non-Repudiation Evidence Agent and Non-Repudiation Store is 
not illustrated). 
15. User Agent gets a reference to a service factory, which can create service 
session objects for the service type (web-cast). 
16. User Agent requests that a new session of the service type (web-cast) be 
created by the Service Factory. 
17. Service Factory creates an Service Session Manager and a User Service 
Session Manager and initialises them. In this case a security context is 
associated with the Service Session Manager, which describes the services 
security requirements, e.g. i f it has audit and non-repudiation requirements. 
18. Service factory returns interface references of the User Service Session 
Manager and the Service Session Manager to the User Agent. 
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19. User Agent returns references of the User Service Session Manager and 
Service Session Manager to the Provider Agent. 
20. Provider Agent returns references of the User Service Session Manager and 
Service Session Manager to the service session-User Application. 
21. The service session related User Application and User Service Session 
Manager (and Service Session Manager) can interact using service specific 
interfaces or interfaces defined by session models, including the T I N A session 
model. Some interactions between these objects may be necessary before the 
user can use the service. 
22. At this point User A is the only user involved in the web-cast session. Some 
services may be single user services. 
Post-conditions: 
A web-cast session is established between the user and provider. 
The new security post-conditions are: 
• An audit record for the request exists in the provider's Audit Knowledge Base. 
• An evidence token for the proof of origin (i.e. the user) exists in the provider's 
Non-Repudiation Store. 
Alternatives within scenario: 
• I f the User Agent were unable to start the service, it would have raised an 
exception in step 15 or one of the later steps (e.g. when the Service Factory 
was creating the Service Session Manager, or User Service Session Manager). 
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• I f the web-cast service were already running, then the audit and non-
repudiation policy information would already have been available, via the 
Service Session Manager's security context. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has specified the DPE security requirements through analysis of the 
current literature and providing a new definition of the DPE security problem domain. 
As a result, a new DPE security framework has been defined. It provides a two-tier 
model that addresses the operational and administrative needs of a DPE environment. 
The operational service objects provides all of the ISO defined security services, and 
the management objects provides the fiexibility and consistency required by using 
mechanism-independence, abstraction and a complete set of management objects to 
administer all of these services. As the framework has been defined using service 
objects, it is scalable and can be easily distributed across the DPE. 
However, there are still two major issues that have to be considered, namely 
interoperability, and the interaction between the security framework and the existing 
DPE services, such as the trader. Both of these topics are covered in detail in the 
following chapters. 
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5,1 Introduction 
A fundamental characteristic of a distributed system is that physical nodes and 
distributed objects require interoperability. It facilitates interaction between entities 
resident across heterogeneous platforms, where such entities may be implemented 
using different technologies or different paradigms. Although computers can be 
networked, this does not imply interoperability has been achieved. Interoperability has 
to solve the challenge of differences in protocols, data formats, programming 
languages and, paradigms. For example, although it may seem a simple task to 
provide a graphical front-end interface to a legacy mainframe system, interoperability 
obstacles have to be addressed including: the front and back-ends operating in two 
different paradigms, (object-oriented and procedural) and data conversion and 
manipulation so that it can be understood by each system. Even within the Internet, 
where currently millions of nodes are connected and are able to interoperate, new and 
more optimal solutions are still being sought to support distributed transparency, for 
example the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [92]. SOAP defines an Remote 
Procedure Call mechanism, using HTTP as the transport and X M L documents for 
encoding requests and responses, in order to provide an object invocation mechanism 
built on standardised Internet solutions. 
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For DPEs, CORBA provides one interoperability solution using a combination of 
brokers (ORB) and language independent IDL interfaces (see Section 2.4) " . C O R B A 
also supports interoperability to other non-CORBA distributed systems, such as COM 
[93], Other organisations, are now explicitly addressing interoperability with their 
frameworks, e.g. Microsoft committed one quarter of its budget in 1999 to 
interoperability [94, 95]. However, these solutions currently only address insecure 
communications. When security requirements are added a significant increase the 
difficulty of the task is noted. Although secure interoperability is not a new topic in 
DPEs, this chapter deals specifically with the issues currently encountered and 
presents proposals on how they can be alleviated with the New Framework 
previously described (see chapter 4). 
5.2 DPE Secure Interoperability Requirements 
Secure Interoperability within and between DPEs can be described as the ability to 
provide a secure association between a client and target even when they exist in 
different security domains. 
In addressing secure interoperability, the requirements need to be established. Table 
5-1 below summarises the DPE security requirements specified in the previous 
chapter. These requirements will be evaluated to see how they apply to secure DPE 
interoperability. 
" The OMG has even sponsored CORBAnei, a research project ai the Disu-ibuted System Technology 
Centre in Australia, whose specific function is to demonsuaie interoperability between different ORB 
vendors [111. 
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No. Security Requirement 
1 Identification and Authentication 
2 Authorization & Access control 
3 Propagation of security attributes 
4 Secure communications 
5 Secure stored data 
6 Secure Auditing 
7 Non-repudiation 
8 Security Management 
9 Interoperability 
10 Scalability 
11 Integration with existing environments 
12 System Recovery 
T l Intrusion Detection 
T2 Management of hardware/software protection 
M l Secure, authenticated inter-object communications 
M2 Secure operation of TINA services 
M3 Secure control of TINA services 
M4 Secure administration of TINA services 
M5 Inter-DPE security 
A l Secure participant interaction with applications 
A2 Secure, usable administration of applications 
A3 DPE security for security in-active and security active 
applications 
Table 5-1 Requirements for D P E Security 
Interoperability is listed as a requirement for secure DPEs. As DPEs are distributed, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that all objects would be distributed within a single 
security domain. Therefore all inter-domain communications still have the same 
security requirements as intra-domain communications, and many of the issues have 
already been addressed in chapter 4. Authentication and Authorisation (Requirements 
#1 & #2) stated the need for inter-DPE authentication, i.e. the ability to authenticate 
through a TTP and the need to allow access to remote clients (see section 4.2.2). 
110 
Chapter 5: Secure Interoperability in a DPE 
Auditing, non-repudiation, secure communications and storage of data are still 
required (Requirements #4-#7). However, interoperability of these services now 
highlights new requirements. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #11: The trust relationship between two disparate security 
domains has to be established. Authentication and authorisation already require 
some form of trust to exist between two entities or services. However, in the case of 
interoperability, the trust model (see section 3.3.1) needs to be defined between the 
domains. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #12; Attribute mappings need to exist between disparate 
domains. Propagation of attributes constitutes a more complex problem in an inter-
domain scenario; this is because the attributes in two domains may differ, and 
therefore a mapping needs to exists between the attributes so they can be converted 
when necessary. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #13: Middleware sub-domain interoperability requires secure 
operational-level interaction. As the middleware sub-domain is responsible for 
operational services, it needs to ensure that compatible mechanisms can be used for 
secure inier-domain DPE interactions. 
R E Q U I R E M E N T #14: Middleware sub-domain interoperability requires secure 
control and administrative interaction. As the middleware sub-domain is 
responsible for control and administration of services, it needs to ensure that the 
policy configurations of services are compatible for secure inter-domain DPE 
interactions. 
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R E Q U I R E M E N T #15: Application sub-domain interoperability requires the 
negotiation of a secure inter-domain context. As the application sub-domain is 
responsible for establishing a secure context between a target and client, it needs to 
begin the negotiation process to allow all domains create the appropriate agreed 
environment. 
5.3 DPE Secure Interoperability - the issues 
The interoperability requirements highlight the fact that there are four possible 
inconsistencies that need to be resolved: 
• conflicting security mechanisms (requirement #/JJ; 
• conflicting security policies (requirement #/2, ^14); 
• conflicting security protocols (requirement #/5J; 
• different trust domains (requirement #/7). 
These issues and their possible solutions are discussed in the following sub-sections 
and then summarised in table 5-2 
5.3.1 Conflicting Security Mechanisms 
I f two domains are using different security mechanisms, interoperability is a serious 
issue. For example, i f they have differing encryption algorithms (e.g. DBS and IDEA) 
The issue of different paradigms is noi considered because it is assumed that all DPEs will be using 
object-oriented technology. 
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it wil l not be possible for these two domains to provide a secure association between 
their members because they cannot interact cryptographically. 
Solutions to this problem include: 
• the provision of a bridge (see section 3.3.3.1) that wil l perform the appropriate 
conversion between encryption mechanisms. However, when using this with 
cryptographic mechanisms, it complicates the situation by adding overheads (due 
to the decryption and re-encryption of messages) and providing another point of 
vulnerability between the two domains. 
• the use of a standard set of mechanisms and the provision of a protocol to 
negotiate a common mechanism to be used (see section 3.3.3.2). For example, 
SSL provides such a facility for secure Iniemel communication. The drawback for 
DPEs is that they require access to a common set of mechanisms and a common 
protocol. 
• the use of generic tokens (see section 3.3.3.3). For example, GSS-API provides 
such a facility, but it does require the definition of the token structure and the use 
of appropriate interfaces/protocol to utilise the tokens. Definition of a generic 
tokens can prove difficult as it needs to ensure that the token is truly generic and 
caters for all protocol requirements; also i f opaque data types are used a 
performance overhead can be incurred due to the data marshalling required. 
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5.3.2 Conflicting Security Policies 
A security policy is defined as a set of criteria for the provision of security services. It 
defines what is and what is not permitted in the area of security during general 
operation of a secured system. These criteria can and do differ between domains. For 
example, a client in domain A has an authentication policy specifying that server-side 
(peer-entity) authentication is required. A server in domain B has an authentication 
policy specifying that mutual (peer-to-peer) authentication is required; i.e. the client 
has to authenticate itself to the server as well. However, the client in domain A has no 
way of authenticating itself to the server, e.g. i f digital certificates were used for 
authentication, the client in domain A may not possess a certificate. Therefore, in this 
example, a secure association, that satisfies both security policies, can never be 
established between domain A and B because the client wi l l never be able to 
authenticate itself to the server. 
A solution to this problem is to allow negotiations between the security policies of the 
two domains. It requires each domain to define what is supported and what is required 
by a policy. A policy requirement is a security service function that must be complied 
with; otherwise a secure association cannot be established, such as mutual 
authentication in domain B in the above example. A supported policy is one that is 
available but not necessary for a secure context. The requirements for a DPE in the 
provision of this solution are two-fold: 
• the definition of security policy configurations for the security services 
between two domains; 
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• ihe definition of a protocol to negotiate the policy configuration. 
This solution wil l also have an impact on the mechanisms used. Mechanism-
independence (see section 3.3.4) facilitates the negotiation process. It wi l l abstract the 
policy (security service) required from the mechanism. However, a successful policy 
negotiation does not necessarily guarantee a secure context can be established 
between two disparate domains. For example, i f domain A requires non-repudiation, 
but domain B does not support any compatible mechanism with domain A, then 
secure interoperability wi l l not be possible. The security policy defines the rules of 
secure engagement between two domains, and therefore it should be negotiated first. 
A policy issue that is not dealt with by this solution is the existence of different 
attributes in disparate domains. For example, domains A and B both support access 
control using Access Control Lists. However, domain A defines different user roles 
and access rights to domain B. There are three possible courses of action. 
• users can be logged in with restricted privileges, as their attributes are not 
recognised in the foreign domain; this solution will restrict the interactions that 
can occur. 
• the administrators of both domains can add the appropriate foreign domain users 
to their own domains; this adds an administrative overhead, and requires the 
administrators to have agreed on the appropriate user access rules. 
• the attributes could be mapped to appropriate corresponding attributes in the 
foreign domain; this approach also requires a certain amount of upfront 
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agreement/trust between the domains, but it considerably reduces the 
administrators' subsequent overhead while still providing interoperability. 
533 Conflicting Security Protocols 
A security protocol is used to establish a security context between the client and 
server and facilitate the secure association once it has been created. I f a client and 
server are using different security protocols, they wil l never be able to agree on the 
security context that needs to be used because they wil l not understand each other. 
The problem for DPEs is that there is currently no adequate security protocol defined. 
For example, the OMG solution is the Internet Inter-Orb Protocol (HOP) and its 
secure version Secure Inter-Orb Protocol (SECIOP) [96], however it does not address 
all of the DPE requirements. Some protocols are functionally restricted, e.g. SSL does 
not provide any access control mechanisms. Others are environmentally restricted, i.e. 
they are designed for a particular environment such as Open Software Foundation's 
Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) [97, 98]. None of the available protocols 
address all the features mentioned in the sections above - negotiation of mechanisms 
and policy configurations, and the use of generic tokens. 
5.3.4 Different Trust Domains 
Interoperability between different security domains within a DPE brings to the 
forefront issues concerning the use of a distributed TCB (see section 3.3.2) and use of 
different trust models (see section 3.3.1). I f a client and server exist in two separate 
domains, A and B, and they wish to communicate, although they are considered to be 
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using a single TCB, it is distributed across two domains and so wil l have different 
levels of trust in different objects. For example, while the DPE wil l trust the security 
service in its own security domain, it may not trust the security service in the other 
security domain. Therefore trust has to be established between these objects. The 
security service in Domain A needs to trust the security service in Domain B is 
operating in a secure fashion, e.g. i f single sign-on is operating between the domains. 
Domain A needs to trust the following: 
• the authentication information that Domain B is holding, in order to login to 
domain A, is adequately protected; 
• the security service in Domain B properiy authenticated and authorised the 
administrator or user that entered the login information; 
• the mechanisms used for the security service are trustworthy. 
In a DPE, using a distributed TCB, the trust model wi l l affect the amount of 
interaction required between two separate security domains. The three basic models 
define the amount of overhead required: 
• No trust: Mutual suspicion exist and so all services are required, e.g. 
authentication, authorisation (providing restricted 'guest' privilege) and any 
user interactions should be carefully monitored and/or restricted; 
• Pre-existing trust: The number of services may be reduced, e.g. 
authentication may not be required (user attributes may just be mapped to the 
local domain attributes), and monitoring may be reduced; 
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• Established trust: The interaction initially requires the authentication process 
to validate a user via a TTP. Once authenticated, the can be authorised to 
operate as a trusted user. 
Therefore a DPE needs to be able to adapt to each of these scenarios, and judge when 
each is required. This places three requirements on secure interoperability in DPEs: 
• the interaction needs to be recognised as an inter-domain operation; 
• the security services needs to be able to configure the security policy 
accordingly to the requirements; 
• the security service needs to be able to adopt the required mechanisms to 
enforce the security policy. 
The possible inconsistencies that may arise, along with their possible solutions are 
summarised in table 5-2 below. 
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Scenario Addressing Secure Interoperability 
Inconsistent 
policy 
Standard Policy Configurations 
Both domains need to use a common policy to interoperate. The 
use of standard policy configurations and any mappings to such 
configurations wi l l overcome the inconsistent policy problem. 
Another possible requirement is the existence of an attribute 
mapping facility, between the domains. 
Mechanism-Independence 
Mechanism-Independence implies that security mechanisms and 
security services (and their governing policies) are managed 
independently of each other. Therefore it is possible to allow 
negotiations so that appropriate mechanisms or appropriate 
services (policies) can be selected to allow interoperation. 
Inconsistent 
mechanism 
Standard Mechanisms 
The provision of a standard set of mechanisms should ensure that 
the problem of inconsistent mechanisms does not arise, as both 
domains should always have at least one mechanism that they 
both support for the service. 
Generic Tokens 
The use of generic tokens, wi l l allow help abstract security 
service implementations from the mechanisms used. 
Both of these facilities help provide mechanism-independence. 
Inconsistent 
protocols 
Standard Handshake Protocol 
A common protocol that can negotiate the security policy and 
mechanisms that wi l l be used to provide a secure communication 
between a client and server. 
Inter-domain 
Trust 
Trusted Tliird Parties 
Trust is essential for secure interoperability. The domain 
administrator needs to know whether he can trust the foreign 
domain. The use of 11 Ps wil l be essential in any inter-domain 
service, e.g. X.509 Certification Authorities. 
Table 5-2 Addressing Secure Interoperability Scenarios 
119 
Chapter 5: Secure Interoperability in a DPE 
5.4 A New Secure Interoperability Framework 
Based upon the previous analysis, a new secure interoperability framework has been 
defined for DPEs. The framework comprises three new elements: 
• the policy configuration structure, 
• a security interoperability protocol, and 
• a set of security service objects together with their interactions. 
5.4.1 New Policy Configuration Structure 
The issue of ensuring compatible policy configurations can be used to facilitate secure 
interoperable control and administration of services, requires a standard policy 
configuration to exist between both domains (Requirement #14). While certain 
security policy features have been negotiated in existing protocols, e.g. the negotiation 
of mutual authentication in SSL, there is no definition of a complete DPE security 
policy negotiation. The objective is to specify all the services that need to be agreed 
and the possible options that wil l be used for these services. The configuration is 
summarised in table 5-3. 
The services should include the fu l l set of ISO 7498/2 facilities: i.e. authentication, 
access control, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. 
• Authentication has one attribute. Type ' , which defines the type of 
authentication required - 'client', 'server' or 'mutual', 'client' and 'server' 
represent peer-entity options where only the client or the server needs to be 
authenticated. 
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• Access control also has only one attribute, ^Mapping'. Although the 
mechanism revolves around the comparison of attributes, there are still 
innumerable variations on the possible values of the attributes, e.g. *read, 
write, execute', 'get, set, mange'. Another problem is the use of administrative 
aids such as roles, and groups, which increases the number of options 
exponentially. Although the research initially hoped to define common sets of 
attributes and possible their groupings (e.g. 'read, write, execute' defined as 
the *Unix' attribute set) it was deemed to be an unrealistic solution. There 
were too many variables, and the set definitions could easily become outdated, 
and the resulting synchronisation of the sets among different domains would 
prove difficult . Therefore, a solution was to provide the option to reference a 
domain mapping object. This object would record the details of the mapping 
between two specified domains. I f the object reference for a particular instance 
of the domain mapper is provided, the interacting domains wil l use the 
mappings specified. I f the object reference is ' N i l ' , then no domain mapping 
exists and one of the following wil l occur, either they wil l authenticate the 
client and then assign rights, or restricted attributes such as guest-privileges, or 
the client wi l l already be defined because of previous adminisn-alor 
interaction. 
• Integrity and confidentiality services have been aggregated into a single 
service Quality of Protection (QoP). There are two options. The Type ' option 
lists whether no protection or a selection from integrity, confidentiality, 
DetectMisordering and DetectReplay are applied. The last two options are 
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included because they can be addressed through time-stamping and 
sequencing when combined with the integrity and confidentiality algorithms. 
The second option is ^Message Part', this is defined under the assumption that 
a DPE protocol wi l l be defined that wi l l allow the QoP mechanisms to be 
applied in this fashion. I f a non-DPE protocol is used, then the message part 
segment may not be applicable. In an effort to reduce the performance 
overhead, the policy tries to configure the amount of message sent between the 
two domains that should be protected. The protocol message is broken up into 
its constituent parts and the policy defines the portion to be protected, the 
operation called, the parameter passed, target destination and any other 
information that might be included, such as transaction related details. 
• Non-repudiation is specified by identifying the types of evidence to that are 
required (see section 3.2.5). Each domain needs to know that the foreign 
domain can produce the requested evidence; otherwise one of the participants 
may be vulnerable to repudiation. 
• TTP is specified by identifying the role the TTP wil l play in a service, e.g. a 
TTP for authentication, or a TTP for non-repudiation delivery authority. A 
object reference is then associated with the specified role. 
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Service Policy Options Policy Configuration Values 
Authentication Type Client, Server, Mutual 
Access Conn-ol Mapping Ni l , <Reference> 
QoP Type 
Message Part 
NoProtection, Integrity, Confidentiality, 
DetectMisordering, DeiectReplay 
parameters, operations, destination, info 
Non-Repudiation Evidence Type Proof of Origin, Proof of Receipt, 
Proof of Submission, Proof of Delivery 
TTP <Role> <Reference> 
Table 5-3 Policy Configurations 
No audit section has been specified because the audit information is considered to 
remain local to each domain. Each security service wi l l create audit records for any 
security-relevant event that occur within their own domain, and this information does 
not need to be propagated across the domain boundaries. There are only two instances 
when such inter-domain audit would occur. Firstly, i f a single audit service is running 
over both domains. In this case, the audit records could be directed to a single central 
repository that both domains could access, as a single audit policy would actually be 
in operation. Secondly, i f a security incident, such as an attack occurred, then the 
administrators from both domains may wish to share audit information to help track 
the culprit. However, this administrative interaction would generally occur off-line 
and with the direct assistance of the administrators. It is not required for the inter-
domain interaction described here. 
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5.4.2 New Secure Interoperability Protocol 
Based on requirements defined in the previous chapter, the secure interoperability 
protocol needs to have the ability to: 
• provide the appropriate translation ability between domains, e.g. the ability to 
map security attributes (Requirement #12); 
• utilise compatible security mechanisms (Requirement #13); 
• utilise compatible security policies (Requirement #14); 
• define a secure context through the negotiation of an agreed policy 
configuration and through the use of compatible security mechanisms 
(Requirement #15); 
• establish a trust relationship (Requirement #11). 
A protocol has been defined to meet the needs of secure inter-domain DPE 
interactions. The messages utilised are listed in table 5-4 below. 
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MessageName Function 
CreateContext Passed by the client to the target when a secure context needs 
to be created. 
NegotiateContext Used by the client or target during context establishment to 
pass further messages to its peer as part of creating the context. 
AcceptContext Returned by the target to indicate that the association has been 
established. 
DeleteContext Used to indicate to the receiver that the sender of the message 
has discarded the identified context. Once the message has 
been sent the sender wil l not send further messages within the 
context. 
ProcessContext When a secure context is established, messages are sent within 
the context using this message. 
ErrorContext Used to indicate an error delected in attempting to establish an 
association either due to a message protocol error or a context 
creation error. 
Table 5-4 Secure D P E Interoperability Protocol Message Types 
A l l messages wil l contain a header with an object reference. An object reference 
identifies the target. It can contain information such as the host (a DNS name or IP 
address), port number (identifies the port the server is running on), server name where 
the object resides. 
CreateContext wi l l use four parameters, Contexildenlifier, ContextldentifierType, 
PolicyConfiguration and Token. Contextldentifier is a unique identifier created by the 
client an associated with the context. ContextldentifierType is used to define describe 
the state of the identifier; it can be Client, Server, or Peer. A Client identifier is one 
that is used by the client before a context is agreed; similariy a Server identifier is 
used by the server; a Peer identifier is one that is used by both client and server once a 
context is agreed by both. PolicyConfiguration describes the client's policy settings. It 
defines the mechanisms, policies and mappings configurations, and lists those items 
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that are required (have to be provided to ensure a context can be created) and 
supported (other possible configurations available that meet or exceed the context 
requirements). It is the information held in the SecurelnvocationPoIicy described in 
section 5.4.3.1 below (see tables 5-5 and 5-6). Token is used to provide the client with 
the opportunity to send authentication information to the server, i f client 
authentication is required. The server wi l l use the configuration information specified 
in PoIicyConfiguration to identify the mechanism and policy requirements of the 
token, i.e. what mechanism is used (e.g. X.509) and what type of policy is used (e.g. 
mutual authentication). 
Once the client has established its parameters with the server, the server responds with 
the NegotiateContext message. NegotiateContext uses the same four parameters as 
CreateContext - Contextldentifier, ContextldentifierType, PoIicyConfiguration and 
Token. It provides the sever with a means of specifying policy requirements, and also 
providing authentication information to the client. The NegotiateContext message can 
be used by both client and server until a policy configuration is found and one or both 
parties are authenticated, i f required. Once negotiation is complete, the server wi l l 
issue the AcceptContext message with two parameters, Contextldentifier (an agreed 
Peer identifier) and PoIicyConfiguration (the final and agreed security context 
configuration). 
ProcessContext can contain any message internally and to accommodates this by 
providing two parameters, Contextldentifier and MessageBuffer. The message buffer 
is an opaque datatype that can contain any datatypes thereby allowing the message to 
hold encrypted, or integrity checked messages; the context is providing the secure 
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channel between client and server and is not concerned with the content of the 
message that is secured (this includes any errors returned by the application or server 
that are not related to a context error); the message wil l be processed by the DPE. 
The DeleteContext message has one parameter, Contextldentifier and is used by either 
the client or server to indicate that the context wil l not be utilised and wil l be 
destroyed. 
The ErrorContext indicate that an error has occurred in the context, either in the 
protocol or during context creation, therefore ErrorContext requires 3 parameters, 
Contextldentifier, ContextIdentifierType(as the Peer identifier may not be available 
yet), and Error. Error contains the error data. 
The message sequence chart, figure 5-1 below, is used to illustrated how the protocol 
operates. The interaction takes place between a client and a target that exist in 
different security domains, and therefore a secure context needs to be established. 
The process begins with the client issuing a CreateContext message to the target. It 
provides the client's requirements for a secure context, i.e. the policy configuration 
(see section 5.4.1 above) the client requires. The server responds with the 
NegotiateContext message, which defines the servers* policy configuration. The 
NegotiateContext message can be used a number of times while the client and target 
establish the secure context. The server wi l l eventually send an AcceptContext 
message i f it agrees to the context; otherwise it wi l l send a DeleteContext to stop any 
further interaction and remove the context. 
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Once a secure context has been established, both client and server use the 
ProcessContext message to send data. A ErrorContext message (not shown on chart) 
is used to show that a protocol or context error has been detected. 
When interaction is completed, a DeleteContext message can be sent by either client 
or server. It is acknowledged by a corresponding DeleteContext from the other party. 
I CreateContext 
L NegotlateContext "1 
1 NegotiateContext J 
AcceptContext 
ProcessContext 
ProcessContext 
DeleteContext 
DeteteContext 
Figure 5-1 Secure Interoperability Protocol Message Sequence 
5.4.3 New Secure Interoperability Service Objects 
Three new service objects are required to provide the secure interoperability 
functionality for DPEs: the Security Interoperability Policy (SIPolicy), the Domain 
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Mapping Agent (DMA), and the Secure Interoperability Agent (SIA). They are 
described in detail in the following sub-sections. 
5.4.3,1 Secure Interoperability Policy 
The SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy object caters for the negotiation of all security 
services to establish a security context between a client and target. As such, it holds 
the configuration information for each of the services specified in table 5-3 above. 
Therefore, a basic structure is applied to each of these security services to facilitate 
negotiation, as shown in table 5-4 below. Each component of the structure is then 
discussed. 
Section Structure 
Mechanisms Required: identifies the mechanisms required for the 
specified service. This wi l l be the minimum security 
required by the object for this service. 
Supported: identifies mechanisms that the object can 
support, other those that specified in Required. Again, this 
can be specified for each of the security services. 
Policy Configuration Identifier: identifies the policy 
configuration being used, be it standard or customised. 
Date: the date the policy was set. 
Mapping Mapping Identifier: identifies the domain mapping being 
used on the policy configuration 
Date: the date the mapping was set. 
Table 5-4 SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy Structure 
o Mechanism has a Required/Supported structure for the security services. This 
wil l list the required (i.e. minimum) security mechanism to be used and then any 
other possible supported mechanisms. Both required and supported mechanisms 
wil l supply references to the MechanismPolicy objects, so that any mechanism-
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specific data required can be accessed from there. The reason that the 
SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy does not access the security services policies, such as 
Authentication Mechanism (see Section 4.4.3), directly, is because the 
administrator may wish to enforce only certain mechanisms for interoperability, 
e.g. he may wish to make inter-domain operations use a higher level of security 
than that available in the local domain. Using the authentication service as an 
example, the Required mechanism may be 'Password', while the supported 
mechanisms could be 'SmartCard', 'Fingerprint', and 'Retinal Scan'. 'Password' 
is the minimum requirement, as it requires the user to possess certain knowledge, 
i.e. the password. However, the other mechanisms rely on users possessing 
another form of authentication, such as a card, or some biometric measurement. 
To enhance performance and reduce negotiation, at least some of the mechanisms 
used should be based on a standard common set of mechanisms. 
• Policy defines the identifier of the policy configuration used. Use of standardised 
policies configurations (see sections 5.3.1) facilitates the negotiation of a common 
policy. As in the Mechanisms section, a Required/Supported structure wi l l specify 
the required policy configuration, and alternate policy configurations that can be 
supported. 
• Mapping includes an identifier to the mapping that is held by the Domain 
Mapping Agent object. This is used to locate the mapping that is applied to 
translate the policy configuration specified in the policy section to the policy 
configuration required for interoperation with a foreign domain. The section also 
contains a date field to identify when the mapping was set. The use of dates in the 
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Policy and Mapping sections allow the DPE to check that the mapping remains in-
synch with the policy configuration. I f the policy configuration is updated, then 
the mapping should possess a date equal to or greater than the date specified for 
the policy; otherwise the Mapping may be from an old configuration and may no 
longer be sufficient to translate the new configuration. 
The whole SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy structure is summarised in table 5-5 below. 
The identifier section allows the administrator to set different policies for different 
object types with different domains and, thereby, optimise performance and tailor 
security requirements. 
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Service Basic Structure Function 
General Identifier Uniquely identifies the policy - and the object 
and donnain it applies to. 
Object type Identifies the object type (i.e. class) the policy 
applies to. If set to default, then the policy 
applies to all Object Types (without a specified 
policy). 
Domain id Identifies the foreign domain the policy applies 
to. If set to default^ then the policy applies to 
invocations on all foreign domains (without a 
specified policy). 
Authentication Mechanisms List the authentication mechanisms required and 
supported by the domain 
Policy List the authentication policy configurations 
required and supported 
Access Control Mechanisms List the access control mechanisms required and 
supported by the domain 
Policy 
- Attribute 
Identifies the mappings that can be applied to the 
Attributes 
QoP Mechanisms List the QoP mechanisms required and 
supported 
Policy 
- Type, Msg_pan 
Lists the QoP policy configurations for Type and 
Msg_part 
Non-Repudiation Mechanisms Lists the non-repudiation mechanisms required 
and supported 
Policy 
- Evidence 
Lists the non-repudiation policy configurations 
required and supported 
Trust Authority Id of a TTP that can be used to validate domain 
administration (a public key certificate) 
Expiry time Expiry time of SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy 
Table 5-5 SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy Structure 
5,4.3.2 Domain Mapping Agent 
The Domain Mapping Agent can be considered a registry/repository for mappings 
between policy configurations. The policy can be accessed through a unique 
identifier, which identifies the domains involved in the mappings, and uniquely 
identifies the instance of the Domain Mapping Agent, e.g. A_B_LO identifies the 
version 1 mapping between domains A and B. The Domain Mapping Agent maps 
values between two sets of attributes, as agreed by the domain administrators. 
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5,4,3,3 Secure Interoperability Agent 
The Secure Interoperability Agent is responsible for taking control of an inter-object 
communication, once it has been identified as an inter-domain interaction. Before 
contacting another service object, the client wi l l need a reference to it. Within llOP, 
this involves an object identifier that immediately identifies that object as originating 
in a foreign domain. Any DPE interoperability protocol wil l include such a facility, 
because even though location transparency is provided to the client, the DPE needs to 
possess this type of knowledge to locate the object. Once the QoP Agent has 
identified the target object as being in a remote domain, the SIA wil l be called, it wi l l 
then retrieve the secure Interoperability policy and possibly any necessary domain 
mapping information, in order to begin negotiations for a secure context with the QoP 
Agent and Secure Interoperability Agent of the remote domain. 
5.4.4 Secure Interoperability Example 
The following example illustrates how the secure interoperability components would 
work together to help create a secure association between different domains. Table 5-
6 below lists the relevant SecurelnteroperabilityPolicy values for the client and server. 
As non-repudiation is not included in the example, it is not included in the table. The 
policy was specifically created to allow interaction between the specified domains. 
Both use ACLs for access control, but have agreed a domain mapping for their 
attributes and roles (see table 5-7). The use of RoleB2 and RoleB2_l is deliberate, to 
illustrate the fact that Domain B only had two roles (RoleBI, RoleB2) while Domain 
A had three roles defined. Therefore, when agreeing the mapping, Domain B's 
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administrator created another role (sub-group), RoIeB2_l. Both client and server 
require integrity checks. 
Service & Level Config. User Policy (A) Provider (B) 
Identifier Default_1.0 A B 1.0 
Object Type Default Default 
DomainlDs Default A 
Authentication 
Mechanism 
Required: -
Supported: -
Required: -
Authentication 
Policy 
Type Required: -
Supported: 
Required: Client 
Supported: -
Access Control 
Mechanism 
Required: ACL Required: ACL 
Access Control Mapping Mapping: A<=>B Mapping: A<=>B 
QoP Mechanisms Integrity/ 
Confidentiality 
Required: -
Supported:DES, RSA 
Required: RSA, DES 
Supported: -
QoP Policy Type 
Msg_part 
Confidentiality 
TTP <TTP_Acert> <TrP_B cert> 
Table 5-6 User/Provider SecurelnteroperabilityPolicies 
A o B 
Attributes in A o Attributes in B 
read and/or execute get 
write and/or execute set 
read, write, execute manage 
Roles in A o Roles in B 
RoleAl (write, execute) RoIeBl (set) 
RoleA2 (read) o RoleB2 (get) 
RoleA3 (read, write,execule) o RoleB2_l (manage) 
Table 5-7 Attribute and Role Mappings 
In the example, a user A (client), whose role is defined as *RoleA2* and has access 
right 'read' in Domain A is requesting an existing service (server) in Domain B (see 
figure 5-2 below). The example is a sub-set of the 'logging into a provider' scenario 
(see section 4.5.1). Therefore the user in Domain A wishes to log into the provider in 
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Domain B, and both are in different administrative security domains. Once the 
Security Agent realises that the provider is in a remote domain, it wil l use the Secure 
Interoperability Agent and QoP Agent to create a secure context. The example is 
detailed below. 
Secure Interoperability subset of Logging in to a Provider in a Foreign Security 
Domain: 
This example shows the user A establishing an access session with their named user 
agent of the provider. The user wishes to make use of the provider's services, which 
the user has previously subscribed to. 
Usei Domain 
SIPolicy 
SIA " 
SecA" 
QoPA 
Piovidei Domain 
as-UAP : i 
1. 
] ; 
:2. 
PA I I lA 
SiPollcy 
y/(ctd) 
UA (ciu) 
S e c A ^ / 
6. DeatqContexl (->} 
(c^S.Negoti^tbConiexi 
lOJicceptGtjntext 
ll.PiocesiContexl 
QoPA 
—! 
Figure 5-2 New Secure Interoperability Login Example 
Preconditions: 
The user has contacted the provider, and the Provider Agent (PA) has an interface 
reference to an Initial Agent ( lA) of the provider. 
The new security preconditions required: 
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• security is available in both the user and provider domains; 
• user A is defined as an authorised user in the provider domain; 
• a QoP Policy is available for the Provider Agent and User Agent; 
• there are no audit or non-repudiation policies related to the login process; 
• to facilitate secure interoperability, the administrators have defined a mapping 
between the security attributes and roles of the domains. 
Scenario: 
(The new secure interoperability interactions are steps 4 to 11.) 
1. User A uses an access session related User Application to login to the 
provider, as a known user. The access session related User Application 
requests the user authentication information such as the UserlD and password. 
The user then requests the Provider Agent to login to the provider, as a known 
user. The access session related User Application supplies the security 
information to the Provider Agent. 
2. Provider Agent requests that an access session is set up with the named User 
Agent of the user. Provider Agent provides the usemame of the user to the 
Initial Agent. 
3. The Provider Agent also sends the security information to the Security Agent 
in the user domain. Security Agent^. 
4. Security Agent^ now has the Initial Agent reference and is aware that it is in a 
foreign domain. Therefore, in order to send the information to the Security 
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Agent in the provider domain (Security Agent**) to authenticate the user, a 
secure association must be established. Security Agent" now contacts the 
Secure Interoperability Agent in the user domain (Secure Interoperability 
Agent"). 
5. Secure Interoperability Agent" retrieves user A*s secure interoperability 
policy information for Secure Interoperability Policy". 
6. In conjunction with the QoP Agent", Secure Interoperability Agent" contacts 
the Secure Interoperability Agent** in the provider domain to establish a secure 
association, using the CreateContext, which contains the client's security 
context information, which is comprised of the association options and a 
security token. The security token is a generic token that is hiding the security 
mechanism-dependent information (in this instance the security token consists 
of user A's request for the TTP_B's RSA public key certificate, along with 
1TP_A*s public key certificate). 
7. Secure Interoperability Agent** receives the request, via Security Agent**. It 
extracts the security context information (the certificate request), along with 
the other interoperability options defined from Secure Interoperability Policy", 
Secure Interoperability Agent** then contacts the Secure Interoperability 
Policy** to obtain the provider's policy. In comparing the options, the provider 
decides to use RSA and DES to provide QoP, and utilise the domain mapping. 
It also extracts TTP_A's certificate. 
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8. Secure Interoperability Agent** then sends a NegotiateContext, in conjunction 
with QoP Agent, to Secure Interoperability Agent^. It defines the accepted 
association options, and the security token contains the TTP_B's certificate, 
and is encrypted using TTP_A's public key. 
9. Secure Interoperability Agent" receives the message, decrypts it with the 
private key, extracts TTP_B*s certificate, and is ready to accept the association 
options. Therefore it now responds with NegotiateConiext, to Secure 
Interoperability Agent^ where the security token now contains a DES secret 
session key and user A's security id and privileges, which is encrypted using 
TTP_B's public key. | 
< ^ 
10. Secure Interoperability Agent** receives the message and decrypts i t using 
TTP_B's private key. It can extract the secret session key and also extract user 
I 
A's security privileges. The user and provider have now established a trust 
relationship between the domains, using the TTPs. It then access the 
appropriate Domain Mapping Agent, and can translate user A's privileges 
using the mapping. Secure Interoperability Agent** sends a AcceptConiext, 
using the DES session key. 
11. A secure communication channel has now been established between the 
domains, and the user's original request to the Initial Agent can be transmitted 
in a ProcessContext message, via the Secure Interoperability Agent. 
12. Session wi l l continue using the Secure Interoperability Agents and QoP 
Agents for secure interoperability. 
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Post-conditions: 
The new security post-conditions required are: 
• secure context exists between the domains; 
• user A*s privileges have been mapped to the provider domain, even though 
user A is not identified as an authenticable user by the provider. 
Alternatives within scenario: 
There are several alternatives available within this scenario: 
• i f both domains did not support compatible mechanisms for any of the 
services, the interaction would fail; 
• i f the user did not exist in the provider's domain, and there was no TTP to 
authenticate the domain, or domain mapping, available then the 
interoperability would fail; 
• Secure Interoperability Agent/Secure Interoperability Policy can be used to 
ensure that domains are compatible, even i f a domain mapping is not required 
(i.e. the user profile exists in the provider domain, and so the user can be 
authenticated and have id and privilege attributes assigned in the usual 
manner). 
Although the introduction of the new Secure Interoperability Service constitutes 
additional overheads, it should be noted that the service allows two domains to 
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interoperate with the minimum administrative interaction, e.g. domain A and B in the 
example above can interoperate i f they provide TTP certificates and a secure 
Interoperability mapping (assuming that the domains have common mechanisms and 
certificates are available to the appropriate clients/servers) - this is instead of domain 
A having to add all of domain B's users to its security policies and domain B having 
to complete similar actions for domain A's users. 
5-5 Summary 
Although secure interoperability is not a new concept, its application to DPEs is new 
in this research. In existing DPEs, secure interoperability is a real problem. It exists 
because disparate domains can have different mechanisms, policies, protocols, and 
trust models. A l l of these differences have to be overcome in order to provide 
interoperability. There are several mechanisms that can be used to help overcome this 
issue. Bridges provide a quick and easy solution, but they do have limitations. 
Immediate bridges are not flexible for large numbers of interoperating domains, 
whereas mediated bridges can increase the performance overhead because they 
increase the number of times a single messages has to be encrypted and decrypted. 
Standardisation of mechanisms and policy configurations provides two benefits, it 
allows clients and servers to negotiate their secure context, and it also facilitates 
mechanisms and service (policy) independence. The use of generic tokens also 
facilitates these characteristics. A l l of these methodologies can be applied to any DPE 
to help solve the secure interoperability problem. 
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Although the standardisation of mechanisms used, policy configuration and 
mappings, may seem unrealistic, it is not. In the selection of standard mechanisms for 
use, there already are obvious leaders in each of the security services. For example, 
access control is generally done by A C L or Capability lists; QoP would find 3DES, 
RSA, and MD5 as some of the most frequently used mechanisms. Policy 
configurations are limited to the key issues, which are completely mechanism 
independent, and the mappings apply to these policies. The fact of using such 
standards can be seen as a limitation to any system. However, as always there is a 
trade-off, limitation of mechanisms used versus the ability for interoperability to 
occur without any user or administrator intervention. In large-scale distributed 
systems, which may cross many boundaries, the administrative overhead would be 
prohibitive i f interoperability required specification of mechanisms, policies and 
agreements for each domain-boundary crossing. 
Up to this point in the research, consideration has been given to security in the DPE, 
with respect to the security services itself and how it can interoperate between 
disparate domains. However, the research needs to extend this scope and look at 
secure interaction with other DPE services. The following chapter wi l l now look at 
how DPE supporting services can improve security by becoming 'security-aware*. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The research has, until now, concentrated on end-to-end security between a client and 
server. However, this is making the assumption that only the core ORB and its 
security service are necessary to complete a secure client-server invocation. But a 
DPE is more complex than this. According to TINA-C (see Section 2.3.3), the main 
function of DPE [99] is to provide uniform execution environment and basic 
capabilities for interaction between objects in heterogeneous network, and this is 
supported by a range of DPE services to provide extra functionality to application 
objects. 
According to the ISO architecture, security should be provided in a modular formal 
[41]. This architecture divides system management into functional units, FCAPS - the 
'S' being the security module. A system should be able to function independently of 
the security service, and when the security module is introduced the same system 
should now operate in a functionally similar but secured fashion. In other words, the 
service should be a self-contained module that can provide security without having to 
change any other services. This type of thinking is practical in a centralized system 
such as IBM's Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) [80]. Here the TCB is 
contained within a single system. The security service can monitor all requests and 
provide the required security functionality. However, distributed systems are more 
complex. As previously discussed in section 4.2.1 distributed objects introduce 
complications and the TCB is no longer contained in a single system and may need to 
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operate across multiple systems, i.e. security domains (see Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). 
This results in an extended set of security requirements for a DPE (see Section 4.2). 
Therefore the modular solution may be inadequate. 
While it is recognized that security should be pervasive [41], the issue in a DPE is 
what the term pervasive means. I f pervasive security in a DPE should be part of the 
whole environment, which implies that the supporting services should also be 
secured, then the modular solution may not be sufficient. 
The objective of this chapter is to look at these services with particular reference to a 
Trader Service (see section 2.5) and see i f in the current modular security architecture 
is adequate to secure them. This topic has not been investigated in previous literature. 
It concludes with recommendations for supporting secure operation of the Trader. 
6 . 2 Security Issues for Supporting Services in a DPE 
As described in Chapter 2, the DPE is reliant on a set of services to provide support 
for distributed objects, i.e. to handle distributed processing and provide transparency 
between clients and servers. Some of the TINA DPE services previously identified 
(see section 2.3.3) are listed below: 
• Trading: provides a binding between objects that use a service (importer) and 
objects that provide the service (exporter); 
• Notification: enables objects to receive notifications without being aware of 
the set of recipient objects; 
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• Transaction: consists of three main management functions: transaction, 
concurrency control and deadlock management; 
• Security: authentication, authorisation and security controlling. 
Each service is implemented by a number of objects. Currently security is 
implemented by applying the security rules to these service objects. This means that 
access can be granted to a client, when requesting use of a service object, i f the client 
possesses the appropriate privilege attributes. However, even looking at an overview 
of the services some security issues become apparent. They are outlined below; 
• Persistence Service: The Persistence Service stores components persistently 
on a variety of storage servers. Although access to the persistent storage 
objects are controlled, the stored data is not secured - the security service has 
no control over this; it would be an implementation level detail, i.e. i f the data 
was stored in a database, the implementer would enable database security. 
• Naming Service: The Naming Service locates components by name. Once an 
object can access the naming service, it can access all names in the service, as 
there are no security restrictions. Also Naming services can be federated, i.e. 
two naming services are linked together to operate like a single service. I f the 
federation exists across different security domains the client is unaware that he 
is crossing a domain boundary and security controls could be by-passed 
• Event Service: This service allows 'consumers' to register/unregister interest 
in specific events. The 'suppliers' then generate information about this event 
and send it to the consumers via an event channel. It is a basic 
144 
( huptcr 0: Sct:iiriry-A\\ arc DPE Services 
publish/subscribe or notification service. Security has not been defined for the 
event channels, i.e. access control is not available for specific events on a 
single channel, and there is no indication whether the channel requires 
encryption. Also the event service demands a certain amount of Quality of 
Service (QoS), i.e. guaranteed delivery, persistence of event data in the event 
of an event channel failure and use of logging facility. I f the event channel 
was subject to encryption then the supporting QoS mechanisms, would also 
need to ensure security, e.g. the persisted data would have to be protected. 
o Query Service: This allows a client to use query operations for attributes 
associated with objects, in much the same way SQL can be used to query a 
database of records by querying the fields in the records. It provides for 
asynchronous query, so that the query can be issued and the client does not 
have to block while waiting for a response. No security precautions have been 
added and so there is no way to identify what attributes a client can perform 
queries on, e.g. does the client have the security clearance to query a payroll 
attribute on an employee database. Another problem is Denial of Service, e.g. 
a rogue client can Hood the query service with too many asynchronous or long 
running synchronous queries thereby causing the services to halt or crash. 
o Trader Service; Similar in function to the Naming Service, the Trader allows 
an importer to locale an object, published by an exporter, but it does so by 
identifying a set of required properties. A security problem could arise i f some 
of the services offered by the trader require higher security clearance than 
others; there is no way of controlling access to particular offers in a single 
Trader. 
145 
Chapter 6: Set:nnr\'-A^ are OPE Servici' 
There are security issues that exist in DPE services that are not currently addressed. 
The above descriptions are just high-level overviews of such problems, but the 
problem demands further detailed investigation. Therefore a single service, the 
Trader, was selected and examined in detail (see section 2.5 for a detailed description 
of the Trader). 
6.3 Security issues related to Trading & Traders 
Traders in a distributed environment are open to attack, as is any part of a system. The 
research has defined the areas where Traders are most vulnerable to security breaches, 
and categorised them below within the five ISO security concepts. 
6.3.1 Authentication 
Traders receive requests for impons/expons from members of the trading community. 
Like any system resource, they are susceptible to masquerade (see Section 3.2.2). 
Authentication is the service required to counteract this threat. It is a two-way 
process; Traders, as well as importers and exporters should be identifiable and 
authenticatable. 
6.3.2 Access Control 
Access Control needs to be handled at two different levels. Firstly, access control of 
the Trader itself should be considered, i.e. who has access to the Trader. Secondly, 
access control of service offers must be handled, i.e. which service offers an importer 
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can see within a Trader. The access control rules need to be preserved across linked 
Traders. 
6.5.2.7 Unauthorised Trader Access 
Traders should have access control information, just like other objects in a distributed 
system. It should be listed in the access control mechanism, e.g. an ACL (see section 
3.2.1). I f trading community objects, e.g. Trader and exporter, are listed in the ACL, 
then the access control manager, i.e. Authorisation Agent (see section 4.4.1.2), would 
be able to make decisions relating to access, e.g. who can make requests on a 
specified Trader. For example, a Trader operating in a domain where access is 
controlled on the basis of roles, may use the roles of 'Role2' and 'RoleT, where 
'RoleT has a higher security classification than 'Role2', i.e., 'Role2' < 'Rolel ' . In 
figure 6-1 below, the Traderl can only be accessed by 'RoleT, where as the Trader2 
can be accessed by both 'Role2' and ^RoIeT. 
access granted Traderl 
'Rotel' access only 
Userl with role 
'Roler 
Trader2 
y 'RoleV &'Role2' 
access granted access 
User2 with role: 
•Role2' 
Figure 6-1 Trader Access Control 
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63.2,2 Unauthorised Service Offer Access 
Even i f an importer has access to a Trader it may not have access to all the service 
offers that the Trader holds. Some of the service offers may be of a higher security 
classification, for example, the security classification of the exporter could, by, 
default, be assigned to the service offer. Alternatively the exporter could specify a 
security classification equal to or lower than its own classification. 
Taking the scenario in the previous section 6.3.2.1, where Trader2 allows both 
'Rolel ' and *Role2' to access the Trader, i f service offer access is enforced then some 
of the service offers wi l l only allow ^RoleT to view them and some service offers wi l l 
allow both *Roler and *Role2* to view them, as illustrated in figure 6-2 below. 
User1 with role: 
'RoleV 
User2 with role: 
'Role2' 
Query Trader2 
Query Trader2 
Rolel - service 1 
Rolel - service 2 
Rolel • service 3 
Role2 - service 1 
Role2 - service 2 
Role2 - service 1 
Role2 - service 2 
Rolel - service 1 
Rolel - service 2 
Rolel - service 3 
Role2 - service 1 
Role2 -service 2 
Figure 6-2 Trader Service Offer Access Control 
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6.3.3 Integrity and Confidentiality 
Iniegrily and confidentiality of data, stored [100] or in transit [101], must be 
guaranteed in a distributed system; this has to include trading-related data. 
6.3.3.1 Stored Data 
Details of service offers, including an object reference, are stored in the Registry. It 
must be protected, as an intruder may try to gain access to a service by gaining illegal 
access to the object. Similarly details of the Service Type held in the Repository, 
should be protected to ensure that intruders do not have knowledge of *how* to use 
the service type, i.e. interface details, parameters, etc. 
Integrity & Confiedentiality ^ 
Protected Trader 
Trader 
Intruder 
Unprotected 
Persistant Storage 
Database 
Unprotected 
Persistant 
Storage 
hlathile 
Figure 6-3 Protecting Stored Data 
It cannot be assumed that the Trader's backend data, i.e. the data stored in the 
Registry and Repository, is hidden behind object interfaces and, therefore, is not as 
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vulnerable to attack as object references that are exported through the interface. 
Intruders do not always use legitimate access mechanisms and, therefore, the 
'backdoor' entry must be considered - see figure 6-3 above. Such data wi l l usually be 
held in persistent storage, such as a database, or flat fi le. Therefore the Trader, i f 
operating as a security-aware service, should be able to guarantee that the data is 
secure, even when i i is in storage. Cryptographic mechanisms (see section 3.2.3 and 
3.2.4) are used to ensure that the confidentiality and integrity of the data is preserved. 
6.3.3.2 Inter-Community Communications 
Since a Trader is operating in a distributed environment, this provides an intruder with 
ample access to intercept any communications between members of a trading 
community. Object references and service type details are transmitted to exporters, 
importers and other Traders. From such interceptions, one may be able to re-construct 
Registry/Repository information. Therefore transmitted data has to be protected. A l l 
communications between trading community members should be secured to ensure 
the confidentiality and integrity of all messages. 
6.3.3.3 Secure Interoperability 
The issue of secure interoperability was covered extensively in the previous chapter, 
and is particularly pertinent to the issue of federated trading, when the Traders exist in 
disparate security domains. 
6.3.4 Non-Repudiation 
The trading community is made up of distributed objects, which are less predictable 
due to their flexible and granular nature [24]. There are two problems. Firstly, i f the 
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intruder is an authorised user, or is successfully masquerading as an authorised user, 
how can their actions be discovered? For example, an intruder can masquerade as an 
importer, and query Traders to find useful service offers. The process of monitoring a 
database may help, by providing clues to an intruder's activities. Secondly, i f 
interactions are taking place, how can it be proven that a specific interaction or event 
took place, i f one party wishes to deny the event, i.e. accountability? Irrefutable 
evidence is required from a non-repudiation service. 
1. Monitoring: A l l security related events should be monitored. These events are 
defined by the security policy. Apart from notifying an administrator, via an 
alarm, that an illegal action has be taken, monitoring could also provide clues 
to a previously unknown intruder, e.g. an importer making multiple 
unauthorised import requests on several Traders. However, this requires data 
filtering to find trends, which can be used to raise a system administrator's 
suspicions. 
2. Irrefutable Evidence: Non-repudiation is used to provide irrefutable evidence 
that certain events took place. For example, digital signatures can be used with 
audit logs to record events. Just as other system resources are subject to a non-
repudiation policy, so too are all the trading community members. 
6.4 Current Limitations 
Within the current DPE specification of TINA, security of a DPE service is not 
defined. Although the access session does provide a limited notion of authentication 
and authorisation (see section 4.3), there is no specification of how this is applied to a 
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service. As the location of Trader objects, within the service environment has not 
been specified, it is initially assumed that they are available only within service 
sessions. The current model suggests that there is no security available and so the 
trading actions are not secure. If, however, the assumption is made that a Trader can 
be available in both service and access sessions, then access-session objects can be 
secured through authentication and authorisation, but the service session Trader is still 
insecure. Additionally, in both of these scenarios, there is no Quality of Protection 
(QoP), audit or non-repudiation security available. Similarly the lack of a secure 
interoperability protocol provides a problem, especially in the case of federated 
trading across security domain boundaries. 
The current DPE specification is insecure for DPE services. If, however, the new 
Security Framework is applied it still does not address all the issues specified in the 
previous section. Although access control of the Trader can be handled by the security 
framework, via the Authorisation Agent (see section 4.4), the access control of the 
service offers within the Registry cannot. The new security service has no way of 
associating security data with a particular service type instance stored in the Registry; 
it only associates security policies with objects or methods on an object. It would 
require the storage of a security property in the Registry itself. The reason for this is 
that such a property would be used to sort and make selections when providing 
service offer lists to importers. This problem is also linked to delegation as the 
security property would be set in the Registry and would probably be delegated from 
the exporter, e.g. use the exporter's security level. 
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IMPORTERS EXPORTERS 
seivtCQ 1 
SOTVicO 2 
service 3 wiih lole 
RolOl 
Usei2 with lole: 
'Role2* 
Tradet2 
o l e l f t 1^0102'accosi 
•Rolc2*vfew 
StmncE SECURTTY 
SOTVfcO 1 'Rote2* 
setvice 2 •RoIe2* 
sendee 3 RoleT 
servico 1 
seMco 2 
Exporter 
role: 
'Role2* 
Exporter 
role: 
•Rolel ' 
Exporter 
role: 
•RoloT 
Figure 6-4 Service Offer Access Control with Registry Security Property 
In figure 6-4 above, three exporters are exporting services to a Trader. The first 
exporter has the 'RoIe2'. When it exports a service offer, the Trader takes 'Role2* as 
the required security role for access to the services, i.e. as the security properly values 
in the Registry. TTie second exporter has 'Rolel ' . When exporting its service offer, it 
specifies *Role2' as the required security role. This is possible because *Role2' has a 
lower security classification, i.e. 'Role2'<'Roler. Finally, the third exporter has a 
'RoleT. It exports its service offer to the Trader and accepts the default security 
property of *RoIer. In the example, when an importer invokes the lookup operation 
on the Trader, only the appropriate services offers are returned, i.e. the importer can 
only view service offers with security properties (Role) less than or equal to their own 
security property (Role). 
Securing trader data, such as that held in the Registry and Repository, needs to be 
addressed. Currently these databases are not encrypted. In addition, trading 
community communications should be secured. The level of security would depend 
on the objects involved and their security level, as well as the level of the service 
offers being exported/imported. 
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Securing transmitted data requires the use of cryptographic mechanisms to preserve 
the integrity and confidentiality of the messages. The use of secure contexts, as 
specified in section 4.4 via the QoP Agent, would provide protection. 
As for stored data, there are a several possible solutions. The data could be encrypted 
before it is written to storage and then decrypted after it is read. This is a solution 
most suited to flat file systems. It could also be applied to database systems. However, 
most databases today employ a security service of their own, i.e. they wil l secure the 
data [102]. These systems are designed to maximise efficiency while still ensuring the 
security of the data and, as such, it would be preferable to utilise these facilities. 
There is one further option that would offer a generic DPE solution as opposed to the 
product-dependent solutions above. This option involves the use of a DPE Persistence 
Service. This service would have to be aware that security was in operation and that 
the stored data needed protection, i.e. it needs to be security-aware. The data for the 
Registry is stored in some persistent storage facility such as a database or file. The 
data is stored using the Persistence Service [103]. I f the Persistence Service is 
security-aware it wi l l ensure that when the data is held in the data stores (e.g. a 
database or file) it wil l be protected. However, DPEs are unable to deal with securing 
stored data because they do not provide security-aware services, and there are no 
other facilities to handle the encryption of stored data or utilise product-encryption 
facilities. 
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6.5 New Facilities Required 
The previous section illustrates that the new Security Framework and Trader 
specifications are inadequate to provide security. Both the Trader modifications, 
described in this chapter, and the Security Framework (including secure 
interoperability), described in chapters 4 and 5, are required for a Security-Aware 
Trader. The new Trader facilities wi l l now be discussed. 
6.5.1 Security-Aware Trader Attributes 
Attributes are already used in the Trader specification to provide a framework for 
describing the behaviour of any Trader (see Section 6.3.2). Security Attributes are 
now introduced into the Trader. They wil l control the security behaviour of a Trader, 
by specifying which security services it uses, i.e. just how security-aware the Trader 
is. Security Attributes are defined in Table 6 -1 below. 
Security Attributes Function Indicated 
Security-aware Indicates that some attributes are checked as the 
Trader is using security (at some level) 
Access_control_trader Include Trader in A C L and uses authentication with 
trading community members, etc. 
Access_control_service_offers Provide access control on the service offers listed 
in a query 
Encrypt_s tores Encrypts Registry and Repository according to 
policy 
Encryptjcomms Encrypts communications according to policy 
Integrity_check_stores Integrity checks Registry and Repository according 
to policy 
Integrity _checkjcotnms Integrity checks communications according to 
policy 
NR trade Non-repudiation of Trading related events 
Audit_trade Audit Trading related events 
Table 6-1 Trader Security Policies 
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It is now possible to have several types of secured Trader. For example, a Trader 
could be a 'Public Trader . This means that everyone would have access to it and it 
would have no security applied, i.e. the Security-aware attribute would be set to off, 
indicating that all other security attributes were also turned off. Alternatively a Trader 
may be a 'Secured Trader'. It would be security-aware and have all other attributes 
turned on, i.e. it would use all the available security services. Another option is to 
make a Trader a *Security-Aware Trader'. In this case the security-aware attribute 
would be on, and some of the other attributes would be on, e.g., Encryptjstores and 
Int€rity_check_stores, but not NR_trader or Auditjrader, thereby providing a 
specified level of security according to the policy within the domain. 
6.5.2 Security-Aware Trader Data Structures 
The two Trader data structures are the Repository and the Registry. The Repository 
should not have to be modified significantly, as it wi l l hold the security properties in 
the same manner as it currently holds any other properties. The only change that is 
required is operational, i.e. i f the Trader is security-aware or secure, then there must 
be a security property available in the data structures. The security property wil l be 
'mandatory' and 'readonly', to ensure that it is available and cannot be modified. 
Table 6-2 below shows an example entry in the Repository. The security properly is 
highlighted in bold italic. 
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Service Property Name Property TypeCode Property Mode 
DataStore Supports SQL Boolean 
Available Space (M) Long Readonly 
Location String Mandatory 
Security String Mandatory, 
Readonly 
Table 6-2 Security-Aware Trader's ServiceType Repository Example 
Table 6-3 below shows an example of two entries in the Registry that are based on the 
Repository service type example in Table 6-2 above. The example assumes that Roles 
are used as the security property and that 'Role2'<*Roler. Each entry holds the 
service type that is being specified; in this case it is a DataStore service. It specifies 
the service instance name and the list of appropriate properties and their values. The 
'Supports SQL' property has no mode specified, and therefore is an optional 
parameter; as a result there is no entry for it in the *DB Store'. Since the Security 
property is 'mandatory' and Readonly', it always has a value, which cannot be 
subsequently modified. For the 'DB Store', the service exporter was a Rolel, and so 
his *Roler role was delegated to the service offer. In the case of the T i l e Server 
Store', the service exporter was a 'Role l ' , however the exporter specified the Security 
property as 'Role2' so that all staff members could access the data store. 
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ServiceType Service Property Name Property Value 
DataStore 'File Server Store' Supports SQL No 
Space Available 600 
Location 'Server room 2' 
Security 'Role2' 
DataStore 'DB Store* Supports SQL Yes 
Space Available 800 
Location 'Server room T 
Security 'RoleV 
Table 6-3 Security-Aware Trader's Registry Entry Example 
6.5.3 Security-Aware Trader Interfaces 
There are eight interfaces defined. However, only five of these interfaces should have 
to be modified, namely the Admin, Lookup, Register, Proxy and Link interfaces. 
6.5.3.1 Admin Interface 
The Attributes and Set methods wil l now have to deal with the additional security 
attributes specified in table 6-1 above. The Attribute methods allow the administrator 
to query the security attributes to find their current values. Set allows the 
administrator to modify the security attribute values, thereby allowing the 
administrator lo specify the *security-awareness' of a Trader. 
I f Security-aware is set to ' on \ then at least one other security attribute must be set to 
'on'; otherwise an error wil l be returned on the Set method. I f Security-aware is set to 
' o f f , then all other security attributes must also be set to ' o f f ; otherwise an error wi l l 
be returned on the method. These attributes control interaction with the Security 
Framework. When as security attribute is set to on, it implies that a security service is 
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available and that a security policy for the Trader must exist. The following example 
in figure 6-5 wil l illustrate this. A Public Trader has been created by Userl, i.e. it is 
security-unaware and all the security attributes are set to *off . Userl then calls the Set 
method to make the Trader security-aware and sets the Accessjcontroljrader 
attribute to *on', i.e. access to the Trader is subject to the Security Framework's 
Access Control Agent. Userl has a security role of *Roler. The Default AccessPolicy 
in the system assigns the security role 'Role2' to the object because 'Role2' is the 
lowest security role available in this system. Therefore when the Trader becomes 
security aware and requires an AccessPolicy, the Security Service checks the system 
to see firstly i f an AccessPolicy already exists for the Trader; i f it existed it would be 
used by the service to control access to the Trader. However, in this case, no such 
policy exists. Therefore the security service finds the Default AccessPolicy and also 
Userl's AccessPolicy. It finds that Userl's policy is of a higher security classification 
and, therefore, creates a new AccessPolicy for the Trader and assigns the higher 
classification ^Rolel' to it. This wi l l be achieved through the AccessPolicy 
component, via the Policy/Context Manager. 
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Figure 6-5 Security-Aware Trader's Admin Interface 
The same procedure would apply to all security attributes: 
1. Set the attribute to on; 
2. Check i f the appropriate policy object exists for the attribute; 
3. I f it exists, the policy wi l l be used; i f it does not exist then find the Default 
and Owner policies; 
4. Create a new policy for the Trader based on the most secure option available 
between the Default and Owner policies. 
6.5.3.2 Lookup, Register and Proxy 
The Lookup, Register and Proxy interfaces now inherit the security attributes, i.e. an 
object with a reference to one of these interfaces wil l be able to query the security 
attributes to see how 'security-aware' a Trader is. This wil l allow trading community 
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members to make decisions relating to how they wil l behave in response to a 
Security-Aware Trader. The following example, depicted in figure 6-6 below, wil l 
illustrate this. 
In this scenario, Userl again has a security classification of 'Rolel ' and is acting as an 
Importer. She wants to query a Trader to look for a DataStore service, but also wants 
to ensure that the Trader is security-aware and controls access to its data. Userl has 
the object reference for the Trader's Lookup interface, and so reads the Secitriry-
Aware Attribute for the Trader to see i f it is secured. She can also read the other 
security attributes to check what security facilities are used - in the example both 
access control attributes are set. Now that Userl knows she is dealing with a secure 
Trader, she invokes the Lookup::Query() method to find service offers for DataStores. 
On the Trader side of the invocation, the attributes indicate that the Trader firstly 
needs to check i f Userl is authorised to Query the service offers. The Security Service 
uses Access Control Agent (ACA) to find whether a client needs to have security 
classification of 'Role2' or 'Role l ' to access the Trader. Userl's credentials, 'Rolel ' , 
can be delegated through the DPE. The Access Control Agent then decides that she 
can access the Trader interfaces. Secondly, the attributes show that the service offers 
themselves are access controlled. Since both service offers are less than or equal to 
the 'Rolel ' classification, the Trader returns both DaiaStore service offers to Userl. 
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Figure 6-6 Security-Aware Trader's Lookup IntiTfait' 
The Register and Proxy interfaces operate in a similar fashion, but are used by 
Exporters. Again an exporter can check the type of Trader it wants to export its 
services to - a Public Trader or a Security-Aware Trader. Then, on the method 
invocation, the Trader is able to use the Security Service to provide the functionality 
set by the security attributes, i.e. access control, confidentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation or audit. The one difference would be when the Exporter is exporting a 
service, the security property for that service wil l either be taken from the exporter's 
own security classification (the default action) or the Exporter can specify a security 
classification equal to or less than his own. 
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6.5.3.3 Link Interface and a New Link Policies 
The Link interface also inherits the Security Attributes as the Lx>okup, Registry and 
Proxy interfaces did above. It wi l l affect Trader behaviour when two Traders are 
creating a link. However, there is one other change - the introduction of a new policy. 
This link policy wi l l define how Security-Aware Traders can be linked. The new 
policy is Link_seciirity and it defines the lowest security classified Trader that can be 
linked with, e.g. i f Link_security is set to 'Rolel ' in Trader T l , then Trader T2 must 
have a security classification of 'RoleT or higher i f it wants to invoke 
Link::Add_Link() on T l . This preserves the security of the immediately linked traders. 
However, in order for this to operate effectively the security interoperability service is 
necessary. I f the two linked traders are in disparate security domains, then the 
credentials may have to be mapped so that the Link_security policy can be preserved. 
For example, Trader T l is in domain A, is classed as a 'RoIeT, and the Link_security 
is specified as ^RoleT. Trader T2 is in domain B, is classed as an 'administrator' and 
the Unk_security is specified as 'administrator'. A mapping exists between A and B 
so that 'RoleT maps to 'administrator'. Without secure interoperability, T l and T2 
could not be linked; however, with the mapping available, they can be linked and 
allowed to communicate securely. 
6.5.3.4 Other Interfaces 
For all other interfaces and methods: 
o Security attributes wil l be treated like the other attributes; 
o Security properties in the Repository wil l be handled like any other 
'mandatory, readonly' property; 
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• Security properties wi l l be handled like all other properties in the Registry; 
• Security properties wi l l be able to be used in Constraints and Preferences; 
• Security properties wil l raise properly errors as all other properties do, e.g. 
PropertyTypeMismatch in Export method on the Register interface. 
6,5.4 Security-Aware Trader and the new Framework for D P E Security 
The security attributes now allow the Trader to make use of the Security Service. The 
following sub-section looks at the problem areas identified in section 6.2 and 
describes how the problems, that would have been experienced by the DPE, have 
been overcome using the new Security Framework. 
The Access_control_trader and Access_coturol_service_offers attributes allow the 
Trader to make use of the access control facilities. Access_control_trader ensures that 
a Trader*s access control information, e.g. a security level, is available in the system, 
i.e. it has an AccessPolicy. A principal wil l own (he Trader object, and the principaPs 
credentials wil l be delegated to the Trader. Altematively, the principal may specify a 
security level lower than its own for the Trader, e.g. the Trader may be specified as a 
'Public Trade' (see Section 6.6.1). The Access Control Agent now supervises all 
access requests to the Trader (in accordance with the AccessPolicy), and all requests 
made by the Trader, e.g. a 'Role2' importer wil l not be allowed access a 'RoleT 
Trader, as it is considered less secure. Access_control_senfice_ojfers enables a 
security property value in the Registry and places an exporter's access control 
information in the Registry as the security property whenever Export is invoked, e.g. 
i f an exporter has security role 'Role l ' , then the service offer exported wil l 
automatically take a default value of 'RoleT as its security property value. The 
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exponer may also specify a security level lower than his own, e.g. he may specify a 
security role 'Role2' which is lower than his own, *Rolel* role. The Security-Aware 
Trader now makes selections based on the security property when creating service 
offer lists, e.g. i f a 'Role2* importer is looking for a service, it wi l l only be shown 
'Role2' service offers - it wi l l not see any offers with a security level higher than its 
own. 
The Encrypt _store. Encrypt jcomms. Integrity _check_stores, and 
Integrity_check_comms control integrity and confidentiality in a Trader. A l l four 
security attributes enable the encryption and integrity facilities that are specified in the 
QoPPolicy object. This facilitates the separation of both stored and transit data 
policies and therefore the level of protection can vary i f required. For example, stored 
data is held for a longer period of time than transmitted data and, therefore, it is more 
vulnerable to attack and so it may require a higher level of security. 
Transmitted data wil l utilise the secure service objects, QoP Agent, and 
SecurelnvocationPolicy. For stored data, the most generic solution was described in 
section 6.5, and involves the use of a security-aware Persistence Service. In this case 
the Persistence Service has two options, it can apply mechanisms to the data before it 
is written to storage or it can utilise the security facilities of the storage product. 
The NR_trade fiag enables/disables non-repudiation for a Trader, i.e. non-repudiation 
is available but can be disabled i f not required, e.g. a Public Trader may not require it 
or it may be a trade-off in an effort to improve performance. A Security-Aware 
Trader, with enabled NRjrade fiag, wi l l utilise the non-repudiation service objects, 
i.e. Non-Repudiation Agent, Non-Repudiation Store, Non-Repudiation Adjudicator 
and QoP Agent in accordance with the specified Non-Repudiation Policy. 
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The Auditjrade flag controls the Trader*s access to the audit service. When set to on, 
Aiidit_trade allow the Audit Sampler Agent to decide whether events are to be 
audited, in accordance with the Audit Policy. I f an event is audited the Audit Analyser 
and Audit Responder wi l l decide what to do, by referencing the Audit Knowledge 
Base. 
6,5.5 New Facility Summary 
The following figure 6-7 (based on figure 2-9 of the Trader, see section 2.5.4), 
summarises the modifications that are required to create a Security-aware Trader: 
1. New Trader security attributes; 
2. Use of ^mandatory, readonly* security property in Repository; 
3. New Registry security property; 
4. Modified Admin interface, inherits Security Attributes; 
5. Modified Lookup interface inherits Security Attributes; 
6. Modified Registry interface inherits Security Attributes; 
7. Modified Proxy interface inherits Security Attributes; 
8. Modified Link interface, inherits Security Attributes, and new link 
policy Link^security; 
9. Use of the new Security Framework, including secure interoperability; 
10. Use of security-aware DPE services. 
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Figure 6-7 Security-Aware Trader 
6.6 Other Security-Aware Services in a DPE 
The previous sections have concentrated on the issues surrounding security and the 
trading services. The problems were addressed by the security behaviour of the trader 
using attributes and the new security framework. 
Section 6.2 highlighted that security problems are apparent in other DPE services and 
not just the Trader. They can also be addressed using the same mechanisms as the 
Trader. The Naming service could also utilise attributes to decide whether a client has 
access rights to view a particular object name or reference. The Persistence Service is 
rather more complex. It could use attributes to decide whether data needs to be 
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encrypted, but then it would need to provide generic interfaces that allowed it to issue 
encryption commands. This would require integration with the security service's 
encryption mechanisms or with the encryption facilities of the data storage 
mechanisms, e.g. a database. These issues can be dealt with by providing separation 
between policy (service) and the mechanisms used to implement them. 
In all of these cases it could be argued that the 'security-awareness' characteristic is 
not necessary. Instead the system administrators could, for instance, set up multiple 
Traders, each of which would have different access rights and therefore the service 
would not have to concern itself with the security attached to the individual offers 
available within the system. However, this increases the administrative overhead and 
therefore the likely-hood of human errors, which could result in a security 
vulnerability. In the case of large scale distributed systems it is not always possible to 
set up multiple Traders each with different access rights. This also relies on the fact 
that each exporter wi l l know the Trader it is supposed to advertise its services in, i.e. 
know the Trader with appropriate security clearance and also assumes that enough 
resources wil l be available to allow multiple traders to exist concurrently. A security-
aware Trader provides a simpler solution - it is less costly on resources and simpler to 
administer because the trader can handle security, and therefore provides a more 
secure solution. The same arguments apply to the other DPE services. 
It can be surmised that at a DPE level, supporting services are required to be security-
aware in order to fully secure the environment. This can be accomplished by using the 
following devices: 
• Use of security attributes to indicate that security is required within a 
supporting service; 
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• Separation of mechanism and policy (service), so that when a security 
attributes indicates the security service is required, the ability to provide the 
service is not mechanism dependent; 
• Secure interoperability to allow this functionality to operate across disparate 
domains. 
6.7 Summary 
Security is an issue for supporting DPE services. Although many of the services 
appear to have security issues, the only way to investigate fully was to select a 
specific service such as the Trader. Traders are an important DPE service because 
they allow clients to finding objects that are required, whether they are local or 
remote, which is pivotal to the success of a DPE. However, the Trader provides a very 
vulnerable point for attack, providing an intruder with access to a multitude of 
services. Therefore, it should be made security-aware. It should be able to ensure that 
only authorised clients can access it, and that clients can only view the service offers 
that they are authorised to see. To provide a Security-Aware Trader, new facilities are 
required in the Trader. This entails providing the Trader with security attributes that 
wil l govern its security behaviour. The Trader^s Registry wil l also hold security 
properties that are associated with each service offer held. The security attributes wi l l 
decide which security services the Trader wi l l have access to, and the security 
properties wil l be used in access control. Therefore, the administrator can decide just 
how secure a Trader should be. 
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Security cannot be completely treated as an add-on facility. Within DPEs, each 
service has to be aware of security. This does not just apply to the Trader. It has 
already been suggested that other services such as the Persistence Service need to be 
security-aware i f a distributed system is to provide a truly generic and secure 
environment. 
The lessons learned from the Trader study can be applied to all DPE services. 
Security attributes, a complete security service that is mechanism-independent, and 
the use of secure interoperability, allow services to become security-aware and work 
together to provide a more secure environment. Having covered the theory of how a 
new Security Framework and security-aware service, such as the Trader, would 
operate to provide a more secure environment, the discussion now moves on to look 
at mapping this work to an implementable DPE specification. 
170 
7. Verification of the New Framework 
7.7 Introduction 
A new framework to provide security in DPEs has been defined in the previous 
chapters. It comprises three main components: 
• security service objects - operational and management providing the main 
security service functionality; 
• secure interoperability service objects to provide secure interaction between 
disparate security domains; 
• security-aware DPE services, such as the Trader. 
The entire framework has been defined in accordance with the TINA specification, 
which describes at a high-level, how DPEs operate. To verify the work, this chapter 
wil l map the framework to a current, OMG DPE specification CORBA. 
7.2 Mapping to CORBASec 
Before performing the mapping, it is necessary to first understand what aspects of the 
new security framework are missing from CORBASec. This is accomplished by 
evaluating CORBASec against the DPE security requirements previously specified in 
section 4.2. 
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7.2.1 CORBASec vs. DPE Requirements 
Table 7-1 below summarises CORBASec against the list of security requirements 
defined by this research (see section 4.2). The indicates that the required 
functionality is present. The indicates that while some of the functionality may be 
present, the ful l requirement is not met by CORBASec. 
Security Requirement Functionality required 
1. Identification and 
Authentication 
Identify entities & generate identity attributes 
Use multiple authentication mechanisms 
• 
2. Authorization & Access Generate privilege attributes 
control Use multiple authorization mechanisms 
Use role/groups 
3. Propagation of security 
attributes 
Specify when propagation is required 
Specify constraints on propagation 
4. Secure communications Ability to select Quality of Protect 
Ability to select amount of message to be 
protected 
5. Secure stored data Ability to specify that data needs to be secured 
Ability to specify the Quality of Protection 
-
6. Secure Auditing Audit security relevant events 
Produce audit records 
Issue alarm 
Protect audit information in transit or in trail 
Should be extended to facilitate intrusion detection 
7. Non-repudiation GenerationA^erification of evidence 
Storage of Evidence 
Secure transport of evidence 
Adjudicator facility 
8. Administrative interfaces System Management 
Service Management 
Mechanism Management 
9. Interoperability Interoperability at all levels-
Invocation 
Security Service, Mechanism and Protocol 
Mapping of attributes between domains 
-
10. Scalability Object system that can be distributed 
Use of domains 
Use of groups etc in administration 
11. Integration with existing 
environments 
Flexible structure to allow the model to integrate 
with other technology environments/security 
models 
Facilitates regulatory requirements 
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Security Requirement Functionality required 
12. System Recovery - -
T l Intrusion Detection Physical/logical procedures to prevent 
intrusion/modification 
-
T2 Hardware/software 
protection 
Mechanism management -
M l Inter-object 
communications 
Authenticated & authorised object access 
Secure object communications 
M2 TINA services Authorised service subscribers 
Secured service operation 
M3 TINA services Secure control data 
Audit service available 
-
M4 TINA services Secure administration data 
Secured access to administration data 
M5 Inter-DPE security Authentication & access control 
A l Secure participant 
interaction 
Authentication & Access control 
Secured participant communications 
Audit 
Non-repudiation 
A2 Application Admin Usability 
Secured 
A3 DPE applications security Security active 
Security in-active 
-
11 Establish Trust Authentication & TTP 
12 Attribute Mappings Domain mapper -
13 Operational interoperability Mechanism-compatibility -
14 Control/Administration 
interoperability 
Policy configuration compatibility -
15 Application Security 
Context 
Secure interoperability protocol 
Table 7-1 DPE Security Requirements available in CORBASec 
It is clear from the above table that the main areas of concern can be addressed by 
applying the proposed new framework, as it addresses the following issues, which are 
missing or inadequate in CORBASec: 
• Management: requires consistent, comprehensive management framework 
that separates mechanism and service administration; 
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• Securing Stored Data: requires management of relevant policies and the 
ability to integrate with a security-aware DPE service; 
• Audit: requires ful l auditing facility that can address IDS requirements; 
• Non-repudiation: requires the fu l l compliment of non-repudiation facilities 
(storage, delivery and adjudication); 
• Interoperability: requires secure interoperability with entities in a disparate 
security domain; 
Some of the DPE specific requirements are not fully addressed in this verification. 
Firstly, the segment of the Native Computing and Communications Environment 
(NCCE) security domain, i.e. mechanism management, is not addressed because the 
CORBA services are not mechanism-independent. Secondly, the differences in the 
DPE Services and Kernel security are not addressed. Security of DPE services is not 
considered. However, the issue of a distributed TCB (of which the kernel is the main 
component) is discussed. It is reliant on two elements - the use of interceptors and the 
trusted installation of security mechanisms. Interceptors are resident in the ORB and 
are able to catch all invocations at particular points in the invocation path, e.g. when 
leaving the client or when arriving at the server process. Security interceptors catch 
every invocation and call the appropriate security services to ensure that a request is 
in-line with the current security policy. Finally, application security is addressed. The 
notion of active and in-active security applications is addressed by CORBA's 
security-aware and security-unaware applications. Security unaware applications do 
not have any knowledge of security and rely on the security interceptors to provide 
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security. Security aware applications can use the defined security objects specified by 
CORBASec. 
The shortcomings found with CORBASec can be further illustrated by looking at the 
products that are based on the specification [104, 105, 106]. A l l of the products have 
certain features in common because they all need to extend past the CORBASec 
specification because it is too restrictive: 
• Extending the administration features through defining new interfaces; 
• Using additional features to integrate with existing technologies, i.e. unitary 
logon, bridge technology; 
• Extending the audit facilities to help secure audit records or make them 
available to monitoring tools. 
However, there are still a number of restrictions: 
• Replaceability is difficult and so they are all limited to specific sets of security 
technologies/mechanism; 
• Data storage is proprietary, e.g. use of LDAP; 
• There is no monitoring/IDS integration available; 
• Non-repudiation is not available; 
• Interoperability is still limited to compatible domains and technologies 
(although most have consulting divisions that provide customised solutions). 
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Another important point to note is that, while it has not been tested by any of the 
vendors, it would appear that none of these products wil l interoperate, out of the box, 
because they all support different technologies. 
7,2.2 Mapping to the new Comprehensive CORBASec 
Applying the new security framework enhances the CORBASec specification, and 
therefore it wil l be referred to as the Comprehensive CORBASec (CCS). The 
complete IDL for CCS is available in Appendix A. The mapping preserves the overall 
CORBA structure of an ORB using security interceptors. Therefore a direct mapping 
from the TINA structure is not appropriate or possible, i.e. a one-to-one mapping 
between TINA service objects and CORBASec objects is not possible. Defining new 
objects and modifying existing object within CORBASec provides the required 
functionality. Figure 7-1 below, summarises all of the objects involved in CCS. It 
highlights three object types: 
• Objects that were defined in CORBASec and remain functionally unchanged 
from that specification; 
• Objects that were defined in CORBASec, but are now significantly changed in 
order to facilitate modified or new objects; 
• Objects that are completely new to the DPE and are used to facilitate the 
CCS*s new functionality. 
The figure has been divided into sections that represent the main service facilities 
available within the CCS. This can be compared with figure 2-11 in section 2.6, 
which shows the objects defined within the CORBASec. 
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Figure 7-1 Comprehensive CORBASec objects 
The following sections wil l examine ihe new and modified objects and how they 
provide the new functionality, to ensure the new DPE security requirements are meet. 
7.23 Management and Mechanism-Independence 
The CCS separates the management of services and mechanisms and thereby provides 
the required mechanism-independence. In uses the four methods identified in section 
4.4.3: 
I . definition of new policy classes to separate management function; 
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2. use of opaque data types to assist abstraction; 
3. definition of policies for all security functions for consistency; 
4. ability to locate the new policies. 
The CCS proposes the introduction of several administration objects, which are listed 
in table 7-2 below: 
Security Service Administration Objects 
Authorization/Access control AuthPolicy, AuthMech, 
AccessPolicy, AccessMech, 
DelegationPolicy 
Integrity/Confidentiality QOPPolicy, QOPMech 
Non-Repudiation/Audit NRPolicy, NRMech, 
AuditPolicy, AuditMech 
Interoperability SecurelnvocationPolicy 
Table 7-2 Administration Objects 
To facilitate mechanism-independence, a new set of mechanism policy objects is 
introduced for each of the security services - AuthMech, AccessMech, QoPMech, 
AuditMech and NRMech. Each of these wil l describe the mechanisms used for the 
service. There is no mechanism policy for delegation, e.g. DelegationMech, as 
delegation is not handled by a separate mechanism; it wi l l use those employed by the 
authentication and access control mechanisms, e.g. X.509 certificates, rights from an 
ACL. 
Two new policy objects are introduced, AuthPolicy and QoPPolicy. AuthPolicy is 
responsible for the authentication security policy, i.e. the mechanism to be applied by 
an application, the valid authentication mechanisms available to a user and the 
relevant authentication data, such as ID and password. QoPPolicy holds the policy 
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information in relation to establishing a secure context between a client and server, 
i.e. the level of secure communication required. 
The functionality of the remaining policy objects, which previously existed in 
CORBASec, is significantly changed in CCS. In CORBASec, non-repudiation policy 
was only supported at application level and only defined the rules for generation and 
verification, while'the audit policy simply listed the types of application events 
j 
audited and specified an associated AuditChannel, i.e. where the record was written. 
NRPolicy is now available at application and invocation level, and manages 
authorities, event types and mechanisms (via NRMech). AuditPolicy now manages 
the event selectors, the new audit objects responsible for monitoring, filtering and 
delivery, and the multiple AudilChannel options now available (see section 7.2.6.1 
below). SecurelnvocationPolicy is still used to manage secure invocations, however 
its functionality has been significantly extended. It now provides more configuration 
options, and is an inherent part of a new CCS interoperability service (see section 
7.2.5.1 below), which manages negotiations between security domains at both service 
and mechanism levels. Therefore, there is no separate mechanism policy because this 
object is primarily used for negotiation, and it is more efficient to do so at one level 
rather than involving another object in the communication protocol. 
One further issues is the ability to find the new policies as accomplished through the 
PCM in TINA. This is addressed by extending the DomainManager functionality 
(previously in CORBASec). Getting access to a policy via the domain manager needs 
to be updated to handle the new MechansimPolicy objects, as illustrated in figure 7-2 
below. The DomainManager can now be queried to find the mechanism policies using 
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a newly defined method called get_domain_mechanism, e.g. 
DoniainManager::^e/_rf£7mfl//j_/Hec/if//i/5//Kaccess). 
AccessPollcy 
VomainManag&r:get_domain_policy(access) 
Object 
Object::get_domain^manager, 
Domain Manager 
[>>mainManagen:gbLpomain_mechanism(access). 
AccessMech 
Figure 7-2 CCS DomainManager 
Therefore the functionality of all the management service objects in the new security 
framework has been mapped to the new and modified management objects in CCS. 
7.2.4 Authentication & Authorisation Enhancements 
CORBA groups authorisation and authentication together, because they are so closely 
linked. Therefore they wil l both be studied under this section. 
7.2.4.1 CCS Authentication & Authorisation Overview 
The Authentication & Authorisation services provide three new facilities: 
• mechanism-independent alternative to the User Sponsor Code; 
delegation controls; 
• parameterised access control. 
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CORBASec refers lo User Sponsor Code (USC), which is not part of the object 
system because it is mechanism specific (it represents a logon module). Therefore the 
CCS defines a UserAgent as a new object to provide a mechanism-independent means 
of communication with users. It is representative of some of the access session related 
User Application and User Agent functionality, which relates to security (see section 
4.4). Although both of these objects already existed in the TINA model, they are 
responsible for interfacing with (access session related User Application) and 
representing (User Agent) the user in the system. Therefore it would be beneficial to 
include them in the CCS model as it would allow the system to interact with users 
irrespective of the logon mechanisms used, i.e. smartcard, biometrics, or password. In 
this way the UserAgent wi l l provide the parameters to CORBA*s 
PrincipalAuthenticator. The parameters are initially provided to the UserAgent using 
the operations; set_security_name, set_aitth_data, set^privileges, set_name. This 
provides a mechanism independent way of getting authentication information because 
any product/mechanism can use these operations. 
The UserAgent can then invoke the PrincipalAuthenticator with the user information. 
If the UserAgenl is required to store any data it wil l have to consider the issues of 
securing authentication information. It could do this by defining the QoP required for 
the stored data (see section 7.2.5 below). A factory is a standard OO design pattern 
that allows the creation of a particular object type [107]. The logon module wil l have 
an associated UserAgent factory because it wil l need to generate a UserAgent for each 
user logging into the system. It is evident therefore that the logon module does not 
have a specific entity or principal, on whose behalf it is acting, as all other objects in 
the system would. It would be beneficial to allow the logon module to be mechanism 
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independent and therefore able to easily adapt to multiple authentication mechanisms, 
e.g. a single console that can deal with password, certificate or token authentication 
depending on the application being accessed. This is achieved by modifying how the 
authentication policy works. AuthPolicy usually requests all the information that a 
single principal requires to authenticate itself, e.g. a user's ID and password. The 
AuthPolicy needs to differentiate between a logon module and normal system object. 
This is accomplished by defining a PrincipalType - ^Principal* indicates a usual 
system object that has a principal and therefore authentication data is required, while 
'UserAgent' (UserAgent system entry point) indicates that authentication data is not 
required because no single principal is involved, instead it associates the type of 
authentication with a particular service/logon module. 
With regard to authentication, the Authentication Policy and Authentication 
Mechanism objects map directly onto the new and corresponding objects in CCS. The 
PrincipalAuthenticator is representative of the AuthenticationAgent. When the user 
has been authenticated it is the responsibility of the PrincipalAuthenticator to generate 
identity attributes for the user, the Credentials object. There is no service object that 
directly represents the Credentials, or indeed the Current objects. However, the data in 
these objects wil l be available through management contexts and the UserAgent. 
CORBASec previously defined two access related policies - DomainAccessPolicy 
and AccessPolicy. The mapping now just provides for AccessPolicy because the 
distinction between the previous two objects was that DomainAccessPolicy managed 
the privilege attributes while AccessPolicy was used to query the access policy for a 
particular set of Credentials. To preserve a consistent management framework, 
DomainAccessPolicy functionality is provided in AccessPolicy. The 
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AccessControlAgent is mapped directly onto AccessDecision as both are responsible 
for deciding i f the presented credentials allow a user to perform a particular operation. 
Another issue that is intrinsically part of authentication and authorisation, in DPEs, is 
delegation. The main issue noted in [36], regarding delegation, is the inability to 
restrict where and when credentials can be delegated. This also includes what 
delegation modes (composite, simple) can be delegated. The issue is addressed by 
modifying several object interfaces. Firstly, the new administration object, 
DelegationPolicy wil l now also handle restrictions on where and when attributes can 
be delegated. Two new operations are introduced - setjcontrols and get_controls. 
These operations specify what privileges can be delegated, the delegation mode to be 
used, the number of invocations permitted and an expiration time for when these 
privileges can be delegated. This handles delegation from an administrative 
perspective. However, CORBA already allows privileges held in the Credentials 
object to be updated 'on-the-fly' using the set_privileges operation. Therefore the 
set_comrol and getjcontrol operations need to be added to Credentials, so that 
delegated privileges within it can be controlled. 
The mapping can be summarised in the following table. 
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New Securit> 
Framework 
Comprehensive 
CORBASec (CCS) 
Functionality 
Access session-User 
Application, 
User Agent 
UserAgent Act as interface between user 
and system 
AuthorisationAgent PrincipalAuthenticator Authentication 
Generation of identity 
attributes 
User Agent Credentials 
Current 
Hold user related information 
AccessControl Agent AccessDecision 
RequiredRights 
Decides i f access is granted to 
a particular object/operation 
AuthPolicy, 
AuthMech 
AccessPolicy, 
AccessMech 
AuthPolicy, 
AuthMech 
AccessPolicy, 
AccessMech 
Management of security 
services and mechanisms 
Table 7-3 Authentication & Authorisation Security Service Object Mappings to 
CCS 
7.2.4.2 CCS Authentication & Authorisation Example 
:Authenticalion PoliCYfor 
Application Standard Logon Screen 
Password Mech ; (Application) 
1 
Details 
ACL-Rights 
Useri = -s 
A (9 ctd ) 
Simple 
Delegation 
Figure 7-3 CCS Authentication 
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Figure 7-3 above illustrates the new method of authentication within the CCS. The 
process is described below. 
A standardised logon screen for an application exists, it is a generic front end that can 
be modified to suit multiple authentication mechanisms. 
1. Find the current authentication mechanism for the application. The logon 
module wil l query the AuthPolicy to find out what authentication policy is 
implemented for the current system. In this example a password mechanism 
identifier is specified in the application's AuthPolicy. 
2. Obtain the authentication mechanism details. AuthPolicy wil l query 
AuthMech to find the details of the identified mechanism, e.g. what 
authentication parameters are required. The logon module screen is populated 
and in this example the system now waits for the user to enter a user ID and 
password. 
3. Principal completes login to system. 'UserP now enters her user ID and 
password. The interaction is now taking place with the UserAgent object. This 
object wil l process the user authentication data, in this case a password and 
ID. However, i f a smarlcard logon were used, the UserAgent would process 
the user ID, user PIN and smartcard data. 
4. Authenticate the Principal. The UserAgent, having all of the required 
authentication data, now calls the PrinciapalAuthenticator to authenticate the 
user. 
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5. Verify the authentication data. The PrincipalAuthenticator wil l now query 
the AuthPolicy object to see i f the user can be authenticated. AuthPolicy wi l l 
confirm that Userl with password "Secret'* is a valid user of the system. 
6. Get the user's access privileges. The PrincipalAuthenticaior now queries the 
AccessPolicy object to see what the user's access privileges are. In the 
example, an ACL with a Role attribute is used. Useri is defined as a 'RoleT 
role with access rights *s'. 
7. Get the delegation policy. The PrincipalAuthenticator wi l l query the 
DelegationPolicy object to see what the delegation mode is to be used. In the 
example, SimpleDelegation is used. 
8. Create the credentials object. EVincipalAuthenticaior returns the 
authenticated Credentials object to serve as the user's security ticket. It 
contains attributes such as ID and privileges. This instance wil l hold the 
'Role l ' role with right's' and SimpleDelegation mode for Userl. 
9. Set the credentials of the execution environment. The Credentials object 
reference is passed to the Current object. 
10. Client invokes a secure method on a server. The security service mediates 
the client/server interaction, by accessing the Current object to ensure that the 
interaction is in accordance with the security policy. 
11. Server executes the secure method. The server can access the Current object 
to get information on the incoming client request, such as the client's rights 
and privileges. The RequiredRights object can then be accessed to find what 
rights are required to access the server method. This information wil l allow the 
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server-side security service, i.e. the AccessDecision object, to make an 
informed access decision. I f the client is allowed access, the server w i l l 
execute the method. Userl's privileges can now be delegated to the server 
object i f further invocations are required for the server to complete its 
operation. 
The authentication and authorisation of a user to the system is complete. 
7.2.5 Integrity & Confidentiality Enhancements 
CORBASec deals with integrity and confidentiality together under the title of Quality 
of Protection (QoP). The new features that are added to QoP are: 
o flexibility in configuring QoP by defining new policy objects; 
o QoP for stored data. 
7.2,5,1 CCS Integrity & Confidentiality Overview 
Previously in CORBASec, there were no objects to independently handle integrity 
and confidentiality. The SecurelnvocaiionPolicy had a set_associationjoptions 
operation, which allowed the administrator to specify whether confidentiality and 
integrity were to be applied to secure invocations. The CCS, however, now has two 
new objects specifically dedicated to Quality of Protection (QoP), QOPPolicy and 
QOPMech. These objects are used to define a secure context between a client and 
server. The SecurelnvocationPolicy, is now specifically devoted to secure 
associations between disparate security domains (see section 7.2.7). 
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Section 4.2.2 noted that there is an issue regarding the security of stored data. Security 
of stored data in this instance is defined as the implementation of a specified level of 
QoP on the data held in a persistent data store. It could be assumed that database 
integrity and security system would be able to handle these secure storage issues 
without DPE intervention. However, database integrity is not the same as security 
integrity. Database integrity refers to the accuracy, correctness and validity of data 
(referential integrity) [108], and does not specifically deal with the issue of 
unauthorised modification. With regard to database security, the mechanisms used are 
very much product specific and, in many cases, database security revolves around 
authentication, access control and the use of specific file formats that prevent file 
modification. However, this does not protect data that is illegally viewed, and some 
encryption mechanism has to be employed to ensure confidentiality and integrity. In 
addition, there are other methods of storage that can be employed (e.g. a flat file) and 
a DPE also has to be able to administer security for stored data in these 
implementations. 
The CCS proposes the use of the QOPPolicy and QOPMechanism to also administer 
stored data security. QOPPolicy wi l l use get_stored_QOP_policy, 
setjstoredjQOP_policy, and query_stored_QOP_policy operations (as opposed to the 
get_QOPj)olicy, set_QOP_policy and query_QOP_poUcy). The reason that separate 
methods are required is that the administrator needs to distinguish between a secure 
communications context with an object, such as a database, and securing the data 
stored within a database. Therefore two policies can exist for the same object, but they 
will mean very different things. The parameters are almost identical to those used for 
secure contexts, except that the administrator does not need to specify a direction or a 
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message part that requires protection, because it is not dealing with a transmitted 
message, it is protecting stored data. The QOP mechanisms can apply the policy-
specified encryption to a data structure before it is written to a database or file. The 
process wil l be reversed when the structure is then read. 
The following table summarises the QoP mappings. 
New Security 
Framework 
CORBASec Functionality 
QoPAgent Vault, SecurityContext Negotiate and build a secure 
association 
QoPPolicy, 
QoPMech 
QoPPolicy, 
QoPMech 
Management of secure 
association options 
Table 7-4 QoP Security Service Object Mappings to C C S 
7.2.5.2 Example of CCS Integrity & Confidentiality 
Figure 7-4 below illustrates the new method of QoP within the CCS. The process is 
described below. 
1. Client invokes a secure method on a server. The security service intercepts 
the client/server interaction. The Vault object is used to establish a secure 
context. It recognises the object as belonging within the trusted domain. 
2. Client checks the QoP policy. The client queries the QoPPolicy to see what is 
required for a secure context between the client and server. 
3. QoPPolicy references QoPMech: It also returns the mechanism to be used, 
via the QoPMech. 
4. Secure context negotiation begins. A secure context wil l be initiated using 
the client's QoP. 
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5. Server Vault finds its secure invocation requirements. The server Vault 
intercepts the new request, and queries its QoPPolicy and QoPMech. 
6. Server returns its QoP. It can use this information to finalise the negotiation 
with the client and so complete a secure context. Both client and server are 
now utilising Security Context objects and can communicate in accordance 
with the security policy. Server queries a data storage object. The server 
needs to query a data storage object DBStore, in order to complete the method 
invoked by the client. The DBSlore queries the QOPPolicy to see i f the data is 
securely stored and, i f so, what QOP is applied. In this example, the data is 
stored with a QOP of Confidentiality, using DES to encrypt the data structures 
(in this scenario no secure communication with the DBStore was required, i.e. 
the data is transmitted in the plaintext but stored in an encrypted format). 
DBStore 
ORB Core 
Figure 7-4 C C S Integrity and Confidentiality 
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7. Server method can be completed. When the record is read from the data 
structure it is decrypted using the appropriate mechanism, DES (Note: in this 
instance, any required key exchange is part of the read mechanism for the data 
structure). The data is returned to the server. The server can now complete the 
method invoked by the client. The response is returned via the secure context. 
This completes the QoP events for transit and stored data. 
7.2.6 Non-Repudiation & Audit Enhancements 
Non-repudiation and audit have changed significantly in the CCS. Both employ new 
objects and provide more facilities. 
7,2,6,1 CCS Non-Repudiation Overview 
The first change is that Non-Repudiation is no longer considered an optional service 
as it was previously specified in CORBASec (Optional in CORBASec means that it 
was not available to security-unaware application - the non-repudiation interfaces had 
to be invoked by a security-aware application). It is available on every object 
invocation. However, the service is also configurable so that it does not provide an 
unacceptable overhead on ORB operations. Non-repudiation wil l be enforced on 
every object invocation, in accordance with the specified policy. This policy wil l be 
dictated by the new administration objects, NRPolicy and NRMech, which correspond 
to the TINA service objects of the same name. NRPolicy is used to configure the 
general non-repudiation policy - this means that it covers all of the non-repudiation 
facilities, mechanisms, evidence types and adjudicators. The NRMech object holds 
details of the non-repudation mechanisms including authorities used and evidence 
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types. The NRCredentials object, as defined in CORBASec, is still used for evidence 
generation and verification. The NRCredentials information is held in contexts and 
User Agent. 
Three other new objects are defined lo provide the missing non-repudiation facilities 
as defined by the ISO - delivery, evidence storage and retrieval, and adjudication. The 
delivery service is made up of two key elements - a delivery authority and the 
NRDeliver object. The delivery authority (DA) is a TTP (see Section 3.3.2) that is 
identified in the NRPolicy authorities list. The authority list provides the name of the 
authority and its role, in this instance the role is "Delivery Authority". NRDeliver 
uses the Delivery Authority, to provide a trusted delivery service. It makes use of the 
SecurityContext objects already defined, in CORBASec, but creates new contexts to 
deliver its own tokens and data as opposed to using the client/server context that 
would already exist for an object invocation. For optimisation purposes, NRDeliver 
could use the existing context i f it had the appropriate QoP, i.e. greater than or equal 
to the non-repudiation QoP specified in NRPolicy. NRDeliver wil l be able to send 
both generated and verified security tokens using the NRedeliverjoken method. 
Another issue with the non-repudiation delivery authority is how it can prove that it 
performed its function. This is achieved by adding two more proofs to the process 
(see Section 3.2.5). This wil l include the client producing a Proof of Submission to 
provide irrefutable evidence that the client submitted the non-repudiation request to 
the Delivery Authority and secondly Proof of Delivery to create irrefutable evidence 
that the server received the original invocation and token from the Delivery Authority. 
These are created by the Delivery Authority for every delivery request and the 
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evidence tokens are stored in the client's evidence store. The NRDeliver functionality 
is mapped from the QoPAgent. 
NRStore is the second of the new facility objects for non-repudiation, and 
corresponds directly to NRStore in the new TINA framework. It provides the 
interface to a storage facility for the tokens and certificates. It can add, get and query 
stored records relating to non-repudiation evidence, and does so using the 
NR_record_set, NR_record_get and NR_record_query operations. 
The NRAdjudicator is mapped to its namesake in CCS. It is an interface to a notary 
that can make judgements on any disputes. A TTP wil l be used to verify evidence and 
then prove/disprove claims made by clients or servers. The adjudication process has 
two phases -the first is an on-line adjudication. The on-line adjudication allows the 
adjudicator process (without any human intervention) to validate the evidence tokens, 
i.e. make sure they have valid signatures and that the times are correct. I f one 
evidence token is found to be invalid, then the process wil l be able to settle the 
dispute by deciding in favour of the valid token holder. However, i f both tokens are 
valid, then one of three options is possible. I f the adjudicator is implemented as an 
expert system, then it may still be able to settle the dispute based on some existing 
rules it contains. I f the adjudicator still cannot settle the dispute, it can either signal 
for human intervention and request assistance in the adjudication process or it can 
return a judgement of "undecided**. This process is implementation independent and is 
not of any concern to the CORBA objects involved in the dispute. 
The following table summarises the mappings between the framework and CCS. 
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New Security 
Framework 
CORBASec Functionality 
NRCredentials Contexts, UA User credentials used for 
evidence generation etc 
NRDeliver QoPAgent Creates a secure context to 
deliver non-repudiation 
tokens 
NRStore NRStore Holds non-repudiation tokens 
securely 
NRAdjudicator NRAdjudicator Makes judgements in the case 
of disputes 
NRPolicy, 
NRMech 
NRPolicy, 
NRMech 
Management of secure 
association options 
Table 7-5 C C S Non-Repudiation Mappings 
7.2,6.2 CCS Non-Repudiation Example 
The following section describes how the objects of the new Non-repudiation Service 
interact in the CORBA environment (see figure 7-5 below): 
1. Client invokes a secure method on a server. The security service 
mediates the client/server interaction. 
2. Client checks the Non-repudiation policy. The client knows it is about to 
invoke the server and so in preparation it queries the NRPolicy to see what 
non-repudiation actions need to be taken, i f any. In this example. Proof of 
Origin is required. 
3. Non-repudiation mechanisms used are identified. NRPolicy queries 
NRMech to find the non-repudiation mechanisms used, e.g. X.509 
certificates, and the accepted I I P acting as Notary. 
4. The client requests the generation of irrefutable evidence. The client 
requests the NRCredentials object to generate a token, using the 
appropriate mechanisms. 
194 
Chapter 7: Verification of the New Security Framework 
5. The Client's token is securely delivered to the Server. NRDeliver is 
used to deliver the token. The Delivery Authority used by NRDeliver was 
identified in NRPoIicy. NRDeliver wi l l query NRPolicy of both the client 
and server objects to find the non-repudiation QoP (NRQoP) defined for 
each. I f they are different, they are then merged to find a QoP that wi l l 
meet both of their requirements. The NRQoP wil l then be compared to the 
QoP of the invocation SecurityConiexl. I f the NRQoP provides an equal or 
lower level of security, then NRDeliver uses the existing SecurityContext; 
otherwise it wil l create a new Security Context using the higher NRQoP 
level. Another function that has to be completed at this stage is the 
generation of evidence to ensure that NRDeliver has completed its task. 
This involves creating two proofs, firstly Proof of Submission to provide 
irrefutable evidence that the client submitted the non-repudiation request 
to the Delivery Authority and secondly Proof of Delivery to create 
irrefutable evidence that the server received the original invocation and 
token (not illustrated in the diagram for simplicity). 
6. The Client's token is stored for possible future adjudication. During 
step 5, NRDeliver wil l have retrieved the name/identifier of the data store 
to be used by the client and server to hold evidence. In this example both 
are using a single data store for the domain. NRDeliver wi l l have to create 
another SecurityContext to deliver the token to NRStore; i f that store is not 
available in server object, e.g. as in the example a separate data store is 
used by all the objects. The token is stored using the add_record method 
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on the NRStore object. In addition, the Proof of Creation and Proof of 
Submission described in step 5 are also stored in the client's data store. 
Client 
ORB Core 
Figure 7-5 CCS Non-Repudiation 
7. The Server may dispute the invocation call origin at some later time. 
The server can call on the NRAdjucator to settle the dispute. 
8. The dispute is deliberated and settled. The NRAdjudicator can query the 
NRStore to validate the client and server claims, i.e. validate their 
supporting tokens. This would be done via a secure context through 
NRDeliver (not shown in the diagram for simplicity). The NRAdjucicator 
wi l l return a decision and the supporting token. 
The non-repudiation action is completed. 
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7,2.6.3 CCS Auditing Overview 
Within the auditing service, there were several facilities, which were not catered for in 
the original CORBASec specification. New objects have been introduced to 
accommodate administration, filtering, routing, reporting and analysis. Firstly, the 
administration objects, AuditPolicy and AuditMech. Although CORBASec specified 
an AuditPolicy, this has been significantly modified. The original operations 
set_audit_selectorSy clear_audit__selectors, replace _audit_selectors and 
get_audit_selectors remain in place to manage the event types to be audited. They are 
now extended to include the selection of which AuditAnalyser and AudiiResponder 
(see below) are to be used with these selectors. The AuditMech allows the 
administrator to manage all the different mechanisms employed in the auditing 
facility (this includes analyser, responder, and knowledge-base mechanisms). 
AuditDecision was specified in CORBASec, but its function has been modified. 
Previously it was used to decide i f an audit record should be written to an 
AuditChannel. It now just decides i f the event needs to be audited, using the 
auditjieeded operation, because the AuditChannel has a new purpose (described 
below). 
New objects for the sampler, AuditSamplerAgent, and knowledge base, AuditKB, are 
not required. The sampler is an object that is deployed in the system, but is not 
accessed by any other object and therefore does not need an interface definition in 
CORBA. Sampling wil l be achieved through the security interceptor. The knowledge 
base does not need any interface because some of its data is already handled in other 
CORBA objects, e.g. the security policy infonnation is available through 
administration objects and the security log information is available in the AuditTrail 
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(see below). Therefore the only information required wil l be the profile, analysis and 
response information and it wi l l be utilised by the analyser and responder. This wi l l 
be mechanism dependent and so wil l not require an object definition to be available. 
After the AuditDecision has decided that an event needs to be audited, the new 
AuditAnalyser analyses the information using the chosen analysis mechanism (e.g. 
rule-based, profiling, etc.) to decide i f the event is anomalous. The analyser employs 
two operations - analyse_data and justify. The former is used to request 
AuditAnalyser to analyse the event data, indicate the analysis result (i.e. whether a 
system violation has occurred or whether suspicion levels should be raised) and 
produce an analysis token; the latter is used to provide a fu l l justification of the 
analysis results, i f required. 
The analysis result and token are then sent to the AuditResponder, which decides 
what to do using the define_response operation; This operation decides what 
AuditChannel wi l l be used to implement the appropriate response and it wi l l generate 
the corresponding data to be processed by that channel's log or action. 
The previously specified AudilChannel object in CORBASec was linked to a specific 
AuditDecision object and used a single operation audit_write to write an audit record. 
However, AuditChannels are now linked to two new objects, either an AudilTrail or 
an AuditAction, e.g. alarms. This is accomplished in the AuditPolicy object using the 
setjauditjohannel method. This means that several channels can now exist 
simultaneously for a single AuditDecision, providing greater fiexibility and efficiency 
from the single object. The AuditChannel can, i f required, establish a secure context 
to the log or event action. This wi l l be specified by QoPPolicy or 
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SecurelnvocationPolicy objects and is implemented by using the secure invocation 
objects. This was not the case in the original CORBASec specification. The 
AuditChannel now writes the audit_data specified by AuditResponder to its linked 
object, i.e. trail or action. 
The AuditTrail is a new object that represents an audit log. As the log now has a 
standard interface, it can be easily accessed and queried. This wi l l facilitate the 
generation of user-friendly interfaces to it. AuditTrail employs r€ad_record, 
write_record and query^record operations. The AuditActions object wi l l allow the 
administrator to define other generic responses to an audit event, e.g. sounding an 
alarm or emailing a security supervisor. AuditActions uses the get_action_info 
operation to return details of what the required action is and executejaction to 
perform it. 
7.2.6,4 CCS Audit Example 
The following section describes how the objects of the new Audit Service interact in 
the CORBA environment. 
1. Client invokes a secure method on a server. The security service mediates 
the client/server interaction. 
2. Client checks i f the event should be audited. The client wi l l query 
AuditDecision to see i f the event should be audited. 
3. AuditDecision checks the Audit policy. The client queries the AuditPolicy to 
see i f the action should be audited. In this example the server invocation is an 
auditable event. AuditPolicy can query AuditMech to identify the specifics of 
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the auditing mechanisms. AudiiDecision returns a response to the user, 
indicating that the event should be audited and identifying the AuditAnalyser 
to be used. 
4. Client initiates the audit. The client invokes the AuditAnalyser identified by 
AuditDecision. The possibility of multiple instances of AuditAnalyser exists 
because of the multiple types of analysis mechanism that may be employed. 
5. Information is accessed to help analysis. The AuditAnalyser can query the 
data in the knowledge base to help it complete its analysis. This occurs at the 
mechanism level. 
6. Appropriate response is formulated. The AuditAnalyser then passes on its 
analysis to the AuditResponder, where the appropriate response to the audited 
event wil l be taken. The response can vary from writing a record to the audit 
log, sounding an alarm, sending an alert message to the administrator's screen, 
or even shutting down a specific application. (Note the AuditResponder can 
also access the knowledge base in order to formulate the appropriate response; 
this is not shown in the example). 
7. Alert sent to administrator screen. In this example, the AuditResponder 
decided that two actions were to be taken. The first action is to send an alert to 
the administrator's screen. This is accomplished by invoking the AuditActions 
object where the alert function is defined, via the AuditChanneL AuditChannel 
wil l provide a suitable context i f required. I f the data is considered security 
sensitive, an appropriate secure context wi l l be established to deliver the data 
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to the AuditAction, thereby preventing any unauthorised access to the data 
during transit. 
8. Audit record writ ten to log. The second response that AuditResponder 
required was to write the audit record to a log. The AuditTrail object is the 
interface to the audit log, and again i f required, AuditChannel wi l l provide a 
secure context to deliver the data. 
Client 
/Knowtedge \ 
ORB Core 
Figure 7-6 CCS Audit 
The auditing of the event is completed. 
7.2.7 Secure Interoperability 
The mapping of security interoperability has two parts, firstly the mapping of the 
protocol and secondly the mapping of objects. 
The protocol defined in chapter 5 (see section 5.4.2) is mapped to the OMG's 
Common Secure Interoperability (CSI) [37] protocol. The table below lists the CSI 
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message types, their function and the Interoperability Protocol Messages to which 
they can be mapped. 
CSI Message Function ORE Message 
EstablishContext Passed by the client to the target 
when a secure context needs to be 
established. 
CreateConiext 
ContinueEstablishContext Used by the client or target during 
context establishment to pass 
further messages to its peer as part 
of establishing the context. 
NegoiiateContext 
CompleteEstablishContext Returned by the target to indicate 
that the association has been 
established. 
AcceptContext 
DiscardEstablishContext Used to indicate to the receiver that 
the sender of the message has 
discarded the identified context. 
Once the message has been sent the 
sender wil l not send further 
messages within the context. 
DeleteConiext 
MessageError Used to indicate an error detected 
in attempting to establish an 
association either due to a message 
protocol error or a context creation 
error. 
ErrorContext 
MessagelnContext When a secure context is 
established, messages are sent 
within the context using the 
MessagelnContext message. 
ProcessContext 
Figure 7-7 CSI Message Types 
The object mapping involves adding a new object, the DomainMapping, and 
significantly altering the functionality of the SecurelnvocationPolicy object. Both of 
these objects provide the functionality of the DMA and SecurelnvocationPolicy in the 
TINA model (see section 5.4.3). However the SecurelnvocationAgent function is 
added to the CORBASec Vault and SecurityContext objects. As these objects are 
already providing the negotiation process of the QoPAgenl, the functionality only 
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needs to be extended to address the issues of interoperability across disparate 
domains. 
The following table summarises the secure interoperability mappings. 
New Security 
Framework 
CORBASec Functionality 
D M A DomainMapping Define mappings between two trust 
domains 
Securelnvocation 
Agent 
QoPAgent 
Vault, 
SecurityContext 
Negotiate and build a secure 
association between different trust 
domains 
SIPolicy Securelnvocation 
Policy 
Management of secure association 
options between different trust 
domains 
Table 7-6 Secure Interoperability Service Object Mappings to CCS 
7.2.8 Security-Aware Trader 
The CORBA Trader [109] is an implementation of the ODP Trader, as describe in 
chapter 6. Therefore the mapping to CORBA of the new security-aware trader is 
simplified as it can be accomplished by following the modification summary stated in 
section 6.5.5 (the modifications are again listed below): 
1. New Trader security attributes; 
2. Use of 'mandatory, readonly* security property in Repository; 
3. New Registry security property; 
4. Modified Admin interface, inherits Security Attributes; 
5. Modified Lookup interface inherits Security Attributes; 
6. Modified Registry interface inherits Security Attributes; 
7. Modified Proxy interface inherits Security Attributes; 
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8. Modified Link interface, inherits Security Attributes, and new link policy 
Link^security; 
9. Use of the new Security Framework, including secure interoperability; 
10. Use of security-aware DPE services. 
The new security-aware trader IDL for CORBA is available in Appendix B. It covers 
the modifications 1 to 8. However, the modifications for 9 and 10 do not produce any 
IDL changes, but rather functional changes in how the Traders interact securely with 
each other when they reside in disparate domains, and how they interact with the 
security service. 
7.3 Summary 
The DPE specifications provided by TINA are high level and do not address many 
implementation issues. To ensure that the new Security Framework is applicable, it 
was considered necessary to map it to a DPE implementation specification. CORBA 
is the leading specification and therefore was used for the mapping exercise. The 
existing CORBA Security Service has been significantly re-designed to provide a new 
more comprehensive and configurable service, in order to meet the needs of a DPE. 
Firstly, the new administration structure, which facilitates service and mechanism 
independence, is provided through the introduction of a new Policy super-class and 
the use of this class to build service and mechanism management objects for each of 
the service facilities. Secondly, each facility within the security service is also 
enhanced. Audit is extended to include new monitoring (IDS) and data filtering 
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facilities. Non-Repudiation provides new delivery and storage facilities. An interface 
to an adjudicator is also provided to help settle disputes. Integrity and Confidentiality 
are extended to provide greater configurability and deal with the issue of stored data 
QoP. Thirdly, secure interoperability has extended its negotiation capabilities to 
handle all of the new Security Service facilities, and is now capable of negotiating a 
secure context between security domains with conflicting policies. Finally, the 
CORBA Trader is now security-aware and can interact with the security service to 
eliminate the trading security threats identified in section 6.4. 
A l l of these mappings go beyond any enhancements planned by the OMG in the 
future [110, 111] and far exceed the current realisation of security within current 
implementations of CORBA. The next chapter wi l l now investigate the prototype 
implementation of the new mappings to CORBA and verify their feasibility. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have covered the core concepts of the new security framework 
- the new security service, new secure interoperability and the security-aware DPE 
service (Trader). A l l of these features address security vulnerabilities in DPEs and 
offer improved secure functionality within the distributed environment. However, a 
theoretical specification alone is not adequate i f the research is to prove useful in the 
worid of distributed object systems. Therefore, the purpose of the implementation is 
to build demonstration software that wil l act as a Proof of Concept for the theoretical 
research defined. The prototype can then be used in the verification work. 
This chapter wi l l look at both implementation and verification. With regard to 
implementation, it wil l define the different aspects of the work - hardware, software, 
the IDL defined and how the object implementations were achieved. Issues relating to 
the implemented IDL, which were identified during the process, wi l l also be 
examined. The verification wil l be performed in two ways. 
o Performance Modelling; 
o Standardisation (including implementation issues); 
Firstly, performance modelling of the work is required to determine the implications 
of implementing the new security services in real-worid environments, and not just 
the research environment described in this chapter. Secondly, the work needs to be 
acceptable within the current standards for ISE and DPEs. These standards have also 
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progressed since the initiation of the research and the work wil l be evaluated to ensure 
that it is still new and novel. Finally, the verification wil l entail looking at current 
real-worid problems that the new security framework wil l solve. 
8.2 The Proof of Concept Prototype 
With regard to the scope of the implementation, it was decided that it should it wi l l 
include all three aspects of the work: 
1. Comprehensive CORBASec (CCS); 
2. Comprehensive CORBA Secure Interoperability Service; 
3. CORBA Security-aware Trader. 
Each one needs to be a workable part, in order for the whole security solution to be 
implementable. Within the CCS, the major security facilities implemented are as 
follows: 
• Authentication; 
• Access Control; 
• Integrity/Confidentiality (QOP); 
• Non-Repudiation. 
These enhanced facilities include all the new objects as defined in chapter 7, both at 
administration and operational levels. The only facilities not implemented for the 
service were the Audit and Recovery. Although Audit was theoretically defined in 
section 7.2.6.3 (based on the components in Chapter 4), neither Audit nor Recovery 
was implementable within the timeframe of the research. The implementation was 
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restricted to a selection of facilities that were considered sufficient to provide a 
prototype for the CCS. 
The Comprehensive Secure Interoperability Service has also been implemented. It 
operates at both the mechanism and policy levels defined in section 7.2.7 (based on 
the components from chapter 5). It includes the extension of the secure context 
objects so that they can handle the new policy configuration negotiations within the 
new administrative structure of the CCS, as well as the introduction of a new object to 
provide mappings between these configurations. 
The final part of this implementation is the construction of a security-aware service, 
which is the Security-aware Trader as described in chapter 6. The Trader 
implemented is a *Stand-alone Trader', as defined in [59], implements the Lookup, 
Register and Admin interfaces. Currently available trader implementations are 
generally only Query or Simple Traders, i.e. they implement the Lookup or Lookup 
and Register interfaces. 
The justification for this research has already been covered in previous chapters and 
has shown that DPE specifications for Security, Interoperability and the Trading 
service, while providing a basis for secure operations, are still incomplete (CORBA 
was used as an illustrative example). The inadequate management and operational 
facilities leave DPEs open to many security vulnerabilities, which are listed in 
sections 4.3, 5.2, and 6.3. This prototype verifies the work by defining a new DPE 
specification framework (CORBA) comprised of new objects, administrative 
structures, policy configuration structures and modes of operation between services to 
ensure greater security. These issues can be summarised as follows: 
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Topic Problem Research Solution 
Security Missing facilities Provision of facilities with the 
addition of new objects 
Inadequate administration Design and Implementation of 
new administration system 
No Mechanism Independence Separation of mechanism and 
service management 
Interoperability Insufficient negotiation 
abilities 
New negotiation abilities of 
interoperability objects 
Unable to handle disparate 
domains, e.g. different 
policies 
New structures introduced to 
handle confiicting policy 
negotiations and inter-domain 
mappings 
DPE Service Not security aware Creation of security-aware 
service that utilises the CCS 
Figure 8-1 Summary of Issues in Research 
8,2.1 Implementation of the Prototype 
The following subsections describe how the prototype was implemented. It details the 
hardware platform, software configuration, structures used and how the Interface 
Definition Language ( IDL - see section 2.4.1) was used to ensure implementation-
independence at several levels within the demonstration software. Further prototype 
hardware and software information is provided in Appendix D. 
8.2.L1 IDL 
CORBA IDL allows the specification of object interfaces in an implementation-
independent manner (see section 2.4.1). It is used by the middleware implementation, 
i.e. Orbix, to generate C-H- code for the implementation. The IDL interface code 
generates the client stub and server skeleton (see figure 2-8 in section 2.4.2). In the 
implementation, three features were implemented using IDL-defined interfaces: 
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• Comprehensive CORBASec; 
• Security-aware Trader; 
• GSS-API. 
The CCS and Security-aware Trader were defined in BDL as they are new services and 
had to be proven to be implemenlabie and operational within the distributed 
environment. The GSS-API server vyas defined in IDL because it was necessary to 
ensure that the other services could utilise GSS-API in order to preserve 
standardisation. 
The CCS IDL has several modules: 
• Security: defines the data types used in the service; 
• SecurityLevell: defines Level I security; 
• SecurityLevel2: defines Level 2 security and basically includes all the 
operational level objects required by the service; 
• SecurityAdmin: defines the new security administration features; 
• SECIOP: defines the enhanced Secure HOP required for the new service. 
In CORBA there were two other modules, the NRService and SecurityReplaceable 
modules; both have been integrated in to the SecurityLevel2 and SecurityAdmin 
modules. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, non-repudiation is no longer an 
optional service and, therefore, is now included in the main modules so that it is 
accessible with all the other facilities. Secondly, security replaceability is no longer 
required as mechanism and service independence is now built into the CORBA 
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security structure and can transparently handle any replacement of mechanism and 
policy objects that is required. 
The Security-Aware Trader IDL module structure has not changed from the original 
CORBA structure. It is still as listed below: 
• CosTrading: defines the Security-Aware Trader that contains attributes, 
including the new security attributes, and core interfaces, i.e. Admin, Lookup, 
Register, Proxy, Link, and Offerlterator; 
• CosTradingDynamic: defines the Trader's Dynamic Property interface, i.e. 
DynamicPropEval; 
• CosTradingRepos: defines the Trader's Service Type Repository interface, 
i.e. ServiceTypeRepository. 
While the CORBA object interfaces are still used, some of the parameter lists are 
extended and a new security attribute interface has been added along with the new 
link policy, Link_security. 
The GSS-API IDL was created from the version 2 specification [85]. It contains a 
single module: 
• GSSAPI: defines all the data types and operations required by the version 2 
specification. 
The ful l IDL descriptions for these services and GSS-API are available in Appendices 
A, B and C respectively. 
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8,2.1.2 Object Implementation 
This section wil l look at the structure of the Prototype software, what objects were 
implemented and how they were utilised. 
8.2.1.2.1 Implementation structure 
The object implementation was accomplished in using Visual C++, cryptlib and 
Microsoft Access in the Orbix environment. It was structured as depicted in figure 8-2 
below: 
Comprehensive 
CORBASec 
GSS-API 
Security-Aware 
Trader 
cryptlib Access 
Figure 8-2 Object Implementation 
The GSS-API server used the cryptlib software to provide the mechanisms required to 
accomplish the security context, credential and protection operations defined in the 
service. The CCS was then able to utilise these generic operations to complete its 
defined methods on the security objects. It also used Microsoft Access as a method of 
persistent storage for administrative data held in the security administration objects. 
The Security-Aware Trader utilised Microsoft Access as a mechanism for persistent 
storage of trading data, this includes attribute values and Repository and Registry 
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information. The Trader wil l use the CCS to accomplish any security-related 
functions that are required - such functionality or behaviour is indicated by the 
security attributes. 
8.2.1.2.2 Objects Implemented 
As previously stated the prototype implementation does not implement all of the 
newly defmed security facilities. Figure 8-3 below clearly illustrates which objects 
have been implemented (it is based upon figure 2-11 in section 2.6). 
Authentication 
& Authorisation 
Socuro rnvocation 
a QoP 
Non-Repudiation 
& Audit 
UserAgcnt 
Current 
Credentials 
Principal 
Authenticator 
Required Rights 
Access Decision 
Vault 
SecurityContexl 
NRCredentials 
NRStore 
NRAd udlcator 
AuthPolicy 
AuthMoch • 
Access Pol icy 
AccessMech 
DelogationPolicy 
DelegatlonMoch 
0 
QOPPolicy 
QOPIUech 
Secure Invocation 
Policy 
DomalnMapping hi 
NRPolicy 
Figure 8-3 CCS Objects Implemented 
In the Security-Aware Trader, the Lookup, Register and Admin interfaces (see section 
6.5) are implemented. It was not necessary to implement the Link or Proxy interfaces 
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lo prove the concept of security-aware services. Figure 8-4 illustrates the interfaces 
implemented in the Security-Aware Trader. 
o "5 
O 
11 
•o 
< 
Core Trader 
Interfaces 
Lookup 
Register 
h 
Other Interfaces 
ServlceTypeRepltory h 
Olferlterator I] 
Admin 
Figure 8-4 Security-Aware Trader Interfaces Implemented 
Within the GSS-API IDL, the core operations relating to credential management, 
context-level (establishment and management), and message-level (integrity and 
confidentiality) were implemented. The support calls were not implemented for the 
demonstration software, as the purpose of utilising GSS-API operations was lo use a 
standardised API within the CCS. 
8.2.1.2.3 How objects were utilised in the implementation 
There are two basic methods of utilising the security objects: 
o Interceptor initiated calls; 
o Direct call from security-aware applications. 
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Both of the methods are utilised in the implementation, and are necessary as they can 
correspond to the security-inactive and security-active invocations (see section 4.2.3). 
This section wil l illustrate how this is accomplished by showing some examples of 
where these methods are applied in the demonstration software. 
Interceptor initialed calls are utilised by the Security-Aware Trader. A security 
interceptor has been created in the Security-Aware Trader. When a call is invoked on 
the Trader, the interceptor intercepts it. It can then interrogate the Trader's security 
attributes and apply the appropriate security facilities to the inbound call. For 
example, as show in figure 8-5 below, i f a Security-aware Trader is using the 
access_control_trader and nrjrade attributes, the interceptor wil l firstly run an 
access control on the call, using AccessDecision, to ensure that the client is authorised 
to access the Trader. I f the client has authorisation, the interceptor wi l l then check the 
Trader's non-repudiation policy (NRPolicy) and find the evidence types required and 
comply with the policy. I f 'proof of origin' is required, then the interceptor wil l ask 
the client for such evidence. When it is received and verified, it wi l l be stored in case 
of future disputes. The interceptor wi l l then forward the call to the Trader. 
215 
Chapter 8: Proof of Concept 
Security 
Attributes 
Gssm 
pomprehenslve 
check 
attributes 
ho 
us© 
security 
functions 
complete 
Trader 
invocation 
initiate 
Trader 
invocation 
Security 
interceptor 
for 
Security-
Aware 
Trader 
Figure 8-5 Interceptor initiated calls 
Security interceptors can process all call invocations when security is to be applied 
across a distributed system. This wil l ensure that the domain security policy wi l l be 
applied to all application calls whether they are security-aware or not. This is how 
Level 1 security is applied. However, as in the example above, security-aware 
applications or services can also utilise interceptors to process all incoming 
invocations. 
The second method of utilising objects is that of a direct call from security-aware 
applications. In this case, applications can make calls on security objects directly as 
opposed to relying on interceptors. An example of such an application in the 
implementation software is during the logon process. The logon facility initially 
queries the AuthMech, via the AuthPolicy object, to find the authentication 
mechanism used, e.g. password or smartcard. In this instance, the password logon is 
defined as the required mechanism for the system and so a password logon screen is 
presented. After the user has entered his ID and password, the logon facility generates 
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a UserAgent to act on the user*s behalf. The UserAgent wi l l then initiate a call to the 
PrincipalAuthenticator in an attempt to authenticate the user. I f successful, a 
Credentials object wi l l be generated for the user and he wi l l be allowed access to the 
remote system. 
AccessPolicy 
Access Mech 
Security-Aware 
Trader 
Secunty 
Attributes 
Administration Application 
for 
Access Control 
Administration Application 
for 
Security-Aware Trader 
dministrator 
Security-Aware 
Trader 
Owner 
Figure 8-6 Direct call on objects 
Another scenario in which an application can call security objects directly is 
administrative applications as illustrated in figure 8-6 above. The demonstration 
provides administration applications for each of the security services and does so by 
accessing the administration objects, both service and mechanism level, to populate, 
verify and update the security policies. An administrative application has also been 
written to allow the Trader owner update the features used in a Security-aware Trader, 
i.e. set the appropriate security attributes. 
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5.2.7.3 Implementation issues 
The first issue relates to the number of parameters that were used in the IDL 
operations, e.g. the Vault object's init_securiryjcomext method clearly shows how the 
number of parameters can become very long. The bold highlight shows the new 
parameters added to the IDL. 
Security::AssociationStatus initjsecurity_context ( 
in CredentialsList 
in Security::SecurityName 
in Object 
in Security::OptionsDirectionPairList 
in Security::MechanismType 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::Opaque 
incut short 
out Security::MechanismType 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out Security::opaque 
out SecurityContext 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::maJor_status 
out Security::minor_status 
credsjist, 
target_security_name, 
target, 
association_options, 
mechanism, 
mechjdata, 
chan_binding, 
lifetime _rec, 
out_mechanism, 
deleg_state, 
mutual_state, 
replay _detjstate, 
sequence jstate, 
anon_state, 
trans_state, 
prot_ready_state, 
conf_availy 
integ_avail, 
security_token, 
security jcontext, 
error, 
majorjsrror, 
minor error 
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The above method was constructed in this manner so that it was easily map to the 
GSS-API method, GSSJnit_sec_context (see below) [85]. 
OM_uint32 GSSJnit_sec_context{ 
in gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, 
in short input_context_handle, 
in intemalname target_name, 
inout objJd_seq mech_type, 
in boolean deleg_req_flag, 
in boolean mutual_req_flag, 
in boolean replay_det_req_flag, 
in boolean sequence_req_fiag, 
in boolean anon_req_flag, 
in short lifetime_req, 
in octetstring chan_bindings, 
in byleBuffer inpul_token, 
in short tincount, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out contexthandle output_context_handle, 
out byteBuffer output_loken, 
out short tcount, 
out boolean deleg_slate, 
out boolean mutual_state, 
out boolean replay_det_stale, 
out boolean sequence_state, 
out boolean anon_state, 
out boolean trans_state, 
out boolean prot_ready_state, 
out boolean conf_avail, 
out boolean integ_avail, 
out short lifetime_rec 
); 
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There are many other similar examples in the new IDL. GSS-API provides a generic 
and standardised method to create a secure context and so is used by many security 
implemenlers. Therefore it was used as the basis for the security implementation in 
the demonstrator. However, the number of parameters in IDL is generally smaller, as 
this helps reduce programmer error. Therefore it may be more conducive to place the 
large number of parameters in a structure instead of listing them sequentially. 
The second issues relates to the number of invocations required. While the 
demonstrator was able to implement and operate all of the interfaces, it was realised 
that the number of invocations required had substantially increased. This issue is 
analysed in detail in the section 8.3.1 later in the chapter. 
8.2.2 A Practical Demonstration Scenario 
The prototype incorporates the use of a demonstration scenario, which itself involves 
two applications, 'Local Application* and 'Remote Application', both of which have a 
set of facilities within an new CORBA environment, i.e. they both utilise the CCS, 
new Secure Interoperability Service, and 'Local Application' also utilises the 
Security-Aware Trader. The scenario involves 'Local Application' users completing a 
service authorisation request. In order to do so they need to access user profile 
information in 'Remote Application', for the user making the service request. 
'Local Application' has the following applications: 
• Logon Application; 
• Service Authorisation Application; 
• Security-Aware Trader to find datastore services; 
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• Security Administration Application; 
• Security Aware Trader Administration Application. 
'Remote Application' has the following Application: 
• User Information Application, which can be remotely accessed by other 
applications with the proper security authorisation. 
For the purposes of the demonstration, a domain mapping has been agreed between 
the administrators of the two security domains where 'Local Application' and 
'Remote Application' reside. 
The following table 8-1, illustrates the users in 'Local Application' and their roles and 
the applications that they are authorised to use: 
Users Local 
Application 
Remote 
Application 
Name Role Service 
Request 
Trader 
Service 
Trader 
Admin. 
Security 
Admin. 
User 
information 
Userl 'Roler X X X X 
User2 'Role2' X X 
Admin 'administrator' X 
Table 8 - lUser Roles and Authorised Access 
The main features of the demonstration are show as follows: 
• CCS with new and enhanced facilities: the 'Local Application' wi l l be able 
to operate in two modes, with security switched on or off. When security is on. 
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the CCS wil l authenticate users and only allow them to access authorised 
applications. It wi l l also employ the appropriate QoP and non-repudiation 
functions; 
• New Secure Interoperability Service: When users try to access the *Remote 
Application' User Information Facility, the new Secure Interoperability wi l l 
come into operation. If authorised, the user wi l l be allowed access to the 
application; 
• New Administration Structure: Only Admin is authorised to access the 
Administration applications for the CCS. Admin wil l be able to make changes 
to certain policies, and the updates wi l l be reflected the next time a user tries 
to access the 'Local Application'; 
• Security-aware Trader: The Security-Aware Trader offers datastore services, 
e.g. a user can query the Trader to find the most appropriate datastore to store 
*Local Application' details. The Security-Aware Trader is administered by its 
owner, i.e. Userl can update the security attributes. The Trader wi l l initially 
operate as a Public Trader, i.e. with no security, and then after an 
administration update it wi l l operate as a Security-Aware Trader. The 
differences can be illustrated by observing who can access the Trader and 
what service offers are returned. 
Figure 8-7 below illustrates the authorised paths through the Prototype, when the new 
CCS is in operation. A security service is active is active in both domains. User2 is 
not authorised by the security service to access the remote application or to authorise 
a service request. 
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Domain A Domain B 
Local 
Application 
Remote 
Application 
adtnin 
1 
Security Security 
Admin Service 
Security 
Service 
J 
Figure 8-7 Authorised paths through the demo with New Security Service 
Only an administrator is allowed to access the security service through the 
administration console, see figure 8-8 below. 
PhO Demonilnrtion 
•SetecloneandpiwtOK-
(»j Security Sefvk:cA<Snintt(iation 
O Tiadei Secirity Adrvntiation 
Sdect to set Ihe Secuity System On-
OK 
C « r d 
Figure 8-8 Administration Selection screen 
Any access request, other than those displayed, should be denied. Without the new 
Security Service, User2 would be able to access all functions - there would be no 
protection. 
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Figure 8-9 Security Service Administration Screens 
The administrator wi l l be able to select the service he wants to manage by selecting it 
from the security menu as shown in figure 8-9 above. The details of how the services 
are administered can be entered using the individual security service screens, such as 
the access control administration screen also illustrated in figure 8-9. 
Figure 8-10 below, illustrates the authorised paths through the Security-aware Trader 
demonstrator. Userl, as the trader owner, is the only authorised user allowed to access 
the Trader administration console, i.e. she is the only one allowed to set the Trader 
attributes. Both Userl and User2 are allowed to access the Trader; however, when the 
new security service is in operation, User2 wil l only see the trader offers that he is 
authorised to see. Userl, acting with 'Rolel ' , is allowed to view all the offers in the 
Security-aware trader. Without the new security, User2 would either be denied any 
access to the trader, or he would have full access and therefore the service offers 
would be unprotected. 
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Figure 8-10 Authorised paths through Trader Demo with New Security Service 
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Figure 8-11 Trader Security Administration & Query Screens 
8.2.3 Requirements Matrix 
To further illustrate the ability of the New Security Framework and the prototype to 
meet the security requirements, the table below lists all of the DPE security 
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requirements, and identifies which ones are meet by the original TINA security 
model, the New DPE Security Framework, the original CORBA Security Service and 
the Prototype (implemented as an extension to CORBA) (see section 4.3 and 7.2.1), 
The matrix illustrates how the DPE Security Framework (and the resulting 
implemented Prototype) is able to provide the necessary requirements for a secure 
DPE. This has been achieved by several means, such as extending facilities such as 
auditing and non-repudiation, which were previously not present or incomplete; 
management has been re-structured and administration interfaces have been added or 
extended to provide the flexibility required; and interoperability has been introduced 
to deal with disparate security domains. 
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Security Requirement TINA New DPE 
Security 
CORBA 
Security 
Prototype 
(CCS) 
1. Identification and 
Authentication 
2. Authorization & Access 
control 
3. Propagation of security 
attributes 
- • 
4. Secure communications -
5. Secure stored data - -
6. Secure Auditing - -
7. Non-repudiation - -
8. Administrative interfaces -
9. Interoperability - -
10. Scalability 
11. Integration with existing 
environments 
- - -
12. System Recovery - - - -
Tl Intrusion Detection - - - -
T2 Hardware/software 
protection (Mech.Mgmt.) 
- - -
M l Inter-object 
communications 
M2 TINA services -
operational 
M3 TINA services - control 
M4 TINA services -
administration 
-
M5 Inter-DPE security -
A l Secure participant 
interaction 
-
A2 Application Admin -
A3 DPE applications security -
11 Attribute Mappings - -
12 Operational 
interoperability 
- -
13 Control/Administration 
interoperability 
- -
14 Application Security 
Context 
-
Table 8 - 2: DPE Security Requirements Matrix 
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8.3 Verification 
In order to verify the prototype, two approaches were used. Firstly, the practical 
verification by performance modeMing was used to analyse the system. Secondly, a 
more theoretical verification by analysing current standards was also used. 
8.3.1 Performance Modelling 
When assessing performance in a distributed object system, the cost of object 
invocation is measured in milliseconds and so the number of invocations should be 
carefully considered when analysing a system [112]. Therefore when considering the 
performance of the CCS, it will be measured in object invocation calls. This will be 
compared with the CORBA Security Service to see if significant overheads have been 
added. The actual time of the invocation is not measured because it is subject to too 
many other variables, e.g. platform, network load, bandwidth. Therefore the number 
of invocations is deemed to be a more realistic measurement. 
The modelling will consider three areas, operational level security, administration of 
security and the security-aware CORBAservice. 
8.3A.1 Operational level 
For each of the six main seciirity facilities in the security service, i.e. authentication, 
access control, QoP, audit, non-repudiation and secure invocation, an event sequence 
chart is presented. It will map the number of calls used and provide a comparison 
between the new Comprehensive CORBASec (CCS) and the current CORBA 
Security Service by highlighting the new enhanced operations with a broken line. 
Operations, which previously existed in CORBA, are illustrated by a solid line. 
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When considering the number of invocations, the chan may illustrate the actual 
method invocation on a server that initiates the security service, however this 
invocation (identified as ^invoke' on the chart) will not be included in the object 
invocation count - the count is restricted to security object invocations. Also in some 
instances a 'create object' invocation is counted, because although it is not a specific 
operation specified in the DDL it is considered an invocation on the constructor of a 
security object. 
Each chart will reference previous examples that have been presented in the thesis 
descriptions of CORBASec and CCS, which will provide a basic explanation of the 
objects utilised in that service. 
Firstly, the authentication event sequence chart. In this scenario, a principal is logging 
on to a system and wishes to be authenticated and presented with valid credentials 
(see section 7.2.4.2 for the CCS example). CORBASec utilises 3 object invocations, 
while the Comprehensive CORBASec (CCS) makes 8 object invocations. 
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Citeni 
|_set_name^| 
|_set_authdal^ 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
authenticate 
Lguery_Auth_pollc3^ I. 
I I 
I " 
gel_controIs _ 
(create Credentials) 
set credentials 
Figure 8-12 Authentication Event Sequence Chart 
Access Control is considered in the next event sequence chart. It considers the 
scenario when a client invokes a server, and the server decides whether the client is 
authorized to do so (see section 7.2.4fs.2 for CCS example). Here, both CORBASec 
and the CCS utilize 4 object invocations. 
I Invoke I 
get_attribute^ 
accessJ allowed 
g et_req u I red_ri ght^ 
Figure 8-13 Access Control Event Sequence Chart 
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The next chart looks at QoP in both services. It considers the case of a client changing 
the QoP it requires when invoking a server (see 7.2,5.2 for CCS example). 
CORBASec makes 2 object invocation, while CCS makes 3 invocations. 
I get_QOP_pollcy^| 
overTlde_def autt _Q O P. 
Invoke 
Figure 8-14 QoP Event Sequence Chart 
Non-repudiation considers a scenario where the client generates evidence, e.g. proof 
of origin, which has to be verified by the server. The server then generates evidence to 
support this verification. A single call to the adjudicator to settle a dispute is also 
shown above (see section 7.2.6,2). CORBASec utilises only 6 invocations while CCS 
makes I I . 
231 
Chapter 8: Proof of Concept 
^ (serverj 
I query_NRjolicy ^ 1 
® 4BEI^ ^B^^ ^R^^^ jflD3^ 
generate_token 
I I 
forTn_complete_evidence 
Invoke. 
NR_se nd_ge ne rated_token 
vertfy_token 
generate.tpken 
form_complete evidence 
N R_send_gene rated_toke_n 
NR_add_recoK 
l_NR^add_recor^| 
NF|_sett[e_disgute 
Figure 8-15 Non-repudiation Event Sequence Chart 
The Audit scenario involves a client invoking a server method. The server considers 
whether the event should be audited and what the response should be when the event 
is to be audited. A record is written to the log to record the event and an alarm is 
raised to notify the administrator (see section 7.2.6.4 for example). CORBASec 
invokes 3 objects while CCS invokes 9 objects. 
232 
Chapter 8: Proof of Concept 
I invoke 
JCS^k AS^A ^ B ^ A ^S^B J^^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^ ^ n ^ ^ ^ A 
^^ ^^ 9 ^^ S^ ^^ ^^W ^^ B^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ s^ 
audit 
ncodca 
analyse_data ^1 " 1 ^ "~ ^ 
dcfinc^response 
audit write 
auditlwrito 
L wr']^ I 
• record^' 
_executo 
acQon 
Figure 8-16 Audit Event Sequence Chart 
The final chart maps a Secure Invocation between a client and server. The server 
requires a mapping between policy configurations, i.e. a domain mapping record. The 
original invocation is then sent to the client, protected by the secure association and a 
protected reply is returned by the server (see section 5.4.4 for example). CORBASec 
requires 7 invocations and CCS requires 11 invocations. 
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Invoke ^ 
>_poHcy 
inil_seci rity_context 
create client 
^ e t Interoj 
gel_lnteroa 
policy ^ 
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SecureContejlt 
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CO itlnue_securily_ci intext 
SecureConten 
1 
protect_message 
reclalm_Lessage 
I I I I 
Figure 8-17 Secure Invocation Event Sequence Chart 
Now that each of the security operations has been mapped on charts, the resulting 
number of invocations for each facility can be compared. 
As can be seen from both table 8-1 and the figure 8-18 below, the CCS makes more 
invocations than CORBASec. However, this is to be expected as the CCS offers 
significantly more facilities than CORBASec. For example, the increase in both non-
repudiation and audit in CCS can be accounted for because of the delivery, storage, 
adjudication and monitoring facilities they now have. Similarly secure invocation now 
offers policy level mappings and authentication is able to use the UserAgent and 
utilise a comprehensive administration structure to build the credential. There is no 
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increase in access control, but for QoP the number of invocations is increased by 1 
(however this is a 100% increase). Even though there are increases, they average 
about 3.3 object invocations per facility, i.e. a 90% increase in the number of 
invocations required. 
Service CORBASec CCS DifTerence % Diff. 
Authentication 3 8 5 166% 
Access Control 3 3 0 0% 
QoP 2 3 1 50% 
Non-Repudiation 6 11 5 83% 
Audit 3 9 6 200% 
Secure Invocation 7 10 3 42% 
Ave.=3.3 Ave. 90% 
Table 8-1 Operational Object Invocation Comparison 
Authentication AudH 
• CORBASec 
• Enhanced Security Service 
Figure 8-18 Operational Object Invocation Comparison 
Therefore this overhead in object invocation is seen as minimal and bearable by the 
system, when one considers the new and enhanced facilities that are now available in 
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CCS. Also these examples are assuming that all services are used all the time, but in 
any large distributed object system, the administrator would tailor the policies to 
provide the maximum protection while minimizing the overhead. 
83.1.2 Administration Level 
Some of the administration objects, and how they are used at an operational level, 
have already been considered in the previous section. However, this is only a small 
number of the possible administrative methods available. This section will look at all 
of the administration objects and their methods. It will not employ sequence charts, 
but will simply compare object method numbers in both CCS and CORBASec. 
Table 8-2 below, lists the administration objects and the number of methods available 
on each in CCS and CORBASec. 
Service CORBASec objects CCS objects 
Authentication - AuthPolicy, AuthMech 
Access Control AccessPolicy 
DomainAccessPolicy 
RequiredRights 
AccessPolicy, AccessMech 
Delegation DelegationPolicy DelegationPolicy, DelegationMech 
QoP - QOPPolicy, QOPMech 
Non-repudiation NRPolicy NRPolicy, NRMech 
Audit AuditPolicy AuditPolicy, AuditMech 
Secure Invocation SecurelnvocaiionPolicy SecurelnvocationPolicy, 
DomainMapping 
Table 8-2 Administration Objects 
This highlights the fact that CCS provides a comprehensive administration structure 
and so will provide more methods. However it should be noted that CCS provides 
policy and mechanism level administration, while CORBASec only dealt with policy 
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level administration. This fact is considered in table 8-3 below which compares the 
number of object methods. 
CORBASec CCS 
Service Policy Policy Mechanism Total 
Authentication - 6 5 11 
Access Control 6 7 5 12 
Delegation 2 10 - 10 
QoP - 11 9 20 
Non-Repudiation 2 6 13 19 
Audit 5 6 9 15 
Secure Invocation 2 15 - 15 
Table 8-3 Comparison of the Numbers of Administration Object Models 
As shown in figure 8-19 below, if one was to compare the total number of methods 
available in administrative CCS objects with the number in CORBASec, then there 
would be a significant overhead, approximately 12.1 object invocations per facility. 
However, if the comparison is made based on comparing policy administration, then 
the overhead becomes only 6.3 object invocations. 
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• CORBASec 
• ESS Policy Admin 
• ESS Policy & Mech Admin 
Figure 8-19 Number of Administration Object Methods 
TTiis overall increase, although significantly less than the original comparison (almost 
50%), still reflects the additional facilities provided by the new administration 
structure. It provides a new flexibility and enables mechanism and service 
independence. Therefore it is again an issue of weighing up the tradeoffs between 
performance and security. Although the increase at administration level is double the 
operation level (3.1 object invocations), it can be seen as a tolerable overhead because 
these administration methods are generally only required at system set-up and for 
maintenance purposes. 
8,3.1.3 Security-A ware CORBAservices 
The Security-Aware CORBAservice that was designed by this research was the 
Trader. By using the figures already calculated for security invocations at an 
operational level, the impact by security on the Trader service can be studied. 
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Security Attributes Attribute Security Total 
Invocations Invocations 
Security-aware 1 - 1 
Access_control_trader 1 3 9 
Access_control _service_offers 1 - 1 
Encrypt_stores, Inlegrity_check_stores 2 2 4 
Encrypt_comms, lntegrity_check_comms 2 10 12 
NR_trade 1 11 12 
Audit_trade 1 9 10 
Table 8-4 Security-Aware Trader's Security Object Invocations 
Table 8-4 above, lists the security attributes defined for the Trader (see section 6.5). It 
details the number of invocations required to get the attribute value and then defines 
the number of operational level object invocations required to execute the appropriate 
security facility. However, when calculating the average increase in the number of 
object invocations for each attribute that is set on, two assumptions are made: 
• Although two attributes are tested. Encrypt_stores and Integrity_check_stores, 
the number of object invocations is kept to a single execution of a QoP 
facility. This is because the implementation will be executed as one function. 
• Similarly for Encryptjcomms and Integrity_check_comms the number of 
object invocations is kept to a single execution of a Secure Invocation facility, 
as the implementation will execute both as a single function. 
The average number of object invocations for each attribute set is then calculated as 
4.9 invocations. Again trade-off is an issue, this Security-aware Trader can provide 
security that previously did not exist within the system and so this overhead has to be 
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weighed against the added protection. Also the Trader will be tailored to suit the 
system, with only the appropriate attributes set, so that performance and security will 
be considered when deciding just how *security-aware' the Trader should be. 
83.2 Standards Verincation 
Having considered verification from the practical perspective, i.e. performance 
modelling, it is relevant to now consider how the research relates on a more 
theoretical level, i.e. the DPE implementation standards. Standards in a research area 
do not remain static, they are constantly being revised and updated. The technologies 
used can become outdate and replaced by new ones. This section will look at how the 
standards and technologies used in the research, have been revised, and explain how 
the new framework is still valid even with the recent changes. 
8J,2.1 iSE and DPE standards 
TINA has influenced groups such as the OMG, and it was not a surprise in September 
2000, when the OMG announced that after TINA-C's decision to discontinue 
operation, the OMG would continue TINA-C's work under their Telecommunications 
Domain Task Force [113]. Therefore TINA will still remain the central ISE DPE 
standard even though it has now transferred to the OMG. This obviously also 
strengthens CORBA's position as an important standards-based DPE solution. 
Another such recognition is the fact that CORBA is now recognised as an 
international interoperability standard [114]. The International Standard's 
Organisation (ISO) recently adopted CORBA's Interoperability platform as ISO/IEC 
19500-2. The ISO have already adopted several other specifications such as DDL 
(ISO/EEC 14750|1TU-T Rec. X.920), Trader (ISO/IEC 13235|1TU-T Rec. X.950) and 
240 
Chapter 8: Proof of Concept 
ODP Type Repository (ISO/IEC DIS 14769|rrU-T Rec. X.960). The OMG has also 
submitted CORBA's ORB specification for adoption. 
8.3.2.2 CORBA Security Service Revision 1.5 and 1.7 
The OMG follows a Technology Adoption Process [115], which will be outlined 
before discussing the version issues of CORBASec. Initially a Task Force may issues 
a Request for Information, which will eventually result in a Request for a Proposal 
(RFP). Submitters can then reply to the RFP by a submission deadline with an Initial 
Submission, which can later be updated as a Revised Submission. Once the OMG 
Architecture Board (AB) has certified a submission, i.e. that it is compliant with 
CORBA technology; the Task Force can then recommend to the Board of Directors 
(BOD) that the submission become an Adopted Specification. A Revision Task Force 
(RTF) can then carry out revisions on the Adopted Specification. The RTF only exists 
for a specified length of time and is responsible for maintenance of an adopted OMG 
specification, i.e. they clarify ambiguities and correct errors; they cannot extend a 
specification with new functionality. Once certified by the AB and implemented by 
one submitter, a BOD can vote to make the technology a formal Available 
Specification. 
When the research began, the CORBA 2 security service was actually at revision 1.2. 
Since then, revision 1.5 was made the formal specification by the OMG in June 2000 
[116] and, at the time of writing, revision 1.7 [117] is now being adopted by OMG 
vote but it has not been accepted as a formal available specification. Revision 1.8 is 
just at the RTF stage [118]. This section will examine the changes in revision 1.5 and 
1.7 (it is too early to evaluate 1.8) and see whether the research is still valid with these 
later versions. 
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Two major changes occurred in version 1.5 as described below (other minor data type 
changes occurred, but they are of no consequence to the research). 
1. New Administrative Objects: Five new policy objects are introduced: 
• MechanismPolicy: used to request the use of one specific set of 
mechanisms when invoking a particular object reference; 
• EstablishTrustPolicy: used to specify a particular policy between a client 
and the target object; 
• QOPPolicy: used to specify a particular Quality of Protect for messages 
sent to a particular object reference; 
• DelegationDirectivePolicy: used to specify the delegation policy used for 
invocations on the target object; 
• CredentiallnvocationPolicy: used to specify a particular set of Credentials 
to be used when invoking a target object. 
There had been some previous confusion with regard to how a client would 
override default policies details - they were generally retrieved from and set in 
objects such as Current and Credentials. Therefore to alleviate confusion and 
provide a clear methodology for clients to specify this information when 
attempting to invoke a server, the above policy objects were specified. They 
all have a very simple structure - a single readonly attribute specifying the 
detail policy value, e.g. the EstablishTrustPolicy contains a single attribute 
structure that can be set to specify if trust is to be established in the client, the 
target or both. 
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2. SSL and S E C I O P : The SSLIIOP specification was previously a separate 
document. It is now introduced as part of the specification. 
A worked example of security, using revision 1.5, is provided in a paper by Chizmadia 
[119]. 
In revision 1.7 only one major change has occurred. 
1. New security object SecurityManager. SecurityManager does not introduce 
any new functionality, it merely takes the security functionahty that previously 
existed in the Current object and places it in a separate security object. 
These changes are superficial. They do not extend or add new functionality - they 
merely clarify procedures or move functionality to new objects. Within the 
specifications, the list of main objects remains unchanged, and so it none of these new 
objects have a substantial impact on the security service provided. Therefore all the 
issues and problems identified in CORBASec remain unchanged, and the new 
recommendations from the research still apply even to these later versions of the 
service. 
8.3.23 CORBA 3.0 
In December 1999, the OMG voted to adopt the complete CORBA 3.0 specification. 
CORBA 3 is actually a suite of specifications, which when taken together, adds a new 
dimension of capability and ease-of-use to CORBA [120, 121]. Although much 
discussed, the CORBA 3 is not yet adopted as the formal available specification, i.e. 
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version 2.4.1 is still the latest official version for vendors to reference. The new 
specification can be divided into three categories, which are described below: 
1. Internet Integration: 
a. New Java-tO'IDL Mapping specifications wi l l allow developers to 
build distributed applications completely in Java and then generates the 
CORBA I D L from the Java class files [122]. CORBA 2 already 
provided a IDL-to-Java mapping. 
b. The CORBA 3.0 Firewall specification defmes interfaces for passing 
HOP through a firewall. It includes options for allowing the firewall to 
perform filtering and proxying on either side [123]. 
c. The Interoperable Name Service [124] defines a URL-fonnat object 
reference that can be typed into a program to reach defined services at 
a remote location, including the Naming Service. 
2. Quality of Service Control 
a. The specification identifies a minimum compliance supporting 
CORBA ORBs. This Minimum CORBA specification is designed to 
jumpstart the use of CORBA embedded devices [125]. 
b. Real-time CORBA extends the CORBA specification for a new type of 
ORB called the Real-time ORB [126]. 
c. Fault-tolerance for CORBA is also addressed, and defines a standard 
based on entity redundancy and fault management control [127]. 
d. The Asynchronous Messaging specification has two components: 
levels of quality of service (QoS) agreements and Interface Definition 
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Language changes necessary to support asynchronous invocations 
[128]. 
3. The C O R B A Component Model (CCM) 
The CCM will specify a framework for the development of *plug-and-play' 
CORBA objects. It encapsulates the creation, lifecycle, and events for a single 
object and allows clients to dynamically explore an object's capabilities^ 
methods, and events. The specification has three major parts, which cover, a 
container environment to provide services, integration with Enterprise 
JavaBeans [129] and a software distribution format that enables a CORBA 
component software marketplace [130]. 
Only one change specifically references the security aspect of CORBA, i.e. the 
firewall specification. However, this is addressing a specific issue and not the overall 
security limitations within the Security Service and CORBAservices. Therefore the 
research is still valid and can still be applied in a CORBA 3.0 environment. 
Component technology may be the driving force for CORBA 3.0, but components 
still require Security, and CORBASec still requires the new objects and functionality 
defined by this research. 
The OMG has realised limitations of CORBASec. It has provided some suggested 
future features within the specification, but has given no detail as to how they might 
be accomplished. One example is the notion of an attribute mapper. It is identified in 
the CORBASec specification [36]. There is also no indication of when any further 
amendments would be introduced. The OMG recently drafted a roadmap [131], which 
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lists several areas and features, but there is no timeline for their introduction or 
whether they wi l l even be completed, e.g. under policy management the OMG 
SECurity Special Interest Group (SECsig) has identified that negotiation of federated 
domains is required, while under interoperability they have listed interoperability 
across products. Many of the features listed in this new wish-list have already been 
addressed by this research, which identified the problems some time before they were 
acknowledged by the OMG. 
8,3.2.4 Issues when implementing the standards 
The previous sections have provided verification of the work by evaluation of a 
performance model of the research and also by viewing the research against the latest 
standards and technologies changes. This section looks at real-world problems that 
have been encountered by vendors using the current version of the DPE security 
The first example revolves around the current implementations of CORBASec 
products that are currently available. These problems were covered in section 7.2.1. 
Vendors such as Concepts, Dascom and Entegrity, all have a common set of problems 
that they address with proprietary solutions. Firstly, they have a common set of 
features they all need to extend past the CORBASec specification because it is too 
restrictive: 
• Extending the administration features through defining new interfaces; 
• Using additional features to integrate with existing technologies, i.e. unitary 
logon, bridge technology; 
• Extending the audit facilities to help secure audit records or make them 
available to monitoring tools. 
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However, there are still a number of restrictions: 
• Replaceability is difficult and so they are all limited to specific sets of security 
technologies/mechanisms; 
• Data storage is proprietary, e.g. use of LDAP; 
• There is no proper monitoring/IDS integration available; 
• Non-repudiation is not available; 
• Interoperability is still limited to compatible domains and technologies 
(although most have consulting divisions that provide customised solutions); 
• Multi-vendor interoperability is also not available. 
A l l of the above issues are addressed by the research. The separation of mechanism 
and policy administration provides for mechanism independence and therefore 
releases implemenlers from the constraints of using the same mechanisms and 
technologies; it also obsoletes the notion of replaceability, because all objects should 
be automatically replaceable because they have been abstracted from mechanism 
dependencies. The new security service addresses issues such securing stored data and 
extends it to persistent storage by introducing the concept of security aware services 
(e.g. a security aware persistent storage service could operate in conjunction with the 
security service). Other facilities such as non-repudiation and audit have been 
extended. 
While the above examples illustrate the issues that CORBASec implemenlers 
encounter, the problem of inadequate DPE security is experienced in other areas. 
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Take, for example, Ericcson's Research and Development team who have a new 
product called FraudOffice [132], for Fraud Detection & Management in a 
telecommunications network. The FraudOffice product family offers a complete end-
to-end package to network operators and service providers to combat fraud within 
telecommunications networks, Ericsson provides the relevant software applications, 
hardware platforms, systems support, fraud management services and fraud 
competence training so that the telecommunications operator organisation is correctly 
equipped to minimise the substantial financial losses and inconvenience caused by 
fraudsters in a network, which can be up to as much as 5% of annual billed revenue. 
One of FraudOffice's main selling points is its integration flexibility [133], which is 
achieved through an open scalable CORBA-based platform. Because of this 
integration ability, FraudOffice can maximise the potential use of the operators* 
existing support systems (e.g. billing, data warehouse, MIS system, SS7 monitoring. 
Customer Care). This wil l become an important consideration in the next generation 
where the number of potential data sources for fraud detection is likely to increase 
dramatically (e.g. credit card transactions, log examinations, balance reconciliation, IP 
transactions, customer service applications, payment history, etc.) and become more 
diverse. 
However, Ericcson encountered some obstacles when developing this system. The 
main problem was related to the fact that the CORBA security service was not 
flexible or extensive enough for their requirements. As a result, they had to build their 
own Security Manager and Audit and Alarm facilities [134], because they were 
unable to use the CORBA security technology. I f the Comprehensive CORBASec had 
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been available, it would have saved the developers time and also provide for 
interoperability with other products using the same standards. 
8.4 Summary 
The purpose of the implementation was to prove that the new Comprehensive 
CORBASec, the new Secure Interoperability Service and the Security-A ware Trader 
are not just theoretical ideals, and that they are implementable. This chapter described 
the implementation of the research and how it was achieved. The research 
implemented all objects necessary within each of these services. It is important to note 
that the method of implementation is not really important to proving the concept, 
because the key issue is that the IDL-defined interfaces are workable. The 
implementation proves this even when they are implemented in the rather limited 
environment. Therefore details of the actual C++ implementation on a Microsoft NT 
are not necessary, as the same objectives should be achievable using Java on a Sun 
Workstation; after all this was the driving force behind CORBA distributed systems -
implementation and platform independence. 
The service implementations have also been applied within an application scenario, in 
order to illustrate cleariy how the services would function together. Therefore the 
implementation has accomplished its objective by realising the services and using 
them within an operational environment. Facilities that were missing and, therefore, 
had to be built in-house are proposed as part of the CCS within the CORBA 
environment, thereby saving time and reducing the risk of error. 
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The chapter also evaluated the research system performance. Benchmark testing 
against current CORBA security products is not appropriate in the case of the research 
because the products could not act as an equivalent comparison to the research 
implementation described. However, object invocation is the advised method of 
performance modelling for object distributed systems, and was therefore used in the 
research model. 
Although there is an overhead for any security operation, it was kept to a minimum 
and is, therefore, considered an acceptable trade-off against the extra security that is 
provided. As in all systems, it is the job of the administrator to tailor policies and 
system options to find the optimal solution, where performance and security can co-
exists harmoniously. The CCS provides a comprehensive and flexible administration 
system to provide the administrator with this ability. 
Verification of the security issues in the CORBA DPE serves to verify the methods 
used as generic DPE solutions. The principles used to provide new security features to 
the security services, secure other DPE services and enable secure interoperability 
between disparate domains have been proven effective and implementable in a 
practical DPE environment. 
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9.1 Achievements of the Research 
This chapter presents concluding thoughts on the research. The following summarises 
the achievements of the research, which have met all of the objectives, defined in 
chapter I . 
1. A comprehensive analysis of the general requirements for distributed 
system security was conducted exceeding any previous investigation of 
this topic. As a result, a new set of DPE security requirements was defined 
and a new definition of the DPE security domain was provided. When 
evaluated against these requirements, the current DPE security model was 
shown to be inadequate on all levels. 
2. A new security framework for DPEs was defined. The service components 
were defined at both an operational and management level. They provide 
all of the necessary security functions: authentication, access control, 
integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. 
3. A new secure interoperability framework for DPEs was defined. A 
distributed system, which operates across disparate security domains, can 
use the new interoperability protocol to facilitate secure DPE inter-domain 
interactions. 
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4. The new and novel concept of security-aware DPE services was 
introduced and found to be necessary to address security vulnerabilities 
within the DPE services themselves. The Trader was selected as the proof-
of-concept, and a new security-aware Trader architecture was defined. 
5. The theoretical DPE security framework was implemented and verified by 
providing a mapping of it to an implementable DPE specification, the 
OMG's CORBA, and then building a working proof-of-concept. The work 
was further verified by providing object invocation analysis of the services 
and also through analysis of standards and existing real-world issues. 
It is therefore, considered that the research has made a substantial contribution to 
knowledge within the domain of DPE security. 
9.2 Limitations of the Research 
The following sub-sections present the author's thoughts regarding the limitations of 
the research. 
1. Although the new audit objects were defined, they were not implemented. 
This was decided as the audit implementation was a substantial 
undertaking and would not have been achievable within the research 
timeframe. Other areas were considered to be of greater significance to the 
proof of concept. 
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2. The issue of recovery, i.e. the system returning to a secure state, was not 
considered within the research. It would take several years of research to 
fully address this issue and, therefore, it was decided that it could not be 
addressed within the scope of this work. 
3. Although it was never the intention of the work to examine the security-
awareness of all DPE services, it was observed within the thesis that other 
services, such as persistence, could provide generic solutions to security 
problems i f ihey were also security-aware. How this could be achieved, 
was not addressed within the research. 
9.3 Suggestions for Future Work 
There are six key areas where continuation of the research should be focused. This 
work was considered outside the scope of this research or was considered too 
complex to complete within the research timeframe. 
1. Within the Audit service, there are several areas that could be further 
investigated in order to complete the service definition. This would include 
the specification of an Audit Record Format to enhance interoperability 
between audit services working in different security domains. A common 
audit record format would allow separate, and independently implemented, 
audit systems to easily exchange information. Similariy the specification 
of the Audit analysis token that is returned by the DPE AuditAnalyser 
needs to be defined. The definition of more Audit Event and Selector types 
could help provide a more flexible and configurable audit policy. Events 
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and Selectors could be defined within specific vertical domains such as 
financial or healthcare. The IDS domain is currently in the process of 
being standardised by the Common Intrusion Detection Framework 
(CIDF) [135] and the IETF [136]. This is expected to provide greater 
interoperability among different analysis and response systems. However, 
these standardisations are not complete. Therefore research in the area 
would significantly help the security of DPEs. 
2. A standard non-repudiation token, that could be written to the NRStore 
object and would facilitate interoperability, needs to be defined. 
3. There are many DPE supporting services, such as persistence, events and 
time. This research has only considered two of those services. Trader and 
Security, and how they can be enhanced to provide a more secure DPE. 
The other services also need to be studied in order to define their security 
vulnerabilities and solutions to these problems. In doing so it would 
provide a complete analysis of security for DPE services. 
4. It was proposed in the research that DPE services, such as the Persistence 
and Query Services, could be made security-aware and then used to 
provide secure generic solutions to problems such as secure persistent data 
storage and retrieval - as would be required by the non-repudiation 
servicers NRStore and many other objects. Another scenario could involve 
the use of secure Event and Transaction services in order to provide secure 
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recovery within a DPE. Although this would provide the ultimate generic 
solution for a DPE, it is recognised that there are problems. With regard to 
persistence, the definition has been recognised as not implementable in its 
current state [137]. As some DPE services are, to-daie, not available in 
detailed specifications, work is needed to ensure that when complete, they 
wil l able to inter-work to provide secure generic solutions to several 
problems. 
9.4 Summary of Research Conclusions 
According to the TINA consortium [138], the future of communications depends not 
only on individual technical or standards-based solutions but also on one universal 
generic software architecture solution. It also states that this approach has to be global, 
and it needs to involve all areas of the industry; the ultimate aim is to produce a 
complete set of specifications for building and managing services of any degree of 
complexity. However, with the rise in security breaches found by recent surveys such 
as that from the FBI/CSI [46], it is important to ensure security in this new open, 
global environment, as such an environment wil l only provide more opportunities to 
compromise a system. The current DPE security solution has been proven to be 
inadequate and this research has addressed the problem. 
The research achieved its objectives by assessing security in a DPE, defining the 
current limitations and then proposing solutions to overcome these limitations. A new 
security framework was defined, which provides a complete set of security facilities 
and a comprehensive management structure. A secure interoperability service was 
defined which facilitated mechanism and policy level negotiations, and a security-
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aware Trader was designed to prove the concept that security-aware DPE services 
offer a greater level of security within a DPE. 
This work provides a standardised solution to increase security. DPE security vendors 
currently experience problems of interoperability between their products and also 
have to create proprietary extensions to overcome other limitations of the security 
service. These problems wil l be dissolved i f vendors adopt the new security solution 
proposed in this research. It wi l l provide users with greater options and, therefore, 
allow them to create a more secure distributed environment. 
Further work can be pursued to ensure improved interoperability of the enhanced 
security facilities, i.e. audit and non-repudiation token definition. Also improved 
security for other DPE services can be achieved through the study of their security 
limitations and the application of security-aware interfaces. 
ISE is no longer limited to just the telecommunications arena, it is supported by the 
data communications and processing industries. E-commerce is readily adopting the 
technology because of its ability to quickly provide new services and facilities in a 
heterogeneous, distributed environment. A l l of this research work wil l provide a more 
secure distributed processing environment in which a multitude of applications can be 
built. Whether it is finance or healthcare, education or just surfing the information 
highways, the data wil l be available, but it wil l be protected. 
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Appendix A - IDL for Comprehensive CORBASec 
This appendix wil l present the IDL for the Comprehensive CORBA Security Service 
(CORBASec). It has several structural changes from the original CORBA 2.0 
Security Service, along with the modification and addition of new object interfaces. 
IModule Structure 
The modules used in the IDL are now: 
• Security 
• SecurityLevell 
• SecurityLevel2 
• SecurityAdmin 
• SECIOP 
The NRService and SecurityRepIaceable modules have had their interfaces now 
included in the SecurityLevel2 and SecurityAdmin modules. There are two reasons 
for this. Non-repudiation is no longer an optional service and therefore is now 
included in the main modules. Also security replaceability is no longer required as 
mechanism and service independence is now built into the CORBA security structure. 
Object Interfaces 
Comments through out the IDL code wil l explain the modifications to and addition of 
new object interfaces. The new IDL code wil l be highlighted in bold. 
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IDL 
/ / * Module: Security * 
// * Function: Defines data types etc. * 
#include <orb.idl> 
module Security { 
typedef string SecurityName; 
lypedef sequence <ociel> Opaque; 
// Used to define the Policy type 
enum PolicyType { 
ClientlnvocationAccess, 
Ta rgetl nvocation Access, 
ApplicationAccess, 
ClientlnvocationAuthentication, 
TargetlnvocationAuthentication, 
ApplicationAuthentication, 
ClientlnvocatibnQoP, 
Target In vocationQoP, 
ApplicationQoP, 
Stored DataQoP, 
ClientlnvocationAudit, 
TargetlnvocationAudit, 
ApplicationAudit, 
ClientlnvocationNonRepudiation, 
TargetlnvocationNonRepudiation, 
AppIicationNonRepudiation, 
ClientlnvocationDelegation, 
TargetlnvocationDelegation, 
AppHcationDelegation, 
ClientSecurelnvocation, 
TargetSecurelnvocation, 
ApplicationSecurelnvocation, 
Construction 
); 
// Used to define the Principal type for the Policy 
// NOTE: UA represents the entry point for a user to the system. 
// User has not yet obtained any id,attributes etc. 
enum PrincipalType { 
Principal, 
UA 
}; 
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II extensible families for standard data types 
struct ExtensibleFamily ( 
unsigned short family_defmer; 
unsigned short family; 
1; 
// security association mechanism type 
typedef string MechanismType; 
typedef sequence <MechanismType> MechanismTypeList; 
struct SecurityMechandName { 
Mec han i smTy pe mech_ty pe; 
SecurityName security_name; 
}; 
typedef sequence <SecurityMechandName> SecurityMechandNameList; 
// security attributes 
typedef unsigned long Security AttributeType; 
// identity attributes; family=0 
const SecurityAttributeType Auditid = I ; 
const SecurityAttributeType AccountingID = 2; 
const SecurityAttributeType NonRepudiationId = 3; 
// privilege attributes; family = 1 
const SecurityAttributeType Public = 1; 
const SecurityAttributeType AccessID = 2; 
const SecurityAttributeType PrimaryGroupID = 3; 
const SecurityAttributeType Groupld = 4; 
const SecurityAttributeType Role = 5; 
const SecurityAttributeType AltributeSet = 6; 
const SecurityAttributeType Clearance = 7; 
const SecurityAttributeType Capability = 8; 
struct AttributeType { 
ExtensibleFamily attribute_family; 
SecurityAttributeTypeatlribute_type; 
}; 
typedef sequence<AttributeType> AttributeTypeList; 
struct Attribute { 
AltributeType attribule_type; 
sequence <octet> derining_authority; 
Opaque value; 
1; 
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typedef sequence<Attribute> 
typedef sequence<octet> 
// Authentication return status 
enum AuthenticationStatus { 
Success, 
Failure, 
Continue, 
Expired 
1; 
// Association return status 
enum AssociationStatus { 
AoSuccess, 
AoFailure, 
AoContinue 
}; 
//Authentication method 
typedef unsigned long AuthenticationMethod; 
//Access Control method 
typedef unsigned long AccessMethod; 
// Authentication Types 
enum AuthenticationType { 
Client, 
Server, 
Mutual 
); 
// Credential types which can be set as Current default 
enum CredentialType { 
InvocationCredentails, 
OwnCredentials, 
NRCredentials 
}; 
// Declarations related to Rights 
struct Right ( 
ExtensibleFamily rights_family; 
string right; 
1; 
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AttributeList; 
def.authority; 
typedef sequence <Right> RightsList; 
enum RightsCombinator { 
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AIIRights, 
AnyRights 
1; 
// Delegation related 
enum DelegationSiate { 
Initiator, 
Delegate 
1; 
//pick up from TimeBase 
typedef TimeBase::UtcT UtcT; 
typedef TimeBase: rlntervalT IntervalT; 
typedef TimeBase: iTimeT TimeT; 
// Security features available on credentials 
enum SecurilyFeaiure 1 
NoDelegaiion» 
SimpleDelegation, 
CompositeDelegation, 
NoProtection, 
Integrity, 
Confidentiality, 
Integrity AndConfidentiality, 
DetectRepiay, 
DetectMisordering, 
EstablishTrustlnTarget, 
Anonimity 
1; 
struct SecurityFeatureValue { 
SecurityPeature feature; 
boolean value; 
}; 
typedef sequence<SecurityFeatureValue> SecurityFeatureValueList; 
// Quality of protection which can be specified 
// for an object ref and used to protect messages 
enum QOP { 
QOPNoProtection, 
QOPIntegrity, 
QOPConfidentiality, 
QOPIntegrity AndConfidentiality 
1; 
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// Association options which can be administered on secure invocation 
// policy and used to initialise security context 
typedef unsigned short AssociationOption; 
const AssociationOption AONoProtection = I ; 
const AssociationOption AOIntegrity = 2; 
const AssociationOption AOConfidentiality = 4; 
const AssociationOption AODetectRepIay = 8; 
const AssociationOption AODetectMisordering = 16; 
const AssociationOption AOEstablishTrustlnClient = 32; 
const AssociationOption AOEstablishTrustlnTarget = 64; 
const AssociationOption AOAnonimity = 128; 
typedef sequence <AssociationOption> AssociationOptions; 
// Flag to indicate whether assocation options being administered 
// are the "required" or "supported" set 
enum RequiresSupports { 
Requires, 
Supports 
1; 
// Direction of communication for which secure invocation 
// policy applies 
enum CommunicationDirection { 
Both, 
Request, 
Reply 
}; 
// AssociationOptions-Direction pair 
struct OptionsDirectionPair { 
AssociationOptions options; 
CommunicationDirection direction; 
}; 
typedef sequence<OptionsDirectionPair> OptionsDirectionPairList; 
// Delegation mode which can be administered 
enum DelegationMode { 
DNoDelegalion, 
DsimpleDelegatibn, 
DCompositeDelegaiion 
1; 
// Association options supported by a given mech type 
struct MechandOptions { 
MechanismType mechanism_type; 
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AssociaiionOptions options_supportecl; 
1; 
typedef sequence <MechandOptions> MechandOptionsList; 
//Audit 
struct AuditEvenlType { 
ExtensibleFamily event_family; 
unsigned short event_type; 
}; 
typedef sequence <AuditEventType> AuditEventTypeList; 
lypedef unsigned longSelectorType; 
// family = I , System event selectors 
const SelectorType Intface = 1; 
const SelectorType Obj = 2; 
const SelectorType Operation = 3; 
const SelectorType Sellnitiator = 4; 
const SelectorType SuccessFailure = 5; 
const SelectorType Time = 6; 
typedef sequence<SelectorType> SelectorTypeList; 
struct SelectorValue { 
SelectorType selector; 
any value; 
I ; 
typedef sequence <SelectorValue> SelectorValueList; 
// used by AuditAnalyser in analyse_data 
enum AnalyserResult { 
O=no_violation, 
]=raise_suspicion, 
2=violation 
) 
// used by AuditAnalyser when justifying audit analysis 
struct Auditjustifyi 
string Justincation_message; 
Opaque justiFication^data; 
}; 
// Msg_part used by QOP to specify how much of the message should 
// have integrity/confidentiality mechanisms applied 
enum msg^part { 
parameters, 
parameters_operations, 
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parameters_operations_targetId, 
parameters_operations_targetId_servicelnfo 
}; 
typedef sequence <msg_part> MsgPartList; 
// Used in the Interoperability Interface 
enum InteropPolicyType { 
Std_niechs, 
Translator 
); 
// Used to define operator types used in access decisions 
enum OperatorType { 
G T , 
L T , 
E Q , 
G E , 
L E , 
NE 
); 
// Used in securiiylevel2 
typedef unsigned short minor_status; 
typedef unsigned short niajor_status; 
typedef'Opaque errormsg; 
typedef Security::MechanismType NRmech; 
typedef Securtty::ExtensibleFaniily NRPolicyld; 
enum NRVerificationResult { 
invalid, 
valid, 
ConditionallyValid 
}; 
// The following are used for evidence validity duration 
// month = 30 days; year = 365 days 
typedef unsigned long durationJn_minutes; 
const durationJn_minutes DURATION_HOUR =60; 
const duralion_in_minutes DURATION_DAY = 1440; 
const duraiionJn_minuies DURATION_WEEK = 10080; 
const duration Jn_minuies DURATION_MONTH= 43200; 
const duraiion_in_minutes DURATION_YEAR = 525600; 
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typedef long time_offset_in_minutes; 
// last_revocation_check_offset may be >0 or <0; add this to evidence 
// generation time to get latest time at which mech wi l l check to 
// see i f this authority's key has been revoked, 
struct authorityDescriptor { 
string aulhority_name; 
string authority_role; 
time_offset_in_niinutes last_revocation_check_ofl'set; 
); 
typedef sequence <authorityDescriptor> authorityDescriptorList; 
// max_time_skey is max permissible difference between evidence 
// generated time and time of service countersignature 
// ignored i f trusted time not required, 
struct mechanismDescriptor { 
NRmech mech_type; 
authorityDescriptorList authorityjist; 
time_offsetJn_minutes max_time_skew; 
}; 
typedef sequence <mechanisniDescnptor> mechanismDescriptorList; 
enum EvidenceType { 
ProofofCreation, 
ProofofSubmission, 
ProofofReceipt, 
ProofofApproval, 
ProofofRetrieval, 
ProofofOrigin, 
ProofofDelivery, 
NoEvidence 
enum EvidenceDirection { 
Evidence, 
RequestedEvidence 
1; 
struct evidenceDescriptor { 
EvidenceType evidence_type; 
duration_in_minutes evidence_validity_duration; 
boolean must_use_trusted_time; 
}; 
typedef sequence <evidenceDescriptor> evidenceDescriptorList; 
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struct NRPolicyFeatures { 
NRPolicyld p o l i c y j d ; 
unsigned long policy_version; 
NRmech mechanism; 
1; 
typedef sequence<NRPolicyFeatures> NRPolicyFeaturesList; 
// features used when generating requests 
struct requestPeatures { 
NRPolicyFeatures 
Security::EvidenceType 
string 
string 
boolean 
}; 
requested_policy; 
requested_evidence; 
requested_evidence_generators; 
requested_evidence_recipients; 
include this token in_evidence; 
// Used in the NRAdjudicator and NRStore 
enum DecisionType { 
originator, 
target, 
undecided, 
neither 
}; 
enum ServiceType { 
Authentication, 
AccessControl, 
Delegation, 
QofP, 
Audit, 
NonRepudiation 
}; 
typedef string Constraint; 
typedef string Preference; 
typedef unsigned long Mappingid; 
typedef sequence<Mappingld> MappingldSeq; 
struct domain_values{ 
sequence<octet> domainl_value; 
5equence<octet> domain2_value; 
}; 
typedef sequence<domaln_values> domain_va!ues Jist; 
// Domain Mapping structure 
struct Mapping { 
Mappingid 
ServiceType 
string policy 
mappingid; 
ServiceType; 
Classincation; 
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unsigned short family.definerl; 
unsigned short fami ly jd l ; 
sequence<octet> attribute_typel; 
sequence<octct> derining_authority 1; 
unsigned short family_deriner2; 
unsigned short familyjd2; 
sequence<octet> attribute_type2; 
sequence<octet> derining_authority2; 
sequence<doniain_values> mapped.values; 
Security: :UtcT . timeStamp; 
Security: :Opaque remoteDomainld; 
Security::Opaque remoteDomainAuthority; 
}; 
typedef sequence<Mapping> MappingSeq; 
//Interoperability Policy Slruciures 
struct MechRequiresSupports { 
sequence<string> mech_required; 
sequence<Security::CommunicationDirection> 
mech_required_direction; 
sequence<string> mechs_supported; 
sequence<Security::CommunicationDirection> 
mechs_supported_direction; 
); 
struct AuthPolicyRequiresSupports{ 
AuthenticationType auth_type_required; 
CommunicationDirection auth_type_required_direction; 
sequence<AuthenticationType> auth_type_supported; 
sequence<CommunicationDirection> 
auth_type_supported_direction; 
}; 
struct SecurelnvocationFamily { 
string policy^classification; 
ExtensibleFamily event_family; 
}; 
typedef sequence <SecureInvocationFamily> SecurelnvocationFamilyList; 
struct DelegationPolicyRequiresSupports{ 
// type = none^simple, composite 
Security: :DelegationIVIode mode_required; 
Security::CommunicationDirection mode_required_direction; 
sequence<Security::DelegationMode> mode_supported; 
sequence<Security::ComniunicationDirection> 
mode_supported_direction; 
}; 
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struct QOPPolicyRequiresSupports{ 
AssociationOptions 
sequence<ConiniunicationDirection> 
AssociationOptions 
sequence<ConimunicationDirection> 
MsgPartList 
sequence<ConiniunicationDirection> 
integ_msg_part_required_direction; 
MsgPartList 
sequence<ConiniunicationDirection> 
integ_msg_part_supported_direction; 
MsgPartList 
sequence<ConiinunicationDirection> 
conf_msg_part_requi red_d i rection; 
MsgPartList 
sequence<ConununicationDirection> 
conf_msg_part_supported_direction; 
}; 
qop_type_required; 
qop_type_required_direction; 
qop_type_supported; 
qop_type_supported_direction; 
integ_msg_part_required; 
integ_nisg_part_supported; 
conf_nisg_part_required; 
conf_msg_part_supported; 
e vidence_requi red; 
struct NRPo!icyRequiresSupports{ 
Security::evidenceDescriptorList 
sequence<Security::ConimunicationDirection> 
evidence_required_dircction; 
Security ::evidenceDescriptorList evidence_supported; 
sequence<Security::ConimunicationDirection> 
evidence_supported_direction; 
Security::authorityDescriptorList authorities; 
}; 
struct AuditPolicyRequiresSupportsj 
Secunty::AuditEventTypeList event_required; 
sequence<Security::ConimunicationDirection> 
event_required_direction; 
Security ::AuditEventTypeList event_supported; 
sequence<Security::ConiniunicationDirection> 
event_supported_direction; 
Security::SeIectorTypeList selector_required; 
Security::Se!ectorTypeList selector_supported; 
// END OF SECURITY DATA MODULE 
1; 
/ / * Module: 1 * 
// * Function: Security Level I Interfaces. * 
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//module securitylevel I { 
//interface Current: CORBAI::Current { 
interface Current { 
Security::AttributeList get_attributes ( 
in Security::AttributeList attributes 
); 
// END OF securitylevel 11 MODULE 
1; 
/ / * Module: securitylevel21 * 
// * Function: Security Level 2 Interfaces (SL2) * 
module securitylevel2 { 
typedef string Identifier; 
typedef string InterfaceName; 
// moved RequriedRights because SL2 interfaces refer to RequiredRights. 
// Previously these interfaces were in SecurityReplaceability module but they 
// are all now part of SL2. 
interface RequiredRights; 
interface UserAgent; 
interface PrincipalAuthenticator; 
interface Credentials; 
interface Object2; 
interface Current; 
// RequiredRights Interface 
interface RequiredRights { 
void get_required_rights( 
in Object 
in Identifier 
in InterfaceName 
in string 
in Security: iGperatorType 
in Security::Opaque 
out Security::RightsList 
out Security::RightsCombinator 
object, 
operation_name, 
interface_name, 
parameter_name, 
operator, 
parameter_va!ue, 
rights, 
rights_combinator 
); 
void set_required_rights ( 
in string operation_name, 
in InlerfaceName interface_name, 
in siring parameter_name, 
in Security: :OperatorType operator, 
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in Security: :Opaque 
in Security::RightsList 
in Security::RightsCombinaior 
parameter.value, 
rights, 
rights_combinator 
interface PrincipalAuthenticator { 
Security::AulhenticationStatus authenticate ( 
in Security::AuthenticationMethod method, 
in string securily_name, 
in Security::Opaque auth_data, 
in Security::AttributeList privileges, 
out Credentials creds, 
out Security::Opaque continuation_data, 
out Security::Opaque auth_speciric_data 
); 
Security::AuthenticationStatus continue_authentication ( 
in Security::Opaque 
inout Credentials 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::Opaque 
response_daia, 
creds, 
continuation_data, 
auth_specific_data 
); 
1; 
// Interface Credentials 
interface Credentials { 
void set_security_features ( 
in Security::CommunicationDireclion direction, 
in Security::SecurityFeatureValueList security_features, 
out Security: :errormsg error, 
out Security: :major_stalus major_error, 
out Security: :minor_status minor_error 
); 
Security::SecurityFeatureValueList get_security_features ( 
in Security::CommunicationDirection direction, 
out Security::errormsg error, 
out Security::major_status major_error, 
out Security::minor_status minor_error 
); 
boolean set_privileges ( 
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in boolean 
in Security::AttribuieList 
out Security::AttributeList 
out Securityiierrormsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
force_commit, 
requesied_pri vi leges, 
actuaLprivileges, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
); 
Security: lAttributeList get_attributes ( 
in Security::AttributeTypeList attributes, 
out Security::errormsg error, 
out Security::major_status major_error, 
out Security::minor_status minor_error 
); 
boolean set_controls ( 
in boolean 
in Security::AttributeList 
in Security::DelegationMode 
in Security::UtcT 
in Security::AttributeList 
in long 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
boolean get_controls ( 
in Security::AttributeList 
out boolean 
out Security: iDelegationMode 
out Security::UtcT 
out Security::AttributeList 
out long 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
boolean is_valid ( 
out Security::UtcT 
out Security::erronnsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
force_commlt, 
required_attributes, 
delegation_mode, 
expiry_time, 
privileges_delegated, 
no_ofJnvocations, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
required_attributes, 
force_commit, 
delegation_mode, 
expiry_time, 
privileges_delegated, 
no_of_invocations, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
expiry_time, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
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boolean refreshQ; 
}; 
typedef sequence<Credentials> CredentialsList; 
// Interface object derived from Object 
// providing additional operations on objref at this security level, 
interface Object: CORBA::Object{ 
void override_default_credentials ( 
in Credentials creds 
); 
void override_default_QOP ( 
in Security::QOP qop 
); 
Security::SecurityFeatureValueList get_security_features ( 
in Security::CommunicationDirection direction 
); 
Credentials get_active_credentials(); 
CORBA::Policy get_policy ( 
long get_policy ( 
in Security::PolicyType policy_type 
); 
Security::MechanismType get_security_mechanismO; 
void override_default_mechanism ( 
in Security::MechanismType mechanism_type 
); 
Security::SecurityMechandName get_security_names(); 
}; 
// Interface Current derived from securitylevell l::Current 
// providing additional operations on Current at this security 
// level. This is implemented by the ORB. 
interface Current { 
Security: :AttributeList get_attributes ( 
in Security::AttributeTypeList attributes 
); 
void set_credentials ( 
in Security: :CredentialType cred_type, 
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in Credentials creds 
readonly attribute CredentialsList rece i ved_creden ti a I s; 
readonly attribute Security::SecurityFeatureValueList 
received_security_features; 
CORBA::Policy get_policy( 
in Security::PolicyType 
); 
policy_type 
readonly attribute RequiredRights required_rights_object; 
// AUDIT OBJECTS 
// Interface for AuditDecision 
interface AuditDecision { 
boolean audit_needed ( 
in Security::AuditEventType 
in Security::SelectorValueseq 
); 
1; 
// Interface for AuditAnalyser 
interface AuditAnalyser { 
boolean analyse_data ( 
in Security: :AuditEventType 
in CredentialsList 
inSecurity::UtcT 
in Security: rSelectorSequence 
in Security: :Opaque 
out Security:: Analyser Result 
out Security::Opaque 
); 
boolean justify ( 
in Security::Opaque 
out sequence<AuditJustify> 
) ; 
}; 
// Interface for AuditResponder 
interface AuditResponder { 
boolean deFine.response ( 
in Security::AnalyserResult 
event_type, 
valuelist 
event_type, 
creds, 
time, 
descriptors, 
event_specific_data, 
result, 
analysis_token 
analysis_token. 
Justification 
result, 
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); 
in Security::Opaque 
out sequence<Security::Opaque> 
out sequence<Object> 
audit_token, 
audit_data, 
audit channels 
}; 
// Interface AuditChannel 
interface AuditChannel { 
readonly attribute Object 
boolean audit_write ( 
in Security::Opaque 
out Security: :errormsg 
out Security: :major_status 
out Security: :minor_status 
); 
}; 
// Interface AuditTrail 
interface AuditTrail { 
boolean read_record ( 
in long 
out Security::AuditEventType 
out CredentialsList 
outSecurity::UtcT 
out Security::SelectorSequence 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::AnalyserResult 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::erromisg 
out Security: :niajor_status 
out Security: :minor_status 
) ; 
nnked_object. 
audit_data 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
id, 
event_type, 
creds, 
time, 
descriptors, 
event_speciric_data, 
result, 
analysis_token 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
boolean write_record ( 
in long 
in Security: :AuditEventType 
in CredentialsList 
in Security::UtcT 
in Security::SelectorSequence 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::AnalyserResult 
in Security::Opaque 
out Security: :erromisg 
out Security::niajor_status 
out Security::minor_status 
id, 
event_type, 
creds, 
time, 
descriptors, 
event_speciric_data, 
result, 
analysis_token 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
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); 
boolean query_record ( 
inout sequence<long> id, 
inout sequence<Security::AuditEventType> event_type, 
inout sequence<CredentialsList> creds, 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> time, 
inout sequence<Security: :SelectorSequence> descriptors, 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> event_speciric_data, 
inout sequence<Security::AnalyserResult> result, 
inout sequence<Security: :Opaque> analysis_token, 
out Security: :erronnsg error, 
out Security: :major_status major_error, 
out Security: :minor_status mlnor_error 
) ; 
}; 
// Interface AuditAction 
interface AuditAction { 
boolean get_action_info ( 
in long 
out Security::Opaque 
); 
id, 
action data 
}; 
boolean execute_action ( 
in Security: :Opaque 
out Security: :erronnsg 
out Security: :major_status 
out Security::niinor_status 
) ; 
action.data 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
// * Module: NRservice * 
// * Function: Non-Repudiation interfaces * 
//Interface NRCredentials 
interface NRCredentials { 
boolean set_NR_features ( 
in Security::NRPolicyFeaturesList 
in Security::NRPolicyFeaturesList 
); 
requested_features, 
actual features 
Security::NRPolicyFeaturesList get_NR_featuresO; 
// 
void generaie_token ( 
in sequence <octet> input_buffer. 
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:Opaque 
:EvidenceType 
in Security: 
in Security: 
in boolean 
in boolean 
in Security::requestFeatures 
in boolean 
out Security: 
out Security 
out Security 
out Security 
out Security 
'::Opaque 
:Opaque 
:errormsg 
:major_status 
:minor status 
input_buffer, 
generate_evidence_type, 
include_data_in_token, 
generate_request, 
request_features, 
input_buffer_complete, 
nr_token, 
evidence_check, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
// 
); 
Security::NRVerificationResult veri 
in Security: :Opaque 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
in boolean 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::Opaque 
out sequence <octet> 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out Security::TimeT 
out Security::TimeT 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::major_siatus 
out Security::minor_siatus 
fy_evidence ( 
input_token_buffer, 
evidence_check, 
form_complete_evidence, 
token_buffer_complete, 
output_token, 
d a t a j nc 1 u d e d j n_token, 
data_includedJn_token, 
evidenceJs_complete, 
trusted_time_used, 
compIete_evidence_before, 
complete_evidence_after, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
); 
void get_token_details ( 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
out string 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out Security: 
NRPolicyFeatures 
EvidenceType 
UtcT 
UtcT 
duration in minutes 
requestFeatures 
errormsg 
major_status 
minor status 
token_buffer, 
token_buffer_complete, 
token_generator_name, 
policy_features, 
evidence_type, 
evidence_generation_time, 
evidence_valid_start_time, 
evidence_validity_duration, 
dataJncludedJn_token, 
requestJncluded_in_token, 
request_features, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor_error 
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); 
boolean form_complete_evidence ( 
in Security: :Opaque 
out Security::Opaque 
out boolean 
out Security::TimeT 
out Security::TimeT 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::niajor_siatus 
out Security::minor_slatus 
input_token, 
output_loken, 
trusted_tinie_used, 
coniplete_evidence_before, 
compleie_evidence_after, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
); 
1; 
// interface NRDeliver 
interface NRDeliver { 
//NR_send_generated_loken will send a token and 
//target object specified. 
boolean NR_deliver_token( 
in Security::Evidence Direction 
in Security::EvidenceType 
in Security: :Opaque 
in Security: :Opaque 
in boolean 
in Object 
in Object 
out Security: :erromisg 
out Security::niajor_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
its input data to the 
evidence_direction, 
evidence_type, 
nr_token, 
evidence_check, 
data_in_token, 
originator, 
target, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
// interface NRStore 
interface NRStore { 
//The NR_record_add method returns a value of True/False depending on 
//whether the record was added successfully. If False, errormsg will 
//contain a systems message, explaining the problem, or the minor_error 
//will contain a mechanism dspecific message (GSS-API compliance). 
//Otherwise the error parameters will be null, 
boolean NR_record_add ( 
in Security: :Opaque 
in CredentialsList 
in Secunty::EvidenceDirection 
in Security: :EvidenceType 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
nr_token, 
nr_creds, 
evidence_direction, 
evidence_type, 
data_in_token, 
evidence_check. 
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); 
in Security::UtcT 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::erromisg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
nr_store_time, 
nrjndex, 
error, 
niajor_error, 
minor error 
//An index is supplied to retrieve the appropriate key. This can be the 
//result of a query or iterator operation (Query and Collection Service). 
//The NR_record_get method returns a value of True/False depending on 
//whether the record was successfully retrieved. If False, errormsg will 
//contain a systems message, explaining the problem, or the minor_error 
//will contain a mechanism specific message (GSS-API compliance). 
//Otherwise the error parameters will be null, 
boolean NR_record_get ( 
in Security: :Opaque 
out Security: :EvidenceDirection 
out Security::EvidenceType 
out boolean 
out CredentialsList 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::UtcT 
out Security::errorinsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::niinor_status 
nr_index, 
evidence_direction, 
evidence_type, 
data_in_token, 
nr_creds, 
nr_token, 
evidence_check, 
nr_store_time, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
); 
Opaque> nrjndex, 
EvidenceDirection> 
boolean NR_record_query ( 
inout sequence<Security 
inout sequence<Security 
evidence_direction, 
inout sequence<Security: :EvidenceType> 
inout sequence<booIean> 
inout sequence<CredentialsList> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<:Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
evidence_type, 
data_in_token, 
nr_creds, 
nr_token, 
evidence_check, 
nr_store_time, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor_error 
}; 
//interface NRAdjudicator 
interface NRAdjudicator{ 
boolean NR_settIe_dispute ( 
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in Object 
in Security::Opaque 
in Object 
in Security::Opaque 
out Security::Opaque 
out Secunty::DecisionType 
out Securityrierrormsg 
out Security::maJor_status 
out Security::niinor_status 
originator, 
originator_nr_token, 
target, 
target_nr_token, 
nr_decision_token, 
decision, 
error, 
maJor_error, 
minor error 
); 
}; 
// The NRPolicy has been removed from this module and placed in the 
// SecurityAdmin module. 
// * Module: SecurilyReplacable * 
// * Function: Allows replacability * 
interface SecurityConiexl; 
// INTERFACE V A U L T 
interface Vault { 
Security::AssociationStatus init_security_context ( 
in CredentialsList credsjisi, 
in Security::SecurityName target_security_name, 
in Object target, 
in Security::OptionsDirectionPairList association_oplions. 
in Security::MechanismType 
in Securily::Opaque 
in Security::Opaque 
inout short 
out Security::MechanismType 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out boolean 
out Security::Opaque 
out SecurityContext 
out Security: :errormsg 
mechanism, 
mech_data, 
chan_binding, 
lifetime_rec, 
out_mechanism, 
deleg_state, 
mutuaLstate, 
replay_det_state, 
sequence_state, 
anon_state, 
trans_state, 
prot_ready_state, 
conf_avail, 
integ_avail, 
securiiy_token, 
security_conlext, 
error, 
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out Security::inajor_st:itus 
out Security: iminor.status 
niajor_error, 
minor error 
Security::AssociationSiatus accept_security_context ( 
in CredentialsList credsjist, 
in Security::Opaque chan_bindings, 
in Securiiy::Opaque in_ioken. 
out boolean deleg^state, 
out boolean mutual.state, 
out boolean replay_det_state, 
out boolean sequencc_state, 
out boolean anon_state, 
out boolean trans_state, 
out boolean prot_ready_state. 
out boolean conf_avail. 
out boolean integ_avai!, 
out CredentialsList delegated_creds_list, 
out Security::Opaque out_token, 
out short lifetime_rec, 
out SecurityContext security_context, 
out Securityxerrormsg error, 
out Security::major_status major_error, 
out Security::minor_status minor_error 
Security ::MechandOptionsList gei_supported_mechs(); 
// Interface SecurityContext 
interface SecurityContext { 
readonly attribute CredentialsList received_credentials; 
readonly attribute 
received_security .features; 
Security::SecurityFeatureValueList 
Security::AssociationStatus continue_security_contexi ( 
); 
in Security::Opaque 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security: :erromisg 
out Security: :major_status 
out Security: :minor_status 
in_token, 
out_token, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
void protect_message ( 
in Security::Opaque message, 
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in Security::QOP 
inout boolean 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security: :Opaque 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::nKyor_status 
out Security: :minor_status 
qop, 
conf, 
text_buffer, 
token, 
error, 
mxyor_error, 
minor_error 
); 
boolean reclaim_message ( 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security: :Opaque 
out Security::QOP 
out boolean 
out Securily::C)paque 
out Security: :erronnsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
boolean is_valid ( 
out Security::UtcT 
out Security: :errormsg 
out Security::inajor_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
iexi_buffer, 
token, 
qop, 
conf, 
message, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
expiry_time, 
error, 
iniyor_error, 
minor error 
boolean refreshQ; 
//Interface AccessDecision 
interface AccessDecision { 
boolean access_allowed ( 
in CredentialsList 
in Object 
in Identifier 
in string 
in Security::OperatorType 
in Security::Opaque 
in Identifier 
); 
}; 
credjist, 
target, 
operationName, 
parameter.name, 
operator, 
parameter_value, 
targetlnterfaceName 
// END OF S E C U R I T Y L E V E L 2 MODULE 
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II * Module: Security Admin * 
// * Function: Administration Interfaces * 
module Security Admin { 
interface Mappinglterator; 
interface UserAgent{ 
void set_security_nanie ( 
in string 
out Security::erronnsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
security_name, 
error, 
ihaJor_error, 
minor error 
void set_auth_data ( 
in Security::Opaque 
out Security::errormsg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security: :minor_status 
); 
auth.data, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
void set^privileges ( 
in Security: :AttributeList 
out Security::erronnsg 
out Security: :major_status 
); 
void set_name ( 
in Security: rOpaque 
out Security: :errornisg 
out Security::major_status 
out Security::minor_status 
); 
privileges, 
error, 
minor_error 
security_name, 
error, 
major_error, 
minor error 
Security: :AuthenticationStatus authenticate ( 
out Security::Opaque continuation_data, 
out Security: :Opaque auth_speciric_data, 
out Security: lerrormsg error, 
out Security::major_status major_error, 
out Security::minor_status minor_error 
); 
//The above methods are used prior to authenticate. The following method 
//is used after the authenticate and with continue_authentication. 
Security::AuthenticationStatus reply_to_challenge ( 
in Security::Opaque response.data, 
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out Security::errornisg 
out Security: :major_status 
out Security::niinor_status 
); 
}; 
error, 
maJor_error, 
minor error 
//Interface QOPPohcy 
interface QOPPoIicy { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
void set_QOP_policy( 
in long 
in Security::InterfaceDefInfo 
inSecurity::QOP 
in long 
in Security: :msg_part 
in long 
in Security::msg_part 
in Security: :CommunicationDirection 
in Security: :UtcT 
policyjd, 
object_type, 
QOP_type, 
integrity _mech, 
integrity_msg_part, 
confidentiality _mech, 
confidential ity_msg_part, 
direction, 
expiry_time 
); 
void get_QOP_policy( 
inout long 
inout Security::InterfaceDennfo 
out Security::QOP 
out long 
out Security::msg_part 
out long 
out Security::msg_part 
out Security::ConununicationDirection 
out Security::UtcT 
policy_id, 
object_type, 
QOP.type, 
integrity_mech, 
integrity_msg_part, 
conndentiaUty_mech, 
confidentiality_msg_part, 
direction, 
expiry_time 
); 
void query_QOP_policy( 
inout long 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<]ong> 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<long> 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
); 
policyjd, 
obJect_type, 
QOP_type, 
integrity_mech, 
integrity_msg_part, 
confidentiality^mech, 
confidentiality_msg_part, 
:CommunicationDirection> direction, 
: U tcT> ex pi ry_ti me 
:InterfaceDennfo> 
:QOP> 
:msg_part> 
;msg_part> 
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void update_QOP_policy( 
in long 
inout Security::lnterfaceDefInfo 
inout Security::QOP 
inout long 
inout Security::msg_part 
inout long 
inout Security::msg_part 
inout Security::CommunicationDirection 
inout Security::UtcT 
); 
policyjd, 
object_type, 
QOP.type, 
integrity_mech, 
integrity _msg_part, 
confidentiality.mech, 
conridentiality_msg_part, 
direction, 
expiry_time 
void 
); 
void 
); 
void 
delete_QOP_policy( 
in long 
inout Security::InterfaceDeflnfo 
set_stored_QOP_policy( 
in long 
in Security::InterfaceDennfo 
in Security::QOP 
in long 
in long 
in Security: :UtcT 
get_stored_QOP_policy( 
inout long 
inout Security::InterfaceDennfo 
outSecurity::QOP 
out long 
out long 
out Security::UtcT 
); 
policy_id, 
object_type. 
policyjd, 
objectJype, 
QOP_type, 
integrity_mech, 
conndentiality.mech, 
expiry J ime 
policyjd, 
object_type, 
QOP.type, 
integrity_mech, 
conndentiality^mech, 
expiry J i m e 
void query_stored_QOP_policy( 
inout sequence<long> policyjd, 
inout sequence<Security::InterfaceDennfo> object.type, 
inout sequence<Security::QOP> 
inout sequence<long> 
inout sequence<long> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
); 
void update_stored_QOP_policy( 
in long 
' inout Security::InterfaceDennfo 
inout Security::QOP 
QOP_type, 
integrity_mech, 
confidentiality.mech, 
expiry J i m e 
policyjd, 
objectjype, 
QOP.type, 
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inout long 
inout long 
inout Security: :RequiresSupports 
inout Security::UtcT 
); 
void deIete_stored_QOP_policy( 
in long 
inout Security: rlnterfaceOeflnfo 
); 
integrity_mech, 
confidentiality.mech, 
requires.supports, 
expiry_time 
policyjd, 
object_type 
//Interface QOPMechanism 
interface QOPMechanism { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
// Integrity operations 
void set_Integrity_mech ( 
in long 
in string 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
inSecurity::UtcT 
); 
void get_Integrity_mech ( 
in long 
in string 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security::UtcT 
); 
integrity_mech, 
integrity_mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface.details, 
expiry_time 
integrity_mech, 
integrity_mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface.details, 
expiry_time 
void query_Integrity_mech ( 
inout sequence<long> integrity.mech, 
inout sequence<string> integrity_mech_name, 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> parameters, 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> remote_parameters, 
inout sequence<boolean> Standard_mechanism, 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> interface.details, 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> expiry_time 
); 
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void delete_Integrity_mech ( 
in long 
); 
// Confidentiality operations 
void set_Confidentiality_mech ( 
in long 
in string 
confidentiality_mech_name, 
in Security: lOpaque 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
inSecurity::UtcT 
); 
void get_Confidentiality_mech ( 
in long 
in string 
confidentiality_mech_name, 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security::UtcT 
); 
void query_ConfidentiaIity_mech ( 
inout sequence<long> 
inout sequence<string> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
ihout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
); 
integrity_mech 
confidentiality_mech, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface.details, 
expiry_time 
confidentiality.mech. 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry_time 
confidentiality_mech, 
conridentiality_mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
int€rface_details, 
expiry_time 
}; 
void delete_Confidentiality_mech ( 
in long 
); 
confidentiality_mech 
//Interface AuthPolicy 
interface AuthPolicy { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
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void set_Auth_policy ( 
in long 
in Security::PolicyType 
in Security::PrincipalType 
in string 
in Security::UtcT 
in Security::AuthenticationMethod 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::AttributeList 
); 
void get_Auth_policy ( 
in long 
in Security: :PollcyType 
in Security: rPrincipalType 
in string 
out Security::UtcT 
out Security: :AuthenticationMethod 
out Security: :Opaque 
out Security: :AttributeList 
); 
policyjd, 
type, 
principaljype, 
security_name, 
expiry J ime , 
method, 
auth_data, 
privileges 
policyjd, 
type, 
principaljype, 
security_name, 
expiry J ime , 
method, 
auth_data, 
privileges 
void query_Auth_policy ( 
inout sequence<long> 
inout sequence<Security 
inout sequence<Security 
inout sequence<string> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
); 
PolicyType> 
PrincipalType> 
policyjd, 
type, 
principaLtype, 
security_name, 
expiry_time. 
inout sequence<Security::AuthenticationMethod> method. 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security:: AttributeList> 
auth_data, 
privileges 
void update_Auth_policy ( 
in long 
inout Security: :PolicyType 
inout Security::PrincipalType 
inout string 
inout Security: :UtcT 
inout Security: :AuthenticationMethod 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security: :AttributeList 
); 
policyjd, 
type, 
principaljype, 
security_name, 
expiry J ime, 
method, 
auth_data, 
privileges 
void delete_Auth_policy ( 
in long 
); 
}; 
policyjd 
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//Interface AuthMechanism 
interface AuthMechanism { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
void set_Auth_mech ( 
in Security: rAuthenticationMethod 
in string 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
inSecurity::UtcT 
); 
method, 
mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
standard.mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry J i m e 
void get_Auth_mech ( 
in Security: :AuthenticationMethod method, 
m stnng 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout Security: :UtcT 
mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry J i m e 
); 
void query_Auth_mech ( 
inout sequence<Security::AuthenticationMethod> method. 
inout sequence<string> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote.parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry J i m e 
); 
void delete_Auth_mech ( 
inout Security::AuthenticationMethod 
); 
method 
//Interface DelegationPolicy 
// The get/sei_delegalion_mode operations are taken from the original 
// Delegation Policy. The query and get/set_control operations are 
// newly defined, 
interface DelegationPolicy { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
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void set_delegation_mode ( 
in long policyjd, 
in Security::InterfaceDefInfo object_iype, 
in Security::De!egationMode mode 
); 
Security: :DelegationMode gei_delegation_mode ( 
in long policyjd, 
in Security::InterfaceDefInfo object_type, 
out Security::DelegationMode mode 
); 
void query_delegation_mode ( 
inout sequence<long> policyjd, 
inout sequence<Security::InterfaceDennfo> objectjype, 
inout sequence<Security::DelegationMode> mode 
); 
void update_delegation_mode ( 
in long 
inout Security::InterfaceDeflnfo 
inout Security: :DelegationMode 
); 
policyjd, 
objectjype, 
mode 
//set_controls is used to specify restrictions on where and when 
//attributes/credentials can be delegated/used, objectjype specifies 
//the object delegating. force_commit, if true, means that the 
//restrictions should be applied immediately. required_attributes 
//identifies the attributes the intemiediale/target object should 
//have so that this client can use a delegation_mode before the 
//specified expiry_time. privileges_delegated lists the 
//privileges that can be delegated (in a composite only some 
//might be delegated), while no_ofJnvocations specifies the 
//maximum number of delegations allowed. The out parameters 
//specify error messages if the method fails, 
boolean set_controls ( 
in long 
in Security::InterfaceDennfo 
in boolean 
in Security::AttributeList 
in Security::DelegationMode 
in Security: :UtcT 
in Security: :AttributeList 
in long 
); 
policyjd, 
objectjype, 
force_commit, 
required.attributes, 
delegation_mode, 
expiry_time, 
privileges_delegated, 
no of invocations 
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//get_controls will return the restriction controls for the 
//initiating object "object_type" or for a target object with the 
//specified required_attributes. 
boolean get_controls ( 
in long 
in Security::lnterfaceDennfo 
in Security: :AttributeList 
out boolean 
out Security::De!egationMode 
out Security::UtcT 
out Security::AttributeList 
out long 
); 
policyjd, 
object_type, 
required.attributes, 
force_commit, 
delegation_mode, 
expiry_time, 
privileges.delegated, 
no of invocations 
boolean query_controls ( 
inout sequence<long> 
inout sequence<:Security:; 
inout sequence<Security:; 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security:: 
inout sequence<Security:: 
inout sequence<Security:: 
inout sequence<long> 
); 
policyjd, 
InterfaceDefInfo> object_type, 
AttributeList> required_attributes, 
force_commit, 
DelegationMode> delegation_mode, 
UtcT> expiry_time, 
AttributeList> privileges_delegated, 
no of invocations 
boolean update_controls ( 
in long 
inout Security::InterraceDennfo 
inout Security::AttributeList 
inout boolean 
inout Security: :DelegationMode 
inout Security::UtcT 
inout Security: :AttributeList 
ihout long 
); 
boolean remove_controls ( 
in long 
inout Security::InterfaceDennfo 
); 
policyjd, 
object_type, 
required_attributes, 
force_commit, 
delegation_mode, 
expiryjime, 
privileges_delegated, 
no of invocations 
policyjd, 
objectjype, 
// The operations used in ACCESSPOLICY below are taken from the 
// original AccessPoIicy and DomainAccessPolicy. The operation names 
// have been preserved for compatability i.e. they are not using the 
// usual get/set/query names. 
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//Interface AccessPoHcy 
interface AccessPolicy { 
readonly attribute Securiiy::PolicyType 
Securi ty:: RightsList get_effecii ve_ri gh ts( 
in securityIevel2::CredentialsList 
in Security::ExtensibleFamily 
); 
void grant_rights ( 
in Security: :AccessMethod 
in Security::Attribute 
in Security: :DelegationState 
in Security: :ExtensibleFamily 
in Security: :RightsList 
); 
void revoke_rights ( 
in Security: :AccessMethod 
in Security::Attribute 
in Security::DelegationState 
in Security::ExtensibleFamily 
in Security::RightsList 
); 
void replace_rights ( 
in Security: :AccessIVlethod 
in Security::Attribute 
in Security::DelegationState 
in Security::ExtensibleFamily 
in Security::RightsList 
); 
Security::RightsList get_rights ( 
in Security::AccessIVlethod 
in Security::Attribute 
in Security::DelegationState 
in Security::ExtensibleFamily 
); 
policy jype; 
credjisi, 
rights_family 
method, 
priv_attr, 
del_state, 
rights_family, 
rights 
method, 
priv_attr, 
del_state, 
rights_family, 
rights 
method, 
priv_attr, 
del_state, 
rights_family, 
rights 
method, 
priv_attr, 
del_state, 
rights_family 
void query_rights ( 
inout sequence<Security::AccessMethod> method, 
inout sequence<Security::Attribute> priv_attr, 
inout sequence<Security::DelegationState> del_state, 
inout sequence<Security::Exten5ibleFamily> rights.family, 
inout sequence<Security::RightsList> rights 
); 
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//Interface AccessMechanism 
interface AccessMechanism { 
}; 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type: 
void set_Access_mech ( 
in Security::AccessMethod 
in string 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security: :Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::UtcT 
); 
void get_Access_mech ( 
in Security: :AccessMethod 
in string 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout Security: :UtcT 
); 
method, 
mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry J i m e 
method, 
mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface.details, 
expiry J i m e 
void query_Access_mech( 
inout sequence<Security::AccessMethod> method. 
inout sequence<string> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
mech_name, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry J i m e 
); 
void delete_Access_mech( 
in Security: :AccessMethod 
); 
method 
//Interface AuditPolicy 
interface AuditPolicy { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
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void set_audit_selectors ( 
in long 
in unsigned long 
in Security::UtcT 
in Security::TimeT 
in boolean 
in Security: :Opaque 
in InterfaceDef 
in Security: :AuditEventTypeList 
in Security::SeIectorValueList 
in Object 
in Object 
in Security::authorityDescriptor 
); 
void clear_audit_seleclors ( 
in long 
in unsigned long 
in Security::UtcT 
in Securily::TimeT 
in boolean 
in Security: :Opaque 
in InterfaceDef 
in Security::AuditEventTypeList 
); 
policy_id, 
policy_version, 
expiry_time, 
effective_time, 
revoked, 
revocation_details, 
object_type, 
events, 
selectors, 
audit_analyser, 
audit_responder, 
accepted_aulhorities 
policyjd, 
policy_version, 
expiry_lime, 
effective_lime, 
revoked, 
revocation_details, 
objeci_type, 
events. 
void replace_audit_selectors ( 
in InterfaceDef 
in Security::AuditEventTypeList 
in Security: :SelectorValueList 
in Object 
in Object 
in Security: :authorityDescriptor 
); 
object_type, 
events, 
selectors, 
audit_analyser, 
audit_responder, 
accepted_authorities 
Security::SelectorValueList get_audit_selectors ( 
inout long 
inout unsigned long 
inout Security:;UlcT 
inout Security::TimeT 
inout boolean 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout InterfaceDef 
inout Security::AuditEventTypeList 
out Security::SeIectorValueList 
out Object audit, 
out Object audit. 
policyjd, 
policy_version, 
expiry_lime, 
effeclive_lime, 
revoked, 
revocation_details, 
object_type, 
events, 
selectors, 
.analyser, 
.responder. 
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out Security::auihorityDescriptor accepted_authoriiies 
); 
boolean set_audit_channel ( 
in SecurityLevel2::AuditChannel 
in Object 
); 
audit_channel, 
response_event 
}; 
//Interface AuditMechanism 
interface AuditMechanism { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
//Audit_niechanism operations 
void set_audit_mech ( 
in Security::MechanlsmType 
in string 
in Security: lOpaque 
in Security: :Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::UtcT 
); 
void get_audit_niech ( 
in Secunty::MechanismType 
in string 
incut Security: :Opaque 
incut Security::Opaque 
incut boolean 
incut Security::Opaque 
incut Security::UtcT 
); 
method, 
mechanism_type, 
parameters, 
remc te_pa ra mete rs, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry_time 
method, 
mechanism.type, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry_time 
void query_audit_mech( 
inout sequence<Security: iMechanismType> method, 
inout sequence<string> 
inout sequence<:Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boclean> 
incut sequence<Security::Opaque> 
incut sequence<Security::UtcT> 
mechanism_type, 
parameters, 
remcte.parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry_time 
); 
void delete_audit_mech( 
inout Security::MechanismType method 
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); 
void set_audit_authority ( 
in Security::authorityDescriptor 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security: :Opaque 
); 
authority, 
parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface details 
void get_audit_authority ( 
in Security::authorityDescriptor 
incut Security::Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security::Opaque 
); 
authority, 
parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface details 
void query_audit_authonty( 
inout sequence<Security::authorityDescriptor> authority. 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
); 
void remove_audit_authority( 
inout Security::authorityDescriptor 
); 
parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface details 
authority 
}; 
//Interface NRPolicy 
interface NRPolicy { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
void set_NR_policyJnfo ( 
in Security: :ExtensibleFamily 
in unsigned long 
in Security::InterfaceDennfo 
in Security::TimeT 
inSecurity::TimeT 
in boolean 
in Security: :Opaque 
inSecurity::evidenceDescriptorList 
in Security::mechanjsmDescriptorList 
in Security::authorityDescriptorList 
); 
NR_policy_id, 
policy_version, 
object_type, 
policy_effective_time, 
poIicy_expiry_time, 
revoked, 
revocation_details, 
supported_evidence_types, 
supported_mechanisms, 
accepted_authorities 
void get_NR_policyJnfo ( 
out Securily::ExtensibleFamily NR_poIicyJd, 
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out unsigned long poIicy_vers!On, 
out Security: ilnterfaceDeflnfo 
out Security::TinieT 
out Security::TimeT 
out boolean 
out Security::Opaque 
out Security::evidenceDescriptorList 
out Security::mechanismDescriptorList 
out Security: lauthorityDescriptorList 
object_type, 
policy_effective_time, 
policy_expiry_time, 
revoked, 
revocation_details, 
supported_evidence_types, 
supported_mechanisms, 
accepted.authorities 
void query_NR_policy_info ( 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<unsigned 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
inout sequence<Security: 
); 
:ExtensibleFaniily> NR_policyJd, 
long> policy_version, 
:InterfaceDennfo> object_type, 
:TinieT> policy_effective_time, 
:TinieT> policy_expiry_time, 
revoked, 
:Opaque> revocation_details, 
:evidenceDescriptorList> 
supported_evidence_types, 
:mechanisniDescriptorList> 
supported_mechanisnis, 
:authorityDescriptorList> 
accepted_authorities 
void update_NR_policy_info ( 
in Security::ExtensibleFamily 
inout unsigned long 
inout Security::InterfaceDennfo 
inout Security::TimeT 
inout Security::TimeT 
inout boolean 
NR_policy_id, 
policy_version, 
object_type, 
policy_effective_time, 
policy_expiry_tinie, 
revoked, 
revocation.details, inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security: :evidenceDescriptorList 
supported_evidence_types, 
inout Security::mechanismDescriptorList supported_niechanisnis, 
inout Security::authorityDescriptorList accepted.authorities 
); 
void delete_NR_policyJnfo ( 
in Security: :ExtensibleFamily 
in unsigned long 
); 
NR_policy_id, 
policy_version 
}; 
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//Interface NRMechanism 
interface NRMechanism { 
readonly attribute Security: iPolicyType 
//NR_mechanism operations 
void set_NR_mech ( 
in Security: :NRmech 
in string 
in Security::Opaque 
in Secunty::Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
in Security::UtcT 
); 
void get_NR_mech ( 
in Security::NRmech 
inout string 
inout Security: :Opaque 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout Security::UtcT 
); 
void query_NR_mech( 
inout sequence<Security::NRmech> 
inout sequence<string> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
); 
void delete_NR_mech( 
inout Security: :NRmech 
); 
policy_type; 
method, 
mechanism_type, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface.details, 
expiry_time 
method, 
mechanism_type, 
parameters, 
remote_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
intcrface_de tails, 
expiry_time 
method, 
mechanism_type, 
parameters, 
remcte_parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details, 
expiry_time 
method 
// Authority operations 
// authorityDescriptor holds Name, Role and 
// Last revocaticn_check_offset 
void set_NR_authority ( 
in Security: tauthcrityDescriptcr 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
authority, 
parameters. 
Standard mechanism, 
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in Security::Opaque 
); 
interface details 
void get_NR_authority ( 
in Security: lauthorityDescriptor 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security: :Opaque 
); 
authority, 
parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface details 
void query_NR_authority( 
inout sequence<Security::authorityDescriptor> authority, 
); 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
parameters, 
Standard_mechanism, 
interface_details 
void delete_NR_authority( 
in Security::authorityDescriptor 
); 
authority 
// Evidence operations 
void set_NR_evidence ( 
in string 
in Security: :EvidenceType 
in Security: :durationJn_minutes 
in boolean 
in Security::UtcT 
in Security::Opaque 
in boolean 
in Security::Opaque 
); 
evidence_name, 
evidence_type, 
evidence_validity_duration, 
must_use_trusted_time, 
date_on_system, 
parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface details 
void get_NR_evidence ( 
in string 
inout Security::EvidenceType 
); 
evidence_name, 
evidence_type. 
inout Security::durationJn_minutes evidence_validity_duration. 
inout boolean 
inout Security::UtcT 
inout Security::Opaque 
inout boolean 
inout Security: :Opaque 
void query_NR_evidence( 
inout sequence<string> 
must_use_trusted_time5 
date_on_system, 
parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface details 
evidence_name. 
inout sequence<Security::EvidenceType> evidence_type, 
inout sequence<Security::duration_in_minutes> 
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inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> 
inout sequence<boolean> 
inout sequence<Secunty::Opaque> 
); 
void de!ete_NR_evidence( 
in string 
in Security::EvidenceType 
); 
evidence_validity_duration, 
must_use_tnisted_tinie, 
date_on_system, 
parameters, 
Standard.mechanism, 
interface details 
evidence_name, 
evidence_type 
// Interface SecurelnvocationPolicy 
interface SecurelnvocationPolicy { 
readonly attribute Security::PolicyType policy_type; 
interop_policy_id, 
interop_poIicy_type, 
object_type, 
doniain_id, 
auth.mech, 
void set_interop_policy ( 
in long 
in Security: :InteropPoIicyType 
in Security: ilnterfaceDeflnfo 
in Security: :Opaque 
// Autheniication segment 
in Security::MechRequiresSupports 
in Security::AuthPolicyRequiresSupports auth_policy_conrig, 
//AuthenticationType 
in long auth_mapping, 
// Access segment 
in Security::MecbRequiresSupports access_mech, 
in SecurityiiSecurelnvocationFamily 
access_Type_policy_conrig, 
//Type=Rights(get,set,nianage;etc), Capability,... 
in Security::SecureInvocationFaniily 
access_Attribute_policy_conrig, 
//Role, Public,... 
in long access_Type_niapping, 
in long access_Attribute_niapping, 
//Delegation segment 
in Security: :DelegationPolicyRequiresSupports 
delegation_policy_conflg, 
in long delegation_niode_niapping, 
// QoP segment 
in Security::MechRequiresSupports qop.mech, 
in Security: :QOPPolicyRequiresSupports qop_poIlcy_config, 
in long qop_type_mapping, 
in long nisg_part_niapping, 
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;MechRequiresSupports 
:NRPolicyRequiresSupports 
nr_mech, 
nr_policy_conrig, 
nr_evidence_niapping5 
// NR segment 
in Security 
in Security 
in long 
// Audit segment 
in Security::MechRequiresSupports audit.mech, 
in Security::AuditPolicyRequiresSupports audit_policy_conrig, 
in long audit_event_mapping, 
in long audit_selector_mapping, 
// The date the mapping is set is automatically set by the ORB. 
// It takes the current date. 
in Security: 
in Security: 
lauthority Descriptor 
:UtcT 
); 
authority, 
expiry_time 
void getJnterop_policy ( 
in long 
out Security: 
out Security; 
out Security: 
out Security: 
out Security: 
auth_policy_conrig 
out long 
out Security: 
InteropPolicyType 
InterfaceDeflnfo 
Opaque 
MechRequiresSupports 
AuthPolicyRequiresSupports 
interop_policy_id, 
interop_policy_type, 
object_type, 
domainjd, 
auth mech. 
auth_mapping, 
MechRequiresSupports access_mech, 
out Security: :SecureInvocationFamily 
access_Type_policy_conrig, 
out Security::SecureInvocationFaniily 
access_Attribute_policy_conrig, 
out long access_Type_mapping, 
out long access_Attribute_mapping, 
out Security: :DelegationPolicyRequiresSupports 
delegation_policy_conrig, 
out long delegation_mode_mapping, 
out Security: :MechRequiresSupports qop_mech, 
out Security::QOPPolicyRequiresSupports qop.policy.config, 
out long qop_type_mapping, 
out long msg_part_mapping, 
out Security: :MechRequiresSupports nr_mech, 
out Security::NRPolicyRequiresSupports nr_policy_config, 
out long 
out Security::MechRequiresSupports 
out Security: :AuditPolicyRequiresSupports audit_policy_config, 
out long audit_event_mapping, 
out long audit_selector_mapping, 
out Security::authorityDescriptor authority, 
out Security::UtcT expiry_time 
nr_evidence_mapping, 
audit mech. 
); 
314 
Appendix A: IDL for Comprehensive CORBA Security 
void query_interop_policy ( 
inout sequence<long> Interop.policyjd, 
inout sequence<Security::InteropPolicyType> interop_policy_type, 
inout sequence<Security::InterfaceDefInfo> object_type, 
inout sequence<Security::Opaque> domainjd, 
inout sequence<Security::MechRequiresSupports> auth_mech, 
inout sequence<Security:: AuthPolicyRequiresSupports> 
auth_policy_conrig, 
inout sequence<long> auth_mapping, 
inout sequence<Security::MechRequiresSupports> 
access_mech, 
inout sequence<Security::SecureInvocationFamily> 
access_Type_policy_config, 
inout sequence<Security::SecurelnvocationFamily> 
access_Attribute_policy_config, 
inout sequence<long> access_Type_mapping, 
inout sequence<long> access_Attribute_mapping, 
inout sequence<Security::DelegatlonPolicyRequiresSupport5> 
delegation_policy_config, 
inout sequence<long> delegation_mode_mapping, 
inout sequence<Security::IVlechRequiresSupports> qop.mech, 
inout 5equence<Security::QOPPolicyRequiresSupports> 
qop_policy_conrig, 
inout sequence<long> qop_ty pe_mappi ng, 
inout sequence<long> msg_part_mapping, 
inout $equence<Security::MechRequiresSupports> nr.mech, 
inout sequence<Security::NRPolicyRequiresSupports> 
nr_policy_conrig, 
inout sequence<long> nr_evidence_mapping, 
inout sequence<Security::MechRequiresSupports> 
audit_mech, 
inout sequence<Security::AuditPolicyRequiresSupports> 
audit_policy_conrig, 
inout sequence<long> audit_event_mapping, 
inout $equence<long> audit_selector_mapping, 
inout sequence<Security::authorityDescnptor> authority, 
inout sequence<Security::UtcT> expiry_time 
); 
void updateJnterop_policy ( 
in long interop_policyJd, 
inout Security::InteropPolicyType interop_policy_lype, 
inout Security::lnterfaceDefInfo object_type, 
inout Security::Opaque domainjd, 
inout Security: :MechRequiresSupports auth_mech, 
inout Security::AuthPolicyRequiresSupports auth_policy_conrig, 
inout long auth.mapping, 
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inout Security: 
inout Security::MechRequiresSupports access_mech, 
inout Security: :SecureInvocationFamily 
access_Type_policy_config, 
:SecureInvocationFamily 
access_Attribute_pclicy_ccnfig, 
inout long access_Type_mapping 
inout long access_Attribute_mapping, 
incut Security::DelegaticnPolicyRequiresSupports 
delegation_policy_conrig, 
incut long delegaticn_mode_mapping, 
inout Security: :MechRequiresSupports qop_mech, 
inout Security: :QOPPclicyRequiresSupports qop_policy_ccnfig, 
inout long qop_type_mapping, 
inout long msg_part_mapping, 
inout Security::MechRequiresSupports nr_mech, 
incut Security::NRPolicyRequiresSupports nr_policy_conrig, 
incut long nr_evidence_mapping, 
incut Security::AuditPolicyRequiresSupports audit_policy_conrig, 
incut long audit__event_mapping, 
inout long audit_selector_mapping, 
inout Security::authorityDescriptor authority, 
inout Security: :UtcT expiry_time 
void delete_interop_policy ( 
in long 
incut Security::InteropPolicyType 
incut Security::InterfaceDennfo 
incut Security: :Opaque 
); 
interop_poIicy_id, 
intercp_policy_type, 
object_type, 
domainjd. 
interface MappingLookup { 
void query ( 
in Security: :ServiceType 
in Security::Constraint 
in Security::Preference 
in unsigned long 
out Security: :MappingSeq 
out Mappinglteratcr 
); 
); 
interface DomainMapping { 
Security::MappingId add ( 
type, 
constr, 
pref, 
how_many, 
maps, 
mapj tr 
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in Security::ServiceType 
in string 
in unsigned short 
in unsigned short 
in sequence<octet> 
in sequence<octet> 
in unsigned short 
in unsigned short 
in sequence<unsigned > 
in sequence<octet> 
in sequence<Security::domain 
in Security: rOpaque 
in Security: :Opaque 
out Security: :UtcT 
serviceType, 
policyClassiflcation, 
family.definerl, 
fami ly jd l , 
attribute_typel, 
derining_authorityl, 
family_deriner2, 
faniilyjd2, 
attribute_type2, 
derining_authority2, 
values> mapped.values, 
remoteDomainld, 
remoteDomainAuthority, 
timeStamp 
void withdraw ( 
in Security::IVIappingId 
); 
Security::MappingSeq describe ( 
in Security::MappingId 
); 
id 
id 
void modify ( 
in Security::MappingId 
in Security::MappingIdSeq 
in Security::MappingSeq 
); 
id, 
deljist , 
modifyjist 
void list( 
in unsigned long 
out Security::]VlappingSeq 
out Mappinglterator 
); 
how_many, 
ids, 
id itr 
}; 
interface Mappinglterator { 
unsigned long maxjeft 0; 
boolean next_n ( 
in unsigned long 
out Security::MappingSeq 
); 
n, 
maps 
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void destroy (); 
// END OF SECURITYADMIN MODULE 
1; 
/ / * Module: SEClOP * 
// * Function: Secure Inter-ORB protocol * 
module SEClOP { 
typedef sequence <octet> Opaque; 
const IOP::ComponentID T A G _ G E N E R I C _ S E C _ M E C H = 12; 
const IOP::ComponentlD TAG_ASSOClATION_OPnONS = 13; 
const IOP::ComponentID TAG_SEC_NAME = 14; 
const IOP::ComponentlD T A G _ A C C E S S _ C O N T R O L = 15; 
const IOP::ComponentID T A G _ A U D I T = 16; 
const 10P::ComponentID TAG_N0N_REPUDIAT10N=17; 
const 10P::ComponentID TAG_SSL_SEC_TRANS=18; 
struct AssociationOptions{ 
Security: :AssociationOptions 
Security: :AssociationOptions 
Security: :MsgPartList 
Security: :MsgPartList 
sequence <TaggedComponent> 
sequence <TaggedConiponent> 
sequence <TaggedComponent> 
sequence <TaggedConiponent> 
} 
target_supports; 
target_requires; 
msg_part_su pported; 
nisg_pa r t_r eq u i r ed; 
integ_mechs_supported; 
integ_niechs_required; 
conf_mechs_supported; 
conf_mechs_required; 
struct GenericMechanismlnfo { 
sequence <octet> 
sequence <octet> 
sec u ri ty_m ec h a n i sm_type; 
mech_spec i fic_data; 
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sequence < IOP::TaggedComponent> components; 
struct AccessCcntrol { 
sequence< Security::SecureInvocaticnFamily> Operation_supports; 
Security::SecureInvocationFamily Operation_requires; 
sequence< Security ::SecureInvocationFamily> Attribute_supports; 
Security::SecureInvocaticnFamily Attribute_requires; 
sequence < Security: :DeiegaticnMode> Delegaticn.supports; 
Security::DelegaticnMode De!egaticn_requires; 
sequence <TaggedCompcnent> access_mechs_suppcrted; 
sequence <TaggedCompcnent> access_mechs_required; 
}; 
struct Audit { 
Security::AuditPolicyRequiresSupport5 Audit_policy; 
sequence <TaggedCcmponent> Audit_mechs_suppcrted; 
sequence <TaggedComponent> Audit_mechs_required; 
}; 
struct NonRepudiation { 
Security::NRPolicyRequiresSupports NR_policy; 
sequence <TaggedCcmpcnent> NR_mechs_supported; 
sequence <TaggedComponent> NR_niechs_required; 
}; 
struct SSL{ 
Security: :AssociationOptions target_supports; 
Security: :AssociationOptions target_requires; 
unsigned short port; 
// prefix with MT (as in Servjdl.idl) so that it does not conflict with the struct names 
enum MsgType { 
MTEstablishContext, 
MTCompleteEstablishContext, 
MTContinueEstablishContext, 
MTDiscardContext, 
MTMessageError, 
MTMessagelnContext 
struct ulonglong { 
unsigned long low; 
unsigned long high; 
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typedef ulonglong ContextId; 
enum ContextldDefn { 
Client, 
Peer, 
Sender 
}; 
snaict EstablishConiexi { 
ContextId 
sequence <octet> 
}; 
struct CompleteEstablishConiext { 
Conlexlld 
boolean 
ContextId 
sequence <ociet> 
1; 
struct ContinueEstabiishContext { 
ContextId 
sequence <octet> 
1; 
client_context_id; 
initialcontexttoken; 
clieni_context_id; 
targe t_con te x t_i d_va lid; 
tartet_context_id; 
final context_loken; 
client_context_id; 
continuation context_ioken; 
struct DiscardContext { 
ContextldDefn 
Contexlld 
}; 
struct MessageError { 
ContextldDefn 
ContextId 
long 
long 
1; 
message_contexi_id_defn; 
message_context_id; 
message_context_id_defn; 
message_context_id; 
major_status; 
minor_status; 
struct MessagelnContexl { 
ContexlldDefn 
ContexUd 
Sequence<octet> 
1; 
// END OF SECIOP MODULE 
}; 
message_contextJd_defn; 
message_context_id; 
message_protection_token; 
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Appendix B - IDL for Security-Aware Trader Service 
This appendix will present the IDL for the Security-Aware Trader Service. 
Module Structure 
The modules used in the IDL are now: 
• CosTrading : Security-Aware Trading Module 
• CosTradingDynamic: Trading Dynamic Property Module 
• CosTradingRepos: Trading Service Type Repository Module 
The module structure has been preserved. The CORBA 2.0 object interfaces are still 
used, but some of the parameter lists are extended and a new security policy interface 
has been added. 
Object Interfaces 
Comments through out the IDL code will explain the modifications to and addition of 
new object interfaces. The new DDL code will be highlighted in bold. 
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IDL 
#include <orb.idI> 
// I D L for Security-Aware Trading Function Module 
module CosTrading { 
// forward references to our interfaces 
interface Lookup; 
interface Register; 
interface Link; 
interface Proxy; 
interface Admin; 
interface Offerlterator; 
interface Offerldlterator; 
// type definitions used in more than one interface 
typedef string Istring; 
typedef Object TypeRepository; 
typedef Istring PropertyName; 
typedef sequence<PropertyName> PropertyNameSeq; 
lypedef any PropertyValue; 
struct Property { 
PropertyName name; 
PropertyValue value; 
}; 
typedef sequence<Property> PropertySeq; 
struct Offer { 
Object reference; 
PropertySeq properties; 
1; 
typedef sequence<Offer> OfferSeq; 
lypedef string Offerld; 
typedef sequence<0fferld> OfferldSeq; 
typedef Istring ServiceTypeName; 
typedef Istring Constraint; 
enum FollowOption { 
local_onIy, 
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if_noJocal, 
always 
I ; 
typedef Istring LinkName; 
typedef sequence<LinkName> LinkNameSeq; 
lypedef LinkNameSeq TraderName; 
lypedef string PolicyName; 
lypedef sequence<PoIicyName> PolicyNameSeq; 
lypedef any PolicyValue; 
struct Policy { 
PolicyName name; 
. PolicyValue value; 
1; 
typedef sequence<Policy> PolicySeq; 
// exceptions used in more than one interface 
exception lIlegalTraderAccess {}; // Security-Aware Trader exception 
exception IIIegalServiceOfrerAccess{};//Security-A\vareTraderexception 
exception UnknownMaxLeft { } ; 
exception Notlmplemenled { } ; 
exception IllegaiServiceType { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
1; 
exception UnknownServiceType { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
}; 
exception IllegalPropertyName { 
PropertyName name; 
1; 
exception DuplicalePropertyName { 
PropenyName name; 
I ; 
exception PropertyTypeMismatch { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
Property prop; 
1; 
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exception MissingMandatoryPropeny { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
PropertyName name; 
}; 
exception ReadonlyDynamicProperty { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
PropertyName name; 
1; 
exception IllegalConstraint { 
Constraint constr; 
}; 
exception InvalidLookupRef { 
Lookup target; 
1; 
exception IllegalOfferld { 
Offerld id; 
); 
exception UnknownOfferld { 
Offerld id; 
1; 
exception DupIicatePolicyName { 
PolicyName name; 
1; 
// the interfaces 
interface TraderComponents { 
readonly attribute Lookup lookup_if; 
readonly attribute Register registerjf; 
readonly attribute Link l i n k j f ; 
readonly attribute Proxy proxy_if; 
readonly attribute Admin admin j f ; 
1; 
// Security-Aware Trader Attributes 
interface SecurityAttributes { 
readonly attribute boolean Security_Aware; 
readonly attribute boolean access_control_trader; 
readonly attribute boolean access_control_service_offers; 
readonly attribute boolean encrypt_stores; 
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readonly attribute boolean encrypt_comms; 
readonly attribute boolean integrity_check_stores; 
readonly attribute boolean integrity_check_comnis; 
readonly attribute boolean nr_trade; 
readonly attribute boolean audit.trade; 
) ; 
interface SupportAttributes { 
readonly attribute boolean supports_modiriable_properties; 
readonly attribute boolean supports_dynamic_properties; 
readonly attribute boolean supports_proxy_offers; 
readonly attribute TypeRepository type_repos; 
); 
interface ImportAttributes { 
readonly attribute unsigned long def_search_card; 
readonly attribute unsigned long max_search_card; 
readonly attribute unsigned long def_niatch_card; 
readonly atuibute unsigned long max_match_card; 
readonly attribute unsigned long def_retum_card; 
readonly attribute unsigned long max_retum_card; 
readonly attribute unsigned long maxj i s t ; 
readonly attribute unsigned long def_hop_count; 
readonly attribute unsigned long max_hop_count; 
readonly attribute FollowOption def_follow_policy; 
readonly attribute FollowOption max_follow_policy; 
}; 
interface LinkAttributes { 
readonly attribute FollowOption n[iax_link_follow_policy; 
1; 
interface Lx)okup:TraderComponents, SecurityAttributes, SupportAttributes{ 
typedef Istring Preference; 
enum HowManyProps { none, some, all }; 
union SpecifiedProps switch ( HowManyProps) { 
case some: PropertyNameSeq prop_names; 
1; 
exception IllegalPreference { 
Preference pref; 
}; 
exception lllegalPolicyName { 
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PolicyName name; 
1; 
exception PolicyTypeMismatch { 
Policy the_poIicy; 
}; 
exception InvalidPoiicyValue { 
Policy the_policy; 
}; 
void query ( 
in ServiceTypeName type, 
in Constraint constr, 
in Preference pref, 
in PoIicySeq policies, 
in SpecifiedProps desired_props, 
in unsigned long how_many, 
out OfferSeq offers, 
out Offerlterator o f f e r j t r , 
out PolicyNameSeq limils_applied 
) raises ( 
lllegalTraderAccessy/Security-Aware Trader exception 
IlIegalServiceOfferAccess^/Security-Aware Trader except. 
IllegalServiceType, 
UnknownServiceType, 
lilegalConstraint, 
IllegalPreference, 
IllegalPolicyName, 
PolicyTypeMismatch, 
InvalidPolicy Value, 
111 ega I Property Name, 
DuplicatePropertyName, 
DuplicatePolicyName 
); 
1; 
interface Register: TraderComponents,SecurityAttributes, 
SupportAttribuies { 
struct Offerlnfo { 
Object reference; 
ServiceTypeName type; 
PropertySeq properties; 
1; 
exception InvalidObjectRef { 
Object ref; 
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exception UnknownPropertyName { 
PropertyName name; 
I ; 
exception InterfaceTypeMismatch { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
Object reference; 
}; 
exception ProxyOfferld { 
Offerld id; 
}; 
exception MandatoryProperty ( 
ServiceTypeName type; 
PropertyName name; 
exception ReadonlyProperty { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
PropertyName name; 
1; 
exception NoMatchingOffers { 
Constraint constr; 
1; 
exception IllegalTraderName { 
TraderName name; 
); 
exception UnknownTraderName { 
TraderName name; 
1; 
exception RegisterNotSupported { 
TraderName name; 
}; 
Offerld export ( 
in Object reference, 
in ServiceTypeName type, 
in PropertySeq properties 
) raises ( 
IIIegalTraderAccess, // Security-Aware Trader exception 
lllegalServiceOfferAccess//Security-Aware Trader except. 
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InvalidObjeciRef, 
lIlegalServiceType, 
UnknownServiceType, 
InlerfaceTypeMismatch, 
IllegalProperlyName, 
PropertyTypeMismatch, 
ReadonlyDynamicProperty, 
MissingMandatory Property, 
DuplicatePropertyName 
); 
void withdraw ( 
in Offerld id 
) raises ( 
lIlegalTraderAccess, // Security-Aware Trader exception 
IllegalServiceOfferAccess, // Security-Aware Trader except 
IllegalOfferld, 
UnknownOfferld, 
ProxyOfferld 
); 
Offerlnfo describe ( 
in Offerld id 
) raises ( 
IllegalTraderAccess, // Security-Aware Trader exception 
IllegalServiceOfferAccess, // Security-Aware Trader except 
lllegalOfferld. 
UnknownOfferld, 
ProxyOfferld 
); 
void modify ( 
in Offerld id, 
in PropertyNameSeq del_list, 
in PropertySeq m o d i f y j i s l 
) raises ( 
Noilmplemented, 
IllegalTraderAccess, // Security-Aware Trader exception 
IllegalServiceOfTerAccess, // Security-Aware Trader except 
lllegalOfferld, 
UnknownOfferld, 
ProxyOfferld, 
IllegalPropertyName, 
UnknownPropertyName, 
PropertyTypeMismalch, 
ReadonlyDynamicProperty, 
Mandatory Property, 
Readonly Property, 
328 
Appendix B: IDL for Security-Aware Trader Service 
DuplicatePropertyName 
); 
void withdraw_using_constraint ( 
in ServiceTypeName type, 
in Constraint constr 
) raises ( 
IllegalTraderAccess, // Security-Aware Trader exception 
IliegalServiceOfferAccess, // Security-Aware Trader except 
IllegalServiceType, 
UnknownServiceType, 
IllegalConstraint, 
NoMatchingOffers 
); 
Register resolve ( 
in TraderName name 
) raises ( 
IllegalTraderName, 
UnknownTraderName, 
RegisierNotSupporied, 
IllegalTraderAccess, // Security-Aware Trader exception 
IllegalServiceOfferAccess // Security-Aware Trader except 
RegisterNoiSupported 
); 
interface Link : TraderComponenis, SupportAttributes, 
SecurityAttributes, LinkAitribuies { 
struct Linklnfo { 
Lookup target; 
Register targei_reg; 
FollowOplion def_pass_on_fol!ow_rule; 
FollowOption limiting_follow_rule; 
OctetSeq Link_security; 
I ; 
exception IllegalLinkName { 
LinkName name; 
1; 
exception UnknownLinkName { 
LinkName name; 
1; 
exception DuplicateLinkName { 
LinkName name; 
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1; 
exception DefaultFollowTooPermissive { 
FollowOption def_pass_on_follow_rule; 
FollowOption limiting_folIow_rule; 
1; 
exception LimitingFollowTooPermissive { 
FollowOption limiting_follow_rule; 
FollowOption maxJink_follow_policy; 
1; 
void add j ink ( 
in LinkName name, 
in Lookup target, 
in FollowOption def_pass_on_follow_rule, 
in FollowOption limiting_follow_rule 
) raises ( 
IllegalLinkName, 
DuplicateLinkName, 
InvalidLookupRef, // e.g. nil 
DefaultFollowTooPermissive, 
LimitingFollowTooPermissive 
); 
void removejink ( 
in LinkName name 
) raises ( 
IllegalLinkName, 
UnknownLinkName 
); 
Linklnfo describejink ( 
in LinkName name 
) raises ( 
IllegalLinkName, 
UnknownLinkName 
); 
LinkNameSeq l i s t j inks ( ) ; 
void m o d i f y j i n k ( 
in LinkName name, 
in FollowOption def_pass_on_follow_rule, 
in FollowOption limiting_follow_rule 
) raises ( 
lllegalLinkName, 
UnknownLinkName, 
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DefaultFoliowTooPermissive, 
LimitingFollowTooPermissive 
}; 
interface Proxy : TraderComponents, SecurityAttributes, 
SupportAttributes { 
typedef Istring ConstraintRecipe; 
struct Proxylnfo { 
ServiceTypeName type; 
Lookup target; 
PropertySeq properties; 
boolean if_match_all; 
ConstraintRecipe recipe; 
PolicySeq policies_to_pass_on; 
}; 
exception IllegalRecipe _ 
ConstraintRecipe recipe; 
1; 
exception NotProxyOfferld { 
Offerld id; 
}; 
Offerld export_proxy ( 
in Lookup target, 
in ServiceTypeName type, 
in PropertySeq properties, 
in boolean if_match_all, 
in ConstraintRecipe recipe, 
in PolicySeq policies_to_pass_on 
) raises ( 
IllegalServiceType, 
UnknownServiceType, 
InvalidLookupRef, // e.g. nil 
lllegalPropertyName, 
PropertyTypeMismatch, 
ReadonlyDynamicProperty, 
MissingMandatory Property, 
IllegalRecipe, 
DuplicatePropertyName, 
DuplicatePolicyName 
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); 
void withdraw_proxy ( 
in Offerld id 
) raises ( 
IllegalOfferld, 
UnknownOfferld, 
NotProxyOfferld 
); 
Proxylnfo describe_proxy ( 
in Offerld id 
) raises ( 
IllegalOfferld, 
UnknownOfferld, 
NotProxyOfferld 
); 
interface Admin : TraderComponents, SupportAltributes, 
SecurityAttributes, ImportAttributes, LinkAttributes { 
lypedef sequence<octet> OcletSeq; 
// exceptions used for the Security Attributes 
exception SecurityAttributesRequired {}; 
readonly attribute OctetSeq requestjd_stem; 
unsigned long set_def_search_card (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_max_search_card (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_def_match_card (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_max_match_card (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_def_reium_card (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_max_relum_card (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_max_list (in unsigned long value); 
boolean set_supports_modifiable_properties (in boolean value); 
boolean set_supports_dynamic_properties (in boolean value); 
boolean set_supports_proxy_offers (in boolean value); 
unsigned long set_def_hop_count (in unsigned long value); 
unsigned long set_max_hop_count (in unsigned long value); 
FollowOption set_def_follow_policy (in FollowOpiion policy); 
FollowOption set_max_follow_policy (in FollowOption policy); 
FollowOption set_maxjink_follow_policy (in FollowOption policy); 
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II Set operations for Security Attributes 
boolean set_Security_Aware (In boolean value); 
boolean set_access_control_trader (in boolean value); 
boolean set_access_control_service_offers (in boolean value); 
boolean set_encrypt_stores (in boolean value); 
boolean set_encrypt_conuns (in boolean value); 
boolean set_integrity_check_stores (in boolean value); 
boolean set_integrity_check_comms (in boolean value); 
boolean set_nr_trade (in boolean value); 
boolean set_audit_trade (in boolean value); 
TypeRepository set_type_repos (in TypeRepository repository); 
OctetSeq set_request_id_stem (in OctetSeq stem); 
void Iist_offers ( 
in unsigned long how_many, 
out OfferldSeq ids, 
out Offerldlterator i d j t r 
) raises ( 
Notlmpiemented 
); 
void lisi_proxies ( 
i n unsigned long how_many , 
out OfferldSeq ids, 
out Offerldlterator id_itr 
) raises ( 
Notlmplemented 
); 
1; 
interface Offerlterator { 
unsigned long m a x j e f l ( 
) raises ( 
UnknownMaxLefi 
); 
boolean nexl_n ( 
in unsigned long n, 
out OfferSeq offers 
); 
void destroy (); 
}; 
interface Offerldlterator { 
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unsigned long max J e f t ( 
) raises ( 
UnknownMaxLeft 
); 
boolean next_n ( 
// in unsigned long n, 
// out OfferldSeq ids 
); 
void destroy (); 
1; 
1; /* end module CosTrading */ 
// I D L for Dynamic Property Module 
module CosTradingDynamic ( 
exception DPEvalFailure { 
CosTrading::PropertyName name; 
coRBA-TypeCode retumed_type; 
any extra_info; 
1; 
interface DynamicPropEval { 
any evalDP ( 
in CosTrading::PropertyName name, 
in CORBA::TypeCode retumedjype, 
in any ex t ra jnfo 
) raises ( 
DPEvalFailure 
); 
1; 
struct DynamicProp { 
DynamicPropEval eval_if; 
cORBA::TypeCode retumed_type; 
any ext ra jnfo ; 
}; 
}; /* end module CosTradingDynamic */ 
// I D L for Service Type Repository Module 
module CosTradingRepos { 
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interface ServiceTypeRepository { 
// local types 
typedef sequence<CosTrading: :ServiceTypeName> 
ServiceTypeNameSeq; 
enum PropertyMode { 
PROP_NORMAL, PROP.READONLY, 
PROP_MANDATORY, PROP_MANDATORY_READONLY 
}; 
struct PropStrucl { 
CosTrading::PropertyName name; 
CORBA::TypeCode value_type; 
PropertyMode mode; 
1; 
typedef sequence<PropStruct> PropStructSeq; 
typedef CosTrading::Istring Identifier; 
struct IncamationNumber { 
unsigned long high; 
unsigned long low; 
1; 
struct TypeStruct { 
Identifier if_name; 
PropStructSeq props; 
ServiceTypeNameSeq super_types; 
boolean masked; 
IncamationNumber incarnation; 
1; 
enum ListOption { all, since ); 
union SpecifiedServiceTypes switch ( ListOption ) 
{ 
case since: IncamationNumber incarnation; 
1; 
// local exceptions 
exception ServiceTypeExists { 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name; 
1; 
exception InterfaceTypeMismaich { 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName base_service; 
Identifier basejf; 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName derived_service; 
Identifier derivedjf ; 
}; 
exception HasSubTypes { 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName the_type; 
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CosTrading::ServiceTypeName sub_type; 
}; 
exception AlreadyMasked { 
CosTrading: :ServiceTypeName name; 
); 
exception NotMasked { 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name; 
}; 
exception ValueTypeRedefinition { 
CosTrading: :ServiceTypeName iype_ 1; 
PropStruct def ini t ion.! ; 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName type_2; 
PropStruct definition_2; 
}; 
exception DuplicateServiceTypeName { 
CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name; 
1; 
// attributes 
readonly attribute IncamaiionNumber incarnation; 
// operation signatures 
IncamationNumber add_type ( 
in CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name, 
in Identifier if_name, 
in PropStructSeq props, 
in ServiceTypeNameSeq super_lypes 
) raises ( 
CosTrading::IllegalServiceType, 
ServiceTypeExists, 
InterfaceTypeMismatch, 
' CosTrading::lllegalPropertyName, 
CosTrading::DuplicatePropertyName, 
ValueTypeRedefinition, 
CosTrading:: UnknownServiceType, 
DuplicateServiceTypeName 
); 
void remove_type ( 
in CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name 
) raises ( 
CosTrading: :IllegalServiceType, 
CosTrading: :UnknownServiceType, 
HasSubTypes 
); 
ServiceTypeNameSeq list_types ( 
in SpecifiedServiceTypes which_iypes 
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); 
TypeStruct describe_type ( 
in CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name 
) raises ( 
CosTrading::IllegaIServiceType, 
CosTrading:: UnknownServiceType 
); 
TypeStruct fully_describe_type ( 
in CosTrading: :ServiceTypeName name 
) raises ( 
CosTrading::IllegaIServiceType, 
CosTrading: :UnknownServiceType 
); 
void mask_type ( 
in CosTrading::ServiceTypeName name 
) raises ( 
CosTrading: iIllegalServiceType, 
CosTradi ng:: UnknownServiceType, 
AlreadyMasked 
); 
void unmask_type ( 
in CosTrading: :ServiceTypeName name 
) raises ( 
CosTrading::lllegaiServiceType, 
CosTrading: :UnknownServiceType, 
NotMasked 
); 
); 
); /* end module CosTradingRepos */ 
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Appendix C - IDL for Generic Security Service API 
This appendix presents the IDL for the GSS-API server. Since GSS-API plays an 
integral part in the implementation of the Enhanced Security Service, a GSS-API 
server was built using this DDL code. It complies with the GSS-API standard. 
I D L 
II 
/ / N A M E : GSSAPI.idl 
// 
// DESCRIPTION: IDL for PhD demo - Operates as a GSS-API server 
// providing the required GSS-API operations, implemented 
// using cryptlib functions 
// 
// GSSAPI.idl 
module GSSAPI { 
// IDL defmtion of GSS-API operations, 
interface GSSAPI { 
// Data types used in this idl file, 
typedef unsigned long OM_uint32; 
typedef long gss_cu_id_t; 
typedef string gss_cred_id_t; 
typedef any gss_name_t; 
typedef string intemalname; 
typedef short o b j j d ; 
typedef short obj_id_seq[10]; 
typedef long contexthandle; 
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typedef string credentialhandle; 
typedef string octeistring; 
//lypedef sequence<octet> octetstring; 
//typedef unsigned char ostring; 
//typedef string Soctetstring; 
typedef char byteBuffer[1024]; 
// DDL operations 
// CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT CALLS 
OM_uint32 GSS_Acquire_cred( 
in intemalname desired_name, 
in short lifetime_req, 
in obj Jd_seq desired_mechs, 
in short cred_usage, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out credentialhandle output_cred_handIe, 
out objJd_seq actual_mechs, 
out short Iifetime_rec 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_Release_cred( 
in credentialhandle cred_handle, 
out short major_status, 
out short niinor_status 
); 
OM_uint32 GSSJnquire_cred( 
in credentialhandle cred_handle, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out intemalname cred_name, 
out short lifetime_rec, 
out short cred_usage, 
out obj_id_seq mech_set 
) ; 
OM_uint32 GSS_Add_cred( 
in credentialhandle inpul_cred_handle, 
in iniemalname desired_name, 
in short initiator_lime_req, 
in short acceptor_time_req, 
in obj J d desired_mech, 
inout short cred_usage, 
out short major_status, 
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out short minor_status, 
out credentialhandle outpui_cred_handle, 
out o b j j d actual_mechs, 
out short initiator_time_rec, 
out short acceptor_time_rec, 
out objJd_seq mech_set 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech( 
in credentialhandle cred_handle, 
in ob j Jd mech_lype, 
out short niajor_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out intemalname cred_name, 
out short lifetime_rec_initiate, 
out short lifetime_rec_accept, 
out short cred_usage 
) ; 
// CONTEXT LEVEL CALLS 
OM_uint32 GSS_Init_sec_context( 
in gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, 
in short input_context_handle, 
in intemalname target_nanie, 
inout obj_!d_seq mech_type, 
in boolean deleg_req_flag, 
in boolean mutual_req_flag, 
in boolean replay_det_req_flag, 
in boolean sequence_req_flag, 
in boolean anon_req_flag, 
in short lifetime_req, 
in octetstring chan_bindings, 
in byteBuffer input_token, 
in short tincount, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out contexthandle output_context_handle, 
out byteBuffer output_token, 
out short tcount, 
out boolean deleg_state, 
out boolean mutual_state, 
out boolean replay_det_state, 
out boolean sequence_state, 
out boolean anon_state, 
out boolean trans_state, 
out boolean prot_ready_state, 
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out boolean conf_avai!, 
out boolean integ_avail, 
out short l i fei imerec 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_Accept_sec_context( 
in credentialhandle acceptor_cred_handIe, 
in short input_context_handle, 
in octetstring chan_bindings, 
in byteBuffer input_token, 
in short tincount, 
out short major_slatus, 
out short niinor_status, 
out intemalname src_name, 
inout o b j j d mech_type, 
out contexihandle output_context_handle, 
out boolean deleg_state, 
out boolean mutual_state, 
. out boolean replay_det_slate, 
out boolean sequence_stale, 
out boolean anon_siate, 
out boolean trans_state, 
out boolean prot_ready_state, 
out boolean conf_avail, 
out boolean integ_avail, 
out short lifetime_rec, 
out credeniialhandle delgated_cred_handle, 
out byteBuffer output_token, 
out short toutcount 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_Delete_sec_context( 
in contexthandle context_handle, 
out short niajor_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out contexthandle output_context_token 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_Process_conlext_token( 
in contexthandle context_handle, 
out octetstring input_context_token, 
out short niajor_status, 
out short minor status 
); 
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OM_uint32 GSS_Contexl_time( 
in contexthandle context_handle, 
out short inajor_status, 
out short niinor_status, 
out short Iifetime_rec 
) ; 
OM_uint32 GSS_Inquire_context{ 
in short input_coniexi_handIe, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_slatus, 
out intemalname src_name, 
out intemalname targ_name, 
out short Iifetime_rec, 
out o b j j d mech_type, 
out boolean deleg_state, 
out boolean mutual_state, 
out boolean replay_det_state, 
out boolean sequence_state, 
out boolean anon_state, 
out boolean trans_state, 
out boolean prot_ready_staie, 
out boolean conf_avail, 
out boolean integ_avail, 
out boolean locally_initialed 
); 
// PER-MESSAGE CALLS 
OM_uint32 GSS_GetMIC( 
in contexthandle context_handle, 
in short qop_req, 
in octetstring message, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out byteBuffer per_msg_token, 
out short tcount 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_VerifyMIC( 
in contexthandle coniext_handle, 
in octelstring message, 
in byteBuffer per_msg_token, 
in short tcount, 
out short qop_state, 
out short major_status, 
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out short niinor_status 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_Wrap( 
in contexthandle context_handle, 
in boolean conf_req_flag, 
in short qop_req, 
in octetstring input_message, 
out short nnajor_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out boolean conf_state, 
out byieBuffer output_message, 
out short tcount 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_UnWrap( 
in coniexthandle context_handle, 
in byteBuffer input_message, 
in short tcount, 
out boolean conf_state, 
out short qop_state, 
out short major_status, 
out short minor_status, 
out octetstring output_message 
); 
/ /L IBRARY OPTIONS 
OM_uint32 GSS_SetOptions( 
in short opliontype, 
in short optionvalue 
); 
OM_uint32 GSS_GetOptions( 
in short optiontype, 
out short optionvatue 
); 
); 
} ; / * end module GSSAPI */ 
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Status Codes for GSS-API 
This appendix also includes the status codes required for GSS-API. There are two 
types of status code: 
• Major Status Codes: provide a mechanism-independent indication of call 
status; 
• Minor Status Codes: provide a mechanism-specific indication of status. 
Only Major Status Codes are defined in the specification, because as Minor codes are 
dependent on the mechanisms used. 
GSS'API Major Status Codes 
F A T A L E R R O R C O D E S Code Dennition 
GSS_S_BAD_BIND1NGS 901 Channel bindings mismatch 
GSS_S_BAD_MECH 902 Unsupported mechanism requested 
GSS_S_BAD_NAME 903 Invalid name provided 
GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 904 Name of unsupported type provided 
GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 905 Invalid input status selector 
GSS_S_BAD_SIG 906 Token had invalid integrity check 
GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 907 Specified security context expired 
GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 908 Expired credentials detected 
GSS S DEFECTIVE CREDENTIALS 909 Defective credentials detected 
GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 910 Defective token detected 
GSS_S_FA1LURE 911 Failure, unspecified at GSS-API 
level 
GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 912 No valid security context specified 
GSS_S_NO_CRED 913 No valid credentials provided 
GSS_S_BAD_QOP 914 Unsupported QOP value 
GSS S UNAUTHORIZED 915 Operation unauthorized 
GSS S UNAVAILABLE 916 Operation unavailable 
GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT 917 Duplicate credential element 
requested 
GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN 918 Name contains multi-mechanism 
elements 
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I N F O R M A T O R Y S T A T U S C O D E S Codes Dennition 
GSS_S_COMPLETE 801 Normal completion 
GSS_S_CONTiNUE_NEEDED 802 Continuation call to routine required 
GSS_S_DUPLICATED_TOKEN 803 Duplicate per-message token detected 
GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 804 Timed-out per-message token detected 
GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 805 Reordered (early) per-message token 
detected 
GSS S_GAP_TOKEN 806 Skipped predecessor token(s) detected 
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This appendix presents an overview of cryptlib, a cryptography library, which was 
used in the implementation of the Enhanced Security System. It was used as to 
provide the security mechanisms, such as encryption and certificates. 
Cryptlib is written by Peter Guttman (pgutOOl@cs.auckland.ac.n7A and in part by 
Eric Young, Colin Plumb, and others. The cryptlib manual is available at the cryptlib 
web site i f further details are required on the product 
(http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/-pgutQ01/crvptlib/). 
The cryptlib encryption library provides an easy-to-use interface that allows 
programmers add strong encryption and authentication services to their software. 
cryptlib uses several encryption, hash, MAC, public-key and digital signature 
mechanisms (see Table A-1 below), cryptlib is supplied as source code for Unix 
(shared or static libraries), DOS, Windows (16- and 32-bit DLL's), and the Amiga. 
Algorithms 
cryptlib provides a standardised interface to a number of popular encryption 
algorithms, as well as providing a high-level interface which hides the implementation 
details and provides an operating-system-independant encoding method which makes 
it easy to transfer encrypted data from one system to another. Although use of the 
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high-level interface is recommended, programmers can directly access the lower-level 
encryption routines for implementing custom encryption protocols or methods not 
provided by cryptlib. 
Algorithm Key size Block size Type 
Blownsh 448 64 Cipher-block 
CAST-128 128 64 Cipher-block 
D E S 56 64 Cipher-block 
Triple DES 112/168 64 Cipher-block 
I D E A 128 64 Cipher-block 
R C 2 1024 64 Cipher-block 
R C 4 2048 8 Cipher-stream 
RC5 832 64 Cipher-block 
Safer 128 64 Cipher-block 
Safer-SK 128 64 Cipher-block 
MD2 — 128 MD-Hash 
MD4 — 128 MD-Hash 
MD5 — 128 MD-Hash 
MDC-2 — 128 MD-Hash 
RIPEMD-160 — 160 MD-Hash 
SHA — 160 MD-Hash 
HMAC-MD5 128 128 M A C 
HMAC-SHA 160 160 M A C 
HMAC-RIPEMD-160 160 160 M A C 
Diffie-Hellman 4096 — Key Exchange 
DSA 4096' — Digital Signature 
EIGamal 4096 — Public-key 
RSA 4096 — Public-key 
Digital Signature 
Table A - 1: crypUib mechanisnis 
Certificate Management 
In relation to certificate management, crypllib implements ful l X.509 certificate 
support, including all X.509 version 3 extensions. Since cryptlib is itself capable of 
processing certification requests into certificates, it is also possible to use cryptlib to 
The DSA standard only defines key sizes from 512 to 1024 bils, crypllib supports longer keys but 
there is no extra security to be gained from using these keys. 
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provide ful l CA services, cryptlib can import and export certification requests, 
certificates, and CRL's in straight binary format,. This covers the majority of 
certificate and certificate transport formats used by a wide variety of software such as 
web browsers and servers. 
Key Database Interface 
cryptlib provides an interface to both native-format and external key collections. The 
cryptlib native format uses commercial-strength RDBMS*s to store keys in the 
internationally standardised X.509 format. The cryptlib key database integrates 
seamlessly into existing databases, for example an existing database containing user 
names and email addresses may be extended to become a public key database with a 
single cryptlib function call. Existing applications need not even be aware that their 
address list database has become a public-key database. 
cryptlib also supports external flat-file key collections such as PGP key rings and 
X.509 keys stored in disk files. The key collections may be freely mixed (so for 
example a private key could be stored in a disk file, a PGP keyring or on a smart card 
with the corresponding X.509 public key certificate being stored in an Oracle or SQL 
Server database). 
Cryptographic Random Number Management 
cryptlib contains an internal secure random data management system which provides 
the cryptographically strong random data used to generate session keys and 
public/private keys, in public-key encryption operations, and in various other areas 
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which require secure random data. The random data pool is updated with 
unpredictable process-specific information as well as system-wide data such as 
current disk I/O and paging statistics, network, SMB, L A N manager, and NFS traffic, 
packet filler statistics, multiprocessor statistics, process information, users, V M 
statistics, process statistics, open files, inodes, terminals, vector processors, streams, 
and loaded code, objects in the global heap, loaded modules, running threads, process, 
and tasks, and an equally large number of system performance-related statistics 
covering virtually every aspect of the operation of the system. The exact data 
collected depends on the hardware and operating system, but generally includes quite 
detailed operating statistics and information. In addition i f a /dev/random-style 
randomness driver (which continually accumulates random data from the system) is 
available, cryptlib wi l l use this is a source of randomness. 
Prototype - Hardware & Software 
The hardware platform used for the implementation consists of a PC with utilising 
Microsoft NT Server. The details of the hardware specification are as follows: 
Personal Computer: Omega - Cyrix PI66 
Processor: Cyrix PI66 133MH2 
RAM: 972801CB 
Hard Drive: 2 GB 
Network Card: SMC Ethernet Card 
Operating system: Microsoft NT Server 4.1; Service Pack 3 
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The platform was selected to accommodate the software packages (see below) that 
were required to build the demonstration software. The software packages used to 
implement the demonstration application were as follows: 
Middleware: lONA's Orbix 2.2c, 2.3c, 3.02 
Programming language: Microsoft Visual C-H- version 4.2, 5, 6 
Cryptography software: cryptlib version 2. lb 
Database Package Microsoft Access 
lONA 's Orbix was selected because, when the research began, it provided the most 
comprehensive set of tools and functions of any of the available middleware products 
available for the Microsoft NT platform [ i ] . Initially, Orbix version 2.2c, with 
Microsoft Visual C-H- Version 4.2 [ i i ] , was used but this was later upgraded to Orbix 
version 2.3c using Microsoft Visual C-H- version 5 and, finally, Orbix version 3.02 
and Microsoft Visual C-H- 6. Microsoft Foundation Classes (MFCs) [ i i i ] were 
available in Visual C-H- and were used to in building the user-interface of the 
demonstration software. The Microsoft Foundation Class Library (MFC) is an 
application framework for programming in Microsoft Windows and provides much of 
the code necessary for managing windows, menus, and dialog boxes; performing 
basic input/output; storing collections of data objects; and so on. 
cryptlib [iv] is a security toolkit which allows programmers to easily add encryption 
and authentication security services to their software, cryptlib provides a transparent 
and consistent interface to a number of widely-used security services and algorithms 
(see Appendix D), which are accessed through a straightforward, standardized 
interface with parameters such as the algorithm and key size being selectable by the 
user. 
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In relation to certificates, cryptlib implements fu l l X,509 support, including all 
version 3 extensions. Since cryptlib is itself capable of processing certification 
requests into certificates, it is also possible to use crypllib to provide fu l l CA services, 
cryptlib can import and export certification requests, certificates in straight binary 
format, and therefore covers the majority of certificate and certificate transport 
formats used by a wide variety of software, such as web browsers and servers, 
crypllib was chosen because it is freely available and provides an extensive set of 
encryption and certificate management functions for the Win 32 platform. 
Microsoft Access was the selected database package, used to store administrative 
data, because it utilises the widely supported Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) 
API, which provides the ability to write applications that are independent of any 
particular database management system (DBMS). Therefore, it is representative of a 
large section of the database worid. 
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Addressing security in an Integrated Service Engineering 
environment 
E.M.Joyce, S.M.Fumell, P.L.Reynolds and P.W.Sanders 
Network Research Group, School of Electronic, Communication and Electrical 
Engineering, 
University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom. 
Abstract 
This paper examines the requirements for security in the emerging area of 
Imegraied Service Engineering (ISE). The I S E field is currently characterised by 
two altemaiive architectures, TINA and OSA, and the structure for a generic 
service machine encompassing both approaches is discussed. A number of ISE-
specific security requirements are then identified and a conceptual solution is 
proposed based upon the Comprehensive Integrated Security System (CISS) 
architecture. This is shown to successfully map onto the suiicture of the I S E 
service machine. The paper is based upon ongoing research In this area which 
will lead to a practical implementation. 
Introduction 
Integrated Service Engineering (ISE) is an environment which handles the 
development, deployment and provision of services on a telecommunications 
infrastructure. This paper examines the issue from a security perspective, identifying 
the requirements involved in realising a secure system. 
The current state-of-the-art in the ISE field is characterised by two architectures, 
namely TINA (Telecommunications Information Networking Architecture) [1] and 
OSA (Open Service Architecture) [2,3]. In order to reap the benefits of both 
approaches, this discussion wil l introduce a generic service machine structure that has 
been produced by the merging of the two architectures. TTiis provides a platform 
upon which security can be implemented. 
As can be seen from figure 1, the service machine has a layered structure. The top 
layer is the telecommunication applications level, which is divided into different 
segments (or separations) - Management, Service and Resource. Management and 
Service are taken from the TINA structure. Management deals with all entities 
relating to the control of the managing systems and can be divided by the OSI 
functional separations for systems management (i.e. FCAPS - fault, configuration, 
accounting, performance and security). 
Service deals with all aspects of the service environment. It can be divided into 
Support and Session. Support is similar to the support services offered in OSA's 
service machine (i.e. trading service). Session deals with an actual service instance 
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and how it is completed. It takes on the TINA structure by sub-dividing into Access, 
Service and Communication. The service can then be viewed from the User or 
Provider perspective. 
The Resource segment is seen as an amalgamation of TINA's Element and Network 
Element segments. It handles control of all resources at any level. Its Adaptors handle 
the mapping of physical network Resources and logical network Elements, so that 
they can be used by a service. 
DTK 
KCCE 
Applications 
Management Service 
Support 
Savices 
Broker, 
etc. 
Session 
Resource 
Support 
Services 
Adaptora; 
D P E 
N C C E 
Hardware 
Fig 1: Generic Service Machine Structure 
Security requirements for ISE 
This section identifies a number of security considerations with specific relevance to 
the ISE environment. These are based upon issues identified by the OMG (Object 
Management Group) in respect of security for distributed objects [4]. 
Authentication: It is essential that system entities (e.g. users, services and 
components) can be identified and authenticated. Within ISE there are two possible 
scenarios. Firstly, the entity is identified and authenticated locally and, therefore, the 
validation can be trusted within the local domain. Alternatively, the entity may have 
been identified and authenticated by another node within the distributed system. In 
this case, the local security system still has to be able to validate the entity. A trusted 
third party (TTP) may be used here to issue a proof of authenticity that the local 
system can trust. 
Authorisation and Access Control: Each identifiable entity should have an 
associated set of privileges which wil l be used when it is looking to access some other 
entity or resource. A large scale system wil l require the use of groups to cut down 
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administration overheads. However, it is sometimes desirable lo have finer 
granularity, where privileges can be assigned to an individual entity to reduce the 
amount of damage any one entity can do. Therefore, the security system wi l l have to 
be able to cope with different levels of authorisation. Again two levels of operation 
may be useful, one within a local system, and one using T I P certification to allow 
access across different domains. 
Audit: System users must be able to be held accountable for their actions. As such, 
an audit trail should be maintained to record (selected) security-relevant events (e.g. 
data access, object activation etc.) associated with specific user identities. The log 
itself must be protected to prevent unauthorised modification. 
Propagation of Attributes: An entity may invoke some other entity enabling the 
latter to carry out operations on its behalf. In order to facilitate authorisation and 
access control, the initial entity should be able to delegate its privileges. However, it 
may wish to restrict these (e.g. to a specific time or a certain access level, such as read 
instead of read/update) and different domain security policies may pose some 
difficulty. Firstly trust wil l have be established between two domains. Secondly, the 
attributes from one domain may need to be mapped to authorised attributes in the 
other domain to provide validation for access control and auditing. 
Secure Communications: Distributed communications require protection to 
preserve confidentiality, as well as to guard against corruption, redirection or other 
forms of attack. It is, therefore, necessary to guarantee secure end-to-end 
communications encompassing integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. A 
facility should also be available to specify the quality of protection. This would allow 
an entity to specify whether a whole session, or a particular message, should be 
protected and to what level. 
Administration: Within the security system, identifiable entities need to be 
registered. The identities, their related privileges and other information (such as 
security groups/roles, access control lists) need to be maintained. Administrative 
operations should be restricted to valid entities, e.g. security administrators or parent 
entities who may register their child entity with the security system. It should be 
possible to split operations so that responsibility can be divided between different 
entities. This division could be either by function (where, say, a security auditor 
would be different from a security administrator) or by role (where service providers 
may have different functions available than do network providers). 
Inter-domain Operations: ISE is an open and distributed environment. It must 
provide for international country boundaries or, more importantly, interactions 
between different administrative domains, as has been highlighted in the previous 
sections. This means that security policies and administration within a local domain 
need to be preserved, but this has to co-exist with the preservation of inter-domain 
security. RM-ODP proposes the use of traders and TTPs for this purpose [5] . This 
allows federation to take place between domains, via the trader, while trust is 
guaranteed by the TTP. 
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The Comprehensive Integrated Security System 
Members of the research team have previously been involved in work relating to the 
design and development of the Comprehensive Integrated Security System (CISS) 
architecture - which facilitates a layered approach to security in an open distributed 
environments [6]. Given this legacy knowledge, it was deemed appropriate to 
consider CISS as an example platform upon which to demonstrate security in ISE. 
However, before examining this applicability in any detail, it is first necessary to 
provide some background information about CISS itself. The architecture supports 
local domain security, inter-domain security and incorporates modularity so that it can 
operate as an add-on service. It has five distinct layers, as depicted in figure 2 and 
described below. 
Uvel 5 
Uvel 4 
Uvel 3 
Uvel 2 
Uvel i 
Management 
/^^Afients & Protocois^^^ , 
• • 
Mechanisms 
Math Modules 
Fig 2 : CISS Layered Architecture 
Mathematical Modules are used to implement Security Mechanisms. They are the 
lowest level, as they cannot be functionally broken down into lower sub-components. 
Several modules can be combined to implement a security mechanism. 
Security Mechaaisms are used to implement Security Services. Examples of 
mechanisms are simple password or digital signatures for authentication; encryption 
for data confidentiality. 
Security Services are used by Security Agents. By combining different mechanisms, 
security services of varying efficiency and strength can be created to comply with a 
security policy. 
Security Agents and Protocols provide the necessary interaction between CISS 
administration and security services. There are ten in total, as described in table i 
below. 
356 
Appendix E: Papers 
Security Management deals with the support and control of secure operations. This 
includes: 
• management and control of data (e.g. mechanism parameters); 
• distribution of data (e.g. keys and security policy information); 
• monitoring, logging and recovery (e.g. to ensure a stable security 
state); 
• inter-domain management (e.g. exchange of security information to 
allow inter-domain communications). 
CISS Agent Function 
User Agent (UA) Interactions between operational/management users and CISS. 
Security 
Administrator Agent 
(SAA) 
Interaction with network management personnel and the 
security administrator, and agent for security policy controls 
by management. 
Security Services 
Agent (SSA) 
Provision, co-ordination and management of security services 
-the core of CISS. 
Security Mechanisms 
Agent (SMA) 
Provision, co-ordination and management of security 
mechanisms. 
SMIB Agent 
(SMIBA) 
Allows access to the SMIB, and performs all related 
operations on behalf of other CISS components. 
Agent for Operational 
Environment 
Interactions (OPENA) 
Interactions with the operational environment, primarily in the 
local environment. 
Association Agent 
(AA) 
Establishes and maintains security in the overall peer-entity 
associations. 
Inter-Domain 
Communications 
Agent (IDCA) 
Responsible for secure communications between 
heterogeneous security domains. 
Monitoring Agent 
(MA) 
Monitoring of all security relevant events, access to the 
security log and management of operations upon it. 
Recovery Agent (RA) Responsible for security violation detection and error 
recovery. 
Table 1 : CISS Agents 
Interactions with users and applications occurs via Application I*rogram Interfaces 
(APIs). 
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Mapping CISS to the ISE architecture 
It is now necessary to place a security architecture onto the generic service machine. 
It is not only the machine, but the security for the ISE environment that must also be 
considered. Therefore, the chosen solution for this problem is the apphcation of the 
CISS architecture. The reasons for this are outlined in table 2 below. 
Reason Detail 
Open and 
distributed 
CISS provides for an open and distributed environment which 
is a necessary requirement for ISE. It allows for local and 
inter-domain communications. 
Not service or 
mechanism specific 
The architecture allows selection from multiple mechanisms 
and services in order to enforce security, enabling it to adapt to 
local security policies. These mechanisms allow the important 
ISE services of authentication and access control to be 
enforced. 
Modular The use of APIs and modular structure allows CISS to be 
easily "added-on" to any system. 
Structure CISS provides separate security service and management 
structures. This division is seen as important in ODP 
environments. 
Meets general 
requirements 
CISS can provide for general security requirements in 
distributed heterogeneous^systems, e.g. scalability, 
consistency, interoperability, availability, regulatory 
requirements, usability, performance. 
Meets ISE security 
requirements 
CISS can provide the ISE-specific security requirements via 
the following agents : 
Identification & Authentication: SMIBA, SSA,SMA,UA 
Authorisation & Access Control: SMIBA, SSA,SMA,UA 
Propagation of Attributes: SMIBA, UA 
Secure Communication: OPENA, AA, IDCA 
Administration: SAA, SMIBA 
Inter-domain Operations: IDCA 
Table 2 : CISS in I S E 
The CISS functional structure is considered to be compatible with that of the service 
machine. This mapping is shown in figure 3 and briefly explained in table 3. 
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Fig. 3 : Functional Mapping between CISS and service machine 
Service 
Machine 
CISS Detail 
Management Layer I : Management There is a direct mapping between the 
Management layers in both CISS and the 
Service Machine. Both provide the 
support and control functionality 
necessary. 
Service Layer 2: Agents and 
Protocols; 
Layer 3: Services 
The service machine Service segment 
wil l map onto layers 2 and 3 in CISS as 
both are dealing with services, i.e. 
entities which have the ability to 
complete operations and are not just 
components). These provide the 
functionality of the service machine or 
security system. 
Resource Layer 4: Mechanisms; 
Layer 5: Math. Modules 
The Resource segment in the service 
machine maps onto layers 4 and 5. In 
both cases, these are the lower levels of 
the architectures. They are the 
components which are combined to 
produce the services required. 
Table 3 : Functional mapping between the service machine and CISS 
CISS Agents on a Service Machine 
Security agents provide the necessary interaction between CISS administration and 
security services. They are the core of the security architecture. It is therefore 
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necessary to see how they map onto the service machine structure. Figure 4 shows 
the suggested placement of each agent, with justification provided in table 4. 
Applications 
Management 
o 
o 
3 
Service 
5. 
f^B^i Support 
Services 
Broker, 
etc. 
Session 
1 ^ 
Resource 
Support 
Services 
DPE 
NCCE 
Hardware 
Fig. 4 : CISS agents in a service machine 
Adaptors 
C/S5 Agent Service 
Machine 
Area 
Detail 
User Agent (UA) Access The TINA model defines the Access area as a 
users ability to have flexible access to services 
[7]. It also defines a user agent which represents 
and acts on behalf of the user. It receives 
requests from users to establish or join service 
sessions. The CISS UA allows interactions 
between users and CISS. Therefore, it should be 
placed in the Access area. 
Security 
Administrator 
Agent (SAA) 
Security The Security area is responsible for the support 
and control of security services. However, this 
has not been fully defined in either OSA or 
TINA. The SAA provides interaction between 
network management personnel or the security 
administrator, and agents for security policy 
controls by management. Therefore, the SAA 
should be placed in the Security areas to allow 
the security administrator access. 
Security Services 
Agent (SSA) 
Support 
Services 
(Service 
Segment) 
The Support Services area of the service 
segment, wi l l provide any non-core services, i.e. 
those not required to actually provide the service 
session, but which can support it. The SSA deals 
with the provision, co-ordination and 
management of security services. Therefore, it 
wil l be involved in providing security when a 
service session is established or joined. 
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CISS Agent Service 
Machine 
Area 
Detail 
Security 
Mechanisms 
Agent (SMA) 
Support 
Services 
(Resource 
Segment) 
The Support Services area of the resource 
segment wi l l provide any supporting services 
required for resources, either software or 
hardware. The SMA deals with the provision, co-
ordination and management of security 
mechanisms. As security mechanisms are viewed 
as resources, the SMA should be located in the 
Support Services area of the resource segment. 
SMIB Agent 
(SMIBA) 
Security As previously stated, the Security area provides 
for the support and control of security functions 
and includes all security relevant data. In CISS, 
the SMIB is a central repository where all such 
security relevant data is maintained. The 
SMIBA allows access to the SMIB and performs 
all operations on behalf of other CISS 
components. Therefore, the SMIBA should be 
located in the Security area. 
Operational 
Environment 
Interactions 
Agent (OPENA) 
Connection The Connections area handles the 
communications connections associated with a 
service session, as described in TINA. The 
OPENA interacts with the operational 
environment to allow access to resources in a 
secure way. Therefore, the OPENA should be 
placed in the Connection area, to allow secure 
communications within the local environment. 
Association 
Agent (AA) 
Connection The AA establishes and maintains security in the 
overall peer-entity associations, i.e. it provides 
communication with other applications in the 
same domain. Therefore, it too should be placed 
in the Connection area to provide secure 
communications within the current security 
domain. 
Inter-Domain 
Communications 
Agent (IDCA) 
Connection The IDCA is responsible for secure 
communications between heterogeneous security 
domains, i.e. inter-domain communications. As 
the Connection agent deals with all 
communications, the IDCA should be placed 
there. 
Monitoring Agent 
(MA) 
Performance 
or Security 
The Performance area is responsible for 
monitoring and managing system performance. 
The M A monitors all security relevant events, 
provides access to the security log and manages 
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CISS Agent Service 
Machine 
Area 
Detail 
all operations on it. Therefore, aspects of the 
M A should be placed in the Performance area. 
However, the Security area is another possible 
location for this agent, as monitoring can also be 
considered a function of security (e.g. a service 
such as user or session supervision). 
Recovery Agent 
(RA) 
Fault The Fault area is responsible for detecting ertors 
and then managing the corresponding recovery 
mechanisms. The RA is responsible for all 
security violation detection and CISS error 
recovery. Therefore, the RA should be placed in 
the Fault area. 
Table 4 : CISS Agents in a service machine 
A Working Model Example 
The following example demonstrates how a security model should operate with a 
working service. The service is broken up into basic steps that a user would take. 
Each step is then subdivided into the activities executed by the service. The security 
services required are then listed under each of the appropriate service activities and 
related back to the requirements listed in section 2. The service example described is a 
user engaging in a document editing session with another party and is based upon a 
modified version of a TINA service example that is described in [7]. 
1. User A selects a terminal to give him access to the network. 
2. User A logs on to the network. This can be done using one of several 
mechanisms, but for this example an identifier and password are used (a 
smartcard would be another possible mechanism), 
(a) The ID and password are taken by the security service to authenticate the user. 
An information base wil l be referenced to check that the ID exists and that the 
password is valid. Trading may be required i f the ID cannot be found 
locally, as wil l a TTP i f the ID is in a different security policy domain. 
User A's privileges wi l l be returned to a local information base i f they are not 
held locally. This wi l l help performance. 
Relates to: Identification and Authentication, Administration (to maintain the 
information base), Inter-domain (access user information in 
another domain, i f necessary) 
(b) User A's user agent is now associated with a terminal agent. 
User A's privileges wil l be checked to ensure he is permitted to use the 
lenninal he is currently logging onto. Once validated the user agent and 
terminal agent are associated. 
User A*s privilege's are propagated to his user agent. 
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The log-on is logged by the security service. 
Relates to: Administration, Authorisation and Access Control, Propagation of 
Attributes, Audit 
3, User A is presented with a menu of capabilities at his terminal, 
(a) The security service checks User A's privileges to see what capabilities he can 
access. 
The security service checks User A's privileges. A list of valid options are 
created. 
Security service may need to validate that the terminal can access these 
capabilities also, by validating the terminal agents privileges. 
Relates to: Administration, Authorisation and Access Control 
(b) The security service sends a list of the valid options to the terminal agent. 
(c) Terminal agent presents a menu on the terminal. 
4, User A selects an option for document editing. 
(a) A request is passed to the user agent to establish a document editing service 
session. 
(b) The user agent creates, via the factory in the DPE, a service session manager 
(SSM). 
The factory wil l be checked by the security service to ensure it has the 
capabilities to create such a service, and that it can do so for the specified 
user. User A. Again an information base, holding the factory capabilities 
wil l need to be tested and checked against User A*s privileges. 
Relates to: Administration, Authorisation and Access Control 
(c) User A is joined to the session by creating a user agent 
The event is logged. 
Relates to: Audit 
5. User A selects a document to be opened. 
(a) The user agent sends a request to open a document to the SSM. 
The security service checks that User A has access to the specified document 
and with the correct access type (e.g. read/write). 
The security service locates the document, a trader may be necessary, and 
checks that document can be accessed. 
The security service notifies the SSM that the request has been validated. 
Relates to: Administration, Authorisation and Access Control 
(b) The SSM opens the document in the session, by notifying the user agent and 
connecting the document resource agent. 
The event is logged. 
Relates to: Audit 
6. User A requests that User B is added to the session, 
(a) User agent sends the request to the SSM. 
(b) SSM locates User B using the specified ID. A trader and TTP may be required to 
locate User B. 
The security service locates User B and identifies and authenticates him. 
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The security service accesses User B's privileges. This may be in a remote 
information base via a remote security service. 
The security service then checks that User A and User B can join in a session 
together. 
Once validated, security service notifies the SSM. 
Relates to: Identification and Authentication, Administration, Inter-domain, 
Authorisation and Access Control. 
(c) User B's user agent alerts the appropriate terminal agent of the incoming request. 
(d) User B's terminal agent then alters the terminal by presenting a window on the 
terminal. 
(e) User B accepts the request. 
(f) The response is sent to the SSM. 
User B is the validated to ensure he has access to the opened document. 
Relates to: Authorisation and Access Control. 
(g) SSM creates a user session for User B. 
User B's privileges are propagated to his user agent. 
The event is logged. 
Relates to: Propagation of Attributes, Audit 
7. User A requests SSM to set-up a video conference connection with User B, 
(a) User A's user agent requests SSM to establish video conference connection with 
User B. 
(b) SSM requests the connection service manager (CSM) to establish a stream 
between the end-user applications on the two terminals. 
The security services wil l validate that both User A and User B, and their 
terminals, have the appropriate capabilities. 
The security service wil l validate that the CSM has access to the appropriate 
resources to establish the stream. 
Relates to: Authorisation and Access Control 
(c) CSM establishes a stream between the users and sends a response to the SSM. 
The stream needs to be secured. 
Relates to: Secure Communications 
(d) The SSM sends a response to User A. 
The event is logged. 
Relates to: Audit 
This example shows how a security model would operate i f all validations were 
successful. However, i f one failed, then the request would be denied, the appropriate 
response sent to the requesting agent and the event then logged. Depending on the 
severity of the violation, other measures may have to be taken, such as the security 
administrator being alerted. However, the precise actions wil l depend on the domain 
security policy. 
Conclusion 
Integrated Service Engineering is a relatively new term which has only come to 
prominence in the last few years. It considers the problem of service development, 
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deployment and provision in the heterogeneous telecommunications environment 
today. Security, on the other hand, is a much older school, with well developed 
mechanisms and theories. However these are continuously scrutinised and modified 
to deal with the new problems posed in a computerised/technological world. The 
paper has considered how they may be applied to the specific issue of ISE. 
The CISS architecture is shown to be a complete security solution for distributed 
networks. However, it also adheres to the requirements specified for ISE in supporting 
local security, inter-domain security and providing a modular service that can be 
integrated into any system compatible with the ISE architecture. Further practical 
work is ongoing in this area and wi l l lead to the development of a demonstrator 
system in due course. 
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CORBA Middleware services - are they secure? 
E.M.Joyce, S.M.Fumell, P.L.Reynolds and P.W.Sanders 
Network Research Group, School of Electronic, Communication and Elecu-ical Engineering, 
University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom. 
1. Introduction 
Distributed object systems are used everywhere - the Internet, telecommunications, 
banking... the list goes on. But securing such systems is not a simple task. For 
instance consider one of today's middleware choices, the Object Management 
Group's (0N4G) Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) is such a 
technology. Although there is a security solution, this paper wil l show that it has not 
addressed all the possible security threats. 
In CORBA, a client is an entity that wishes to invoke an operation on a target object 
via the Object Request Broker (ORB). The object implementation comprises the code 
and data that realise the target object's behaviour. The ORB receives a request and 
then locates an appropriate object implementation, and transmits the request data and 
results between the client and the target object. There is also a set of supporting 
services that are used to extend the ORB functionality, and without which a 
standardised distributed solution would not be possible. It is the security of these 
services that this paper wil l focus on. 
According to the International Standards Organization (ISO), security should be 
provided in a modular format [1]. This architecture divides system management into , 
functional units, FCAPS - the 'S' being the security module. A system should be able 
to function independent of the security service, and when the security module is 
introduced the same system should now operate in a functionally similar but secured 
fashion. This type of thinking is practical in a centralized system, such as a 
mainframe, where the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [2] is contained within a single 
system. The security service can monitor all requests and provide the required 
security functionality. However, distributed systems are more complex. Distributed 
objects introduce complications and the TCB is no longer contained in a single system 
and may need to operate across multiple systems and security domains. This results in 
an extended set of security requirement for a distributed processing environment 
(DPE) such as CORBA, and therefore the modular solution may be inadequate. 
7,1 Security Issues for Supporting Services in a DPE 
CORBA currently consists of an ORB and 15 CORBAservices [3]. Each services is 
implemented by a number of object, the interfaces of which are defined in Interface 
Definition Language (IDL). Currently security is implemented by applying the 
security rules to these service objects. This means that access can be granted to a 
client, when requesting use of a CORBAservice object, i f the client possesses the 
appropriate privilege attributes. However, even looking at an overview of the services 
some security issues become apparent. They are outlined below: 
• Persistence State Service (PSS): The PSS stores components persistently on 
a variety of storage servers. Although access to the persistent storage objects 
are controlled, the store data is not secured - the security service has no 
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control over this; it would be an implementation level detail, i.e. i f the data 
was stored in a database, the implementer would enable database security. 
• Naming Service: The Naming Service (NS) locates components by name. 
Once an object can access the NS, it can access all names in the service, as 
there are no security restrictions. Also NSs can be federated, i.e. two naming 
services are linked together to operate like a single service. I f the federation 
exists across different security domains the client is unaware that he is 
crossing a domain boundary and security controls could be by-passed 
• Event Service: This service allows "consumers" to register/unregister interest 
in specific events. The "suppliers" then generate information about this event 
and send it to the consumers via an event channel. It is a basic 
publish/subscribe or notification service. Security has not been defined for the 
event channels, i.e. access control is not available for specific events on a 
single channel, and there is no indication whether the channel requires 
encryption. Also the event service demands a certain amount of Quality of 
Service (QoS), i.e. guaranteed delivery, persistence of event data in the event 
of an event channel failure and use of logging facility. I f the event channel 
was subject to encryption then the supporting QoS mechanisms, would also 
need to ensure security, e.g. the persisted data would have to be protected. 
• Query Service: This allows a client to use query operations for attributes 
associated with objects, in much the same way SQL can be used to query a 
database of records by querying the fields in the records. It provides for 
asynchronous query, so that the query can be issued and the client does not 
have to block while waiting for a response. No security precautions have been 
added and so there is no way to identify what attributes a client can perform 
queries on, e.g. does the client have the security clearance to query a payroll 
attribute on an employee database. Another problem is Denial of Service, e.g. 
a rogue client can flood the query service with too many asynchronous or long 
running synchronous queries thereby causing the services to halt or crash. 
• Trader Service: Similar in function to the NS, the Trader allows an importer 
to locate an object, published by an exporter, but this time is does so by 
identifying a set of required properties, e.g. like the Yellow Pages. A security 
problem could arise i f some of the services offered by the trader require higher 
security clearance than others; there is no way of controlling access to 
particular offers in a single Trader. 
Obviously there are security issues that exist in CORBAservices that are not handled 
currently by CORBA Security Service (CORBASec). The above descriptions are just 
high-level overviews of such problems, but the problem demands further detailed 
investigation. Therefore a single service was selected and examined in detail. 
1.2 Selecting a CORBAservice 
A Trader facilitates the dynamic offering and discovery of service instances of 
particular types within a distributed environment. As such, it allows clients to 
advertise their available services and to also match their needs against other 
advertised services. 
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Traders have an important role to play in future Internet and telecommunications 
networks. It can perform its basic 'yellow pages' function in the world of e-commerce 
by providing access to internet services, e.g. a financial Trader may provide lists of 
financial services that a user may wish to buy over the Internet, everything from car 
loans to share brokerage services. The user can decide which Trader to advertise its 
services in, and which Trader to import services from. The Traders can be structured 
to provide a greater degree of choice, e.g. a financial services Trader, may be linked 
to a car loans Trader and a stock brokerage Trader (and many other such traders) as 
opposed to having the services registered directly in its own registry. 
Resnick [4] suggested that the Trader could be used to standardise World Wide Web 
(WWW) facilities. There are a dizzying array of choice of search engines, web 
crawlers and white pages such as Yahoo, HotBot, and Alta Vista. However, these 
facilities, especially the search engines, lack a programmatic interface and differ not 
just in implementation but also in how they are accessed, how predicates are formed 
and how Uniform Resource Lx)cators (URLs) are registered. Therefore a synergy 
between the CORBA Trader and the Internet facilities would offer a solution. Search 
engines would benefit from a standardised programmatic API, represented in CORBA 
IDL. 
It is also important to remember that CORBA is not just for Internet use. It is 
designed to work on any heterogeneous distributed object environment. Therefore 
some other possible uses of the Trader have been suggested by the Distributed 
Systems Technology Centre (DSTC) research group in University of Canberra, 
Australia [5]: 
• real-time trading, e.g. dynamic configuration of services within 
telecommunications switches (combining bandwidth from local and trunk 
carriers to provide an end-to-end service); 
• large scale trading, e.g. using trading to access network elements from 
network management applications for a national telephone system. 
2. The need for Security 
After the publicity and damage caused by viruses and such as the "Love Bug" [6] and 
numerous hacker attacks, business are taking security seriously. Businesses have 
suffered huge losses as a result of cybercrime. On 8 December 2000, a hacker stole 
55,000 credit card numbers from CreditCard.cbm, and when the company refused to 
pay any money for extortion, the hacker posted the numbers on a web-site [7], 
According to the 5^*^  annual "Computer Crime and Security Survey", conducted by the 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, such 
cyber-crimes are widespread, diverse in nature and on the increase [8]. 90% of survey 
respondents reported computer security breaches within the last year; 74% suffered 
financial loss as a result of security breaches and of the 42% (i.e. 273 respondents) 
who were willing to quantify those losses, the financial lose was estimated to be 
$265,589,940. 
Security for any distributed system uses five basic and partially overiapping services 
as specified by the International Standards Organisation (ISO): 
• Authentication: The security service should be able to guarantee that the 
user/resource is actually who/what it claims to be. One type of threat is known 
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as a masquerade; that is when an entity successfully pretends to be some 
other legal entity and thereby gains illegal access to a resource. 
Access control: Protects resources from unauthorised use. It can be used on 
various assets, e.g., communications, data. It provides for the various types of 
access to a resource, e.g. read, write, update, or execution; 
Conndentiality: Confidentiality means being able to guarantee the privacy 
and secrecy of a resource such as a data file containing personnel details. 
Apart from unauthorised access to a resource, the loss of anonymity or the 
misappropriation of messages or data records can be considered breaches o f 
security; 
Integrity: Integrity of resources ensures that they are always available and 
correct, no matter what corruption attempts have been made. Therefore any 
integrity services must guard against any threats involving illegal 
asset/resource modification; 
Non-repudiation: Repudiation is the denial of an action by an entity, e.g. a 
user may deny sending or receiving a message. Non-repudiation forces an 
entity to own up to its participation in some action. Denial of origin, 
transmission, receipt or participation are all repudiation threats. 
By applying these concepts, a system can be made secure. However to implement 
security, these concepts must be realised. Security mechanisms, or methodologies, 
must be used to actually implement these security services, e.g. cryptography, digital 
signatures, access control lists. The ISO also defines a security policy as a set of 
criteria for provision of security services. It defines what is and what is not permitted 
in the area of security during general operation of a secured system. It must be 
implemented by taking the appropriate security measures. However, no security 
measures, no matter how ingenious they may be, wi l l be effective unless the user 
understands what needs to be protected and can determine what mechanisms are used, 
i.e. what the policy is. Security needs a complete and usable administration system 
that wi l l allow users to maintain and operate security on a day-to-day basis. 
It is clear that the intense interest in security in web-based [9] and other distributed 
systems security [10,11] means that Traders wi l l have to incorporate security i f they 
are to be included in this future. Even though Traders can make use of CORBASec to 
counteract threats, there are still some security holes. These Trader-Security issues are 
addressed below, after describing how CORBASec and the Trader operate. 
2,1 CORBA Security Service 
CORBASec provides a framework for distributed object security. There are two levels 
of security. Level 1 provides protection for applications that are "unaware" of 
security, by transparently calling security functions on object invocation. Level 2 
security provides more facilities and allows applications themselves to control the 
security provided, i.e. security-aware applications. 
CORBASec currently supports certain levels of authentication, access control, 
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. Another feature of CORBA security is 
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the use of credential delegation between objects. It allows credentials to be 
propagated along an object request chain. 
Security is implemented by a number of objects, as shown in figure I below. Apart 
from the specific security interfaces, CORBA makes use of two objects. Current and 
Credentials. Current, a pseudo-object initially used by the transaction service to 
propagate transaction context, it is now adopted by security to propagate the security 
context. It does so by holding a reference to Credentials. Once a user is authenticated, 
a Credentials object is created. It holds information such as roles, privileges and an 
authenticated ID. 
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Figure 1 : CORBA Security Service 
3. Traders 
The OMG / CORBA Trader [ 1 2 | provides the ability to match a service request, 
against a list of supported services provided by potential servers, as illustrated in 
figure 2. The exporter wi l l advertise its available services, by notifying the Trader. 
The Trader keeps a Registry of such advertisements. An importer makes a request on 
the Trader for a particular service, specifying any conditions that need to be met. The 
Trader checks its RegisOy to find a matching service type, with corresponding 
conditions. The Trader then notifies the importer of the exporter and the service. 
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Figure 2 : Trader Interactions 
I f a Trader cannot find a matching service, it wi l l then pass the request onto another 
linked (or federated) Trader. The linked Trader can then check its Registry to see i f it 
can match the original request. Therefore trading allows an importer access to 
multiple Trading domains. The second Trading data store is the Service Type 
Repository. It stores, retrieves, manages and names service types" that are used in the 
Registry. Importers^ Exporters and the Traders are all part of the Trading Community, 
i.e. all objects that interact to import/export services. 
Each Trader also has Attributes. These define a Trader's characteristics, e.g. policies 
for scoping the extent of a search. 
4. Security issues related to Trading & Traders 
Traders, in a distributed environment like the Internet, are open to attack, just like any 
part of a distributed system. The following outlines the areas most vulnerable to 
security breaches and the security services that must be used to counteract them. 
4.1 Authentication 
Traders receive requests for imports/exports from members of the trading community. 
Like any system resource, they are susceptible to masquerade. Authentication is the 
service required to deal with this threat. It is a two-way process; traders, as well as 
importers and exporters should be identifiable and authenticatable. One possible way 
of achieving this is the use of certification by Trusted Third Parties (TTP). The ISO's 
X.509 [13], an authentication framework using public-key certificates, could be used. 
It is a hierarchy of Certification Authorities (CA) which issue signed certificates^. 
Authentication is accomplished through the presentation of a certificate signed by a 
trusted CA. 
4.2 Access Control 
^ Service Types are associated with a traded service and are used lo describe the service. They comprise 
an interface type and zero or more named property types 17]. 
^ A Signed Public-Key Certificate is someone's public key, signed by a trustworthy party. X.509 
specifies a structure for pubic-key certificates that includes the users unique name, a version number, 
algorithm identifier, issuer's name, validity period, etc. 
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Access Control needs to be handled at two levels. Firstly, access control of the Trader 
itself should be considered, i.e. who has access to the Trader. Secondly, access control 
of service offers must be dealt with, i.e. which service offers an importer can see. 
Unauthorised Trader Access 
Traders should have security attributes. Two trading community objects, e.g. Trader 
and exporter, have access to the security domain Access Control Manager - in 
CORBA this would be the AccessDecision object. Therefore, AccessDecision can 
make decisions relating to who can have access to which Trader, using the domain's 
access control mechanisms and working in accordance with the access control 
policies. 
Unauthorised Service Offer Access 
Even i f an importer has access to a Trader it may not have access to all the service 
offers the Trader holds. Some of the service offers may be of a higher security 
classification. Therefore, a Trader wi l l have to hold an associated security attribute 
with each service offer held in the Registry. 
Current Access Control Limitations 
Although access control of the Trader can currently be handled by CORBA's 
AccessDecision object, the access control of the service offers within the Registry 
cannot. It would require the storage of a security attribute in the Registry itself. The 
reason for this is that such an attribute would be used to sort and make selections 
when providing service offer lists to importers. This problem is also linked to 
Delegation, as the security attribute would have to be set and would probably be 
delegated from the exporter, e.g. use the exporter's security level. 
4.2 Integrity and Confidentiality 
Integrity and confidentiality of data, stored or in transit, must be guaranteed in a 
distributed system; this has to include trading-related data. 
Stored Data 
Details of service offers, including an object reference, are stored in the Registry. 
Therefore it must be protected, as an intruder may try to gain unauthorised access to a 
service, by gaining illegal access to the object. Similariy details of the Service Type 
held in the Repository, should be protected to ensure that intruders do not have 
knowledge of "how'* to use the service type, i.e. interface details, parameters, etc. 
It is not wise to assume that the Trader's backend data, i.e. the data stored in the 
Registry and Repository, is hidden behind object interfaces and, therefore, is not as 
vulnerable to attack as object references that are exported through the interface. 
Intruders do not always use legitimate access mechanisms and, therefore, the 
'backdoor' entry must be considered. Such data wil l usually be held in persistent 
storage, such as a database, or flat file. Therefore the Trader, i f operating as a 
security-aware service, should be able to guarantee that the data is secure, even when 
it is in storage. Cryptographic mechanisms are used to ensure that the confidentiality 
and integrity of the data is preserved. 
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However, these types of solutions are product dependent and so the only way to 
ensure a truly generic solution would be to use the Persistent State Service** (PSS) in a 
secure fashion. 
Inter-Community Communications 
Since a Trader is operating in a distributed environment, this provides an intruder with 
ample access to intercept any communications between members of a trading 
community. From such interceptions, one may be able to re-constnici 
Registry/Repository information. In addition, replay attacks have to be considered. 
Al l communications between trading community members should be encrypted to 
ensure the confidentiality of any intercepted messages. Another form of 
communications security is a digital signature. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
[14] uses a public key to verify to a recipient the integrity of data and the identity of 
the sender of the data. The DSS can also be used by a third party to ascertain the 
authenticity of a signature and its associated data. Finally replay attacks can be dealt 
with by using sequencing data. 
Use could again be made here of security-aware CORBAservices. In this case it 
would also be necessary for the Query service^ to be security-aware. This would allow 
the Trader or other trading community members to interrogate the 
Registry/Repository, in a secure manner. 
Current Integrity and Confidentiality Limitations 
Securing trader data, such as that held in the Registry and Repository, needs to be 
addressed. Currently these databases are not encrypted. Also trading community 
communications should be secured. The level of security would depend on the objects 
involved and their security level, as well as the level of the service offers being 
exported/imported. 
4.3 Non-Repudiation 
The trading community is made up of distributed objects, which are less predictable, 
due to their flexible and granular nature. There are two problems. Firstly, i f the 
intruder is an authorised user, or is successfully masquerading as an authorised user, 
how can their actions be discovered? For example, an intruder can masquerade as an 
importer, and query Traders to find useful service offers. The processing of a 
monitoring database may help, by providing clues to an intruder's activities. 
Secondly, i f adhoc interactions are taking place, how can it be proven that a specific 
interaction took place, i f one party wishes to deny the event, i.e. accountability? 
Irrefutable evidence is required, i.e. a non-repudiation service. 
Monitoring 
Al l security related events should be monitored. These events are defined by the 
security policy. Apart from notifying an administrator, via an alarm, that an illegal 
action has be taken, monitoring could also provide clues to a previously unknown 
* The Persistent State Service provides a single interface for storing components persistently on a 
variety of storage servers - including object databases, relational databases and flat files. 
* The Query service provides query operations for objects. It is a superset of SQL. 
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intruder, e.g. an importer making multiple unauthorised import requests on several 
Traders. However this requires data filtering to find trends that can be used to raise a 
system administrator's suspicions, i.e. intrusion detection. 
Irrefutable Evidence 
Non-repudiation is used to provide irrefutable evidence that certain events took place. 
For example, digital signatures can be used with audit logs to record events. Just as 
other system resources are subject to a non-repudiation policy, so too are all the 
trading community members. 
Current Non-Repudiation Limitations 
There are two issues relating to non-repudiation. Firstly, the current CORBASec non-
repudiation service is not complete. It deals with evidence generation and verification, 
but does not address delivery and evidence storage. Secondly, non-repudiation is 
considered to be an optional service. It is available, but only to security-aware 
applications. It should be made available to security-unaware applications. 
5< Modifications required for Security-Aware Traders 
Both the Trader and the Security Service require modification i f they are to provide a 
Security-Aware Trader. 
5.7 Security-Aware Trader Attributes 
Attributes are already used in the Trader specification to provide a framework for 
describing the behaviour of any OMG Trader. It is proposed that Security Attributes 
be added for use by the Trader. They wil l control the security behaviour of a Trader, 
by specifying which security services the Trader uses, i.e. just how security-aware the 
Trader is. The suggested security attributes are defined in Table 1 below. 
Security Policy-Attributes Flags use of following function 
Security-aware Al l other policies are checked as the Trader is using 
security (at some level) 
Access_controLtrader Includes Trader in ACL and uses authentication with 
trading community members, etc. 
Access_control 
_service_offers 
Provides access control on the service offers listed in a 
query 
Encrypt_siores Encrypts Registry and Repository 
Encrypl_comms Encrypts communications 
Integrity_check_stores Integrity checks Registry and Repository 
Integrity_check_comms Integrity checks conmunications 
NR trade Non-repudiation of Trading related events 
Audit trade Audit Trading related events 
Table 1 : Trader Security Attributes 
For example, a Trader could be a Public Trader. This means that everyone would 
have access to it and it would have no security applied, i.e. the Security-aware 
attribute would be set to off , indicating that all other attributes were also turned off. 
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Alternatively a Trader may be a Secured Trader. It would be Security-aware and 
have all other attributes turned on, i.e. it would use all the available security services. 
Another option is to make a Trader a Security-Aware Trader. In this case the 
security-aware attribute would be on, and some of the other attributes would be on, 
e.g.. Encrypt_stores and lnterity_check_stores, but not NRjrader or Aud\t_trader, 
thereby providing a specified level of security. 
5.2 Security-Aware Trader Data Structures 
The two Trader data structures are the Repository and the Registry. The Repository 
should not have to be modified, as it wi l l hold the security attributes in the same 
manner as it currently holds any other properties. 
The Registry wi l l not have to be modified either. It holds details of the instances of 
service offers. This includes the service type, an object reference and a set of 
properties held as name-value pairs. A new security property that defines the security 
level of a service offer wil l now be held in the Registry so that access controls can be 
applied to the offer. The exporter wi l l specify the security level. 
5.3 Security-Aware Trader Interfaces 
There are eight interfaces defined for a CORBA Trader. However only one of these 
interfaces should have to be modified, namely the Admin interface. The Admin 
interface allows the administrator to configure the Trader, by using Set methods on 
the Trader's Attributes, These methods wil l now have to deal with the additional 
security attributes specified in table I above, to control the Trader's security 
behaviour. I f Security-aware is set to on, then at least one other security attribute must 
be set to on also; otherwise an error wi l l be relumed on the Se/ method. I f Security-
aware is set to off , then all other security attributes must also be set to off; otherwise 
an error wi l l be returned on the method. 
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5.4 An Enhanced CORBA Security Sen/ice \ 
The CORBA security service is itself incomplete. There are certain facilities missing 
or incomplete. Firstly non-repudiation is only supports evidence generation and 
verification. It does not deal with delivery, storage or adjudication issues. Secondly, 
the audit facility is a simple one and does not address the needs of today's Intrusion 
Detection Systems. Thirdly, Secure Interoperability is also limited between security 
domains. Both domains must possess the same mechanisms and policies. Such 
limitations would mean that i f two federated traders existed in different security 
domains, they may not be able to communicated i f they have to do so securely. 
Finally, security administration is another problem area. Most ORB security product 
vendors promote the fact that they have gone beyond the CORBA Level 2 
specification and provide administration services, but sure security administration 
should be part of the overall standards to allow integration between products. By 
enhancing CORBASec to make these facilities available, it would provide better 
security for ORB operations. However, this is a complete topic in itself and outside 
the scope of this paper. 
5.5 Security-Aware CORBAservice 
As was mentioned earlier, i f other CORBAservices were secured then a more generic 
security solution could be applied. I f services such as the PSS, Query and Collection 
services were security-aware they would able to guarantee security of the data they 
were accessing. Then other CORBAservices, such as the Trader, could make use of 
them. For example, i f the PSS was secure, the Trader could use it to access its 
Registry and Repository. 
5.5 Modification Summary 
Figure 3 (based on the OMG Trader), summarises the modifications that have to be 
made to the CORBA Trader to create a Security-aware Trader. The modifications are 
as follows: 
1. New Trader Security Attributes; 
2. New Registry Security Property; 
3. Modified Admin interface; 
4. Use of the Enhanced Security Service (including Enhanced Secure 
Interoperability Service); 
5. Use of security-aware CORBAservices 
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Figure3: Modifications to create a Security-aware Trader 
6. Conclusion 
In a distributed object system such as the Internet, services could be built using 
objects. Therefore finding the objects required, local or remote, is pivotal to the 
success of such an environment. A Trader can do this. However, the Trader provides a 
very vulnerable.point for attack, providing an intruder with access to a multitude of 
services. Therefore it should be made security-aware. It should be able to ensure that 
only authorised clients can access it, and that clients can only view the service offers 
which they are authorised to see. To provide a Security-Aware Trader, modifications 
have to be made to the CORBA Trader and Security services. 
However the Trader was only a detailed example given in this paper, to act as a proof 
of concept. But other CORBAservices need to be secured, and be part of the TCB, i f 
the OMG is to provide a secure environment, where security administration does not 
become fragmented and therefore impossible to manage. The bottom line is that 
security cannot be completely treated as an "add-on" facility. Within CORBA, each 
CORBAservice has to be "aware" of security and able to interact with comprehensive 
security service. 
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Appendix F - Letters 
This appendix present letters of support for the research. The letters are f rom: 
1. Declan O'Sullivan, who acted as an industrial supervisor, f rom l O N A 
Technologies. 
2. Orange 
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UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN 
Fax: 353 1 6772204 I Department of Computer Science 
Tel: 353 1 6081765 f l ^ m ^ School of Engineering 
Telex: 93782 TCD EI \ ^ ^ g ^ j Trinity CpIIege 
Dublin 2 
Declan O'Sullivan 
Lecturer 
Computer Science Department 
Trinity College Dublin 
E>ublin2 
Ireland 
Prof Paul Reynolds 
Orange P C S 
Bradley Stoke 
Bristol 
BS32 4 Q J 
UK 
With Reference to thesis of Elizabeth Joyce 
Dear Paul. 
Thank you for forwarding on Elizabeth's thesis for review. It was a pleasure to act as 
Elizabeth's industrial supervisor in lONA Technologies. 
This research is a significant and pragmatic contribution to the area of security and 
distributed systems. As Elizabeth has quite rightly highlighted, security has been too 
often been an aAer thought in system design, and this deficiency is all too painiully 
being increasingly exposed in value added telecom and internet services. 
The framewoilc proposed is impressive, especially since it proposes solutions to a 
wide set of separate but interlinked problems, namely security components for DPE; 
security interoperability components; and security aware DPE serviced. On this later 
point, the choice of Trader for analysis is I believe particularly welcomed, especially 
given the emergence of Trader-like services in the wider web services community 
(e.g. UDDI) which is gathering momentum. 
Overall the research has demonstrated in my opinion: a thorough analysis of the 
problems faced by the DPE community; design and proposal of an innovative 
framework solution; and a pragmatic approach to proof of concept; leading to a step 
forward in the state of the art with respect to CORBA. TINA and DPE security. 
Yours sincerely, 
DecftrfO'Sullivan 
orange 
OTMI Part Read 
Dr Stephen Fumell AimontotMyp«t 
University of Plymouth ^ 
Drake Circus « « . B S 3 2 4 a i 
Plymouth Phon .oi454««oQ 
F u 01464 618S0t 
Wib Sto: www.arano*^uk 
Monday 10 December 2001 
Dear Stephen, 
Reference Security Service for CORBA 
Orange has been experimenting with the use of distributed processing environments 
for some five years; starting in applications we are currently investigating its use in the 
transport layer. 
It is clear that before CORBA can be used in eamest two things must happen; one it 
needs to more scalable, and two, it needs to be more secure. It is the latter that 
caused us to be invoh/ed with Elizabeth Joyce's research. 
Whilst Elizabeth has focused upon the development of a generic security service she 
spend a significant amount of time to understand our, i.e. the mobile operator 
communities, requirements. She has used these requirements to validate the 
applicability of her research. Indeed, we are impressed enough with the results she 
has achieved that we intend to continue the experimentation work within our 
laboratories. 
Orange has been pleased to be associated with her research which we believe has 
contributed to the State of the Art in security for distributed systems. 
Yours sincerely. 
Paul Reynolds 
